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EU inter-coordination and strategic autonomy are key to Euro semiconductor stability---only domestic capacities and geopolitical leverage provide resilience against competition and shocks.

Poitiers 21, Research Fellow for Bruegel, Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona, a M.Sc. in economics from the Universität Bonn, and a B.Sc. from Universität Mannheim. (Niclas, “Digital European Economic Sovereignty? The Case of Semiconductors” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf) //CHC-DS ‍

2.1 The Global Semiconductor Industry in a Geopolitical Storm The US-China conflict is often portrayed as a ’technological cold war’5 , where leadership in new technologies is key to obtaining or retaining economic supremacy. The EU, while being at the forefront of digital regulation, all the while harnessing the ‘Brussels effect’6 , relies on both the US and China for many digital goods and services. This leaves the EU caught in between the US-China rivalry. The highly specialised and globalised Informatics and Communication Technologies (ICT) industry and its core technology – semiconductors – is an interesting case study. Semiconductors are one of the most strategically important sectors of the modern economy. They have a wide range of use – from memory chips over sensors to processors – and are essential parts of the value chains in many industries. Semiconductors are embedded in all types of modern goods, from manufacturing machinery, computers and smartphones, 5G transmitters, medical equipment, cars to everyday household appliances. ICT goods are the most important Chinese export good. In 2019, they account for over 27% of Chinese total exports and 96% of high-tech exports from China to the US.7 Telecommunications equipment account for over 30% of EU imports from China. 8 However, for the most crucial input to these ICT goods – semiconductors – China is dependent on foreign inputs. As a result, semiconductors have become China’s single largest import, surpassing even oil (see Figure 1). China’s foreign dependency in its biggest industry has made semiconductors a critical target for US trade policy and sanctions. Semiconductors and related equipment account for a quarter of the US exports subject to the Phase I trade agreement9 , and the technology is used for targeted sanctions against Chinese companies10. Unsurprisingly, the development of ‘home-grown’ semiconductors is an important goal of Chinese industrial policy11. For such high-end products, know-how and production capacities are highly specialised but they are also integrated at the global level12. A few countries are home to cutting-edge semiconductor production capacities: the US, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Europe and increasingly, China. But to date, no country has achieved self-sufficiency in the sector13. In fact, according to one study14, the semiconductor value chain is made up of three steps along which high coordination between firms is required: 1) design; 2) fabrication; and 3) assembly (see Figure 2). Some firms, Integrated Design Manufacturers (IDM), do the first two steps and represent about half of the overall semiconductor market. The below analysis focuses on firms that only provide one production step15. The design phase specifies the physical architecture of the semiconductor by laying its functions and the electronic components that will be needed for production. The US is by far the leader in design with firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia and AMD, but it is followed by Taiwan with Mediatek, Novatek and Realtek. However, Chinese market shares are increasing fast16 and Chinese firms such as Unigroup and Huawei subsidiary HiSilicon are important in this regard. Semiconductor designs rely on specific software for which the market is highly concentrated around three US-based firms – Cadence, Synopsy, Mentor –, and it is on this part of the value chain that US sanctions were most effective in blocking Huawei HiSilicon productions.

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The second production step – fabrication - is highly technical and the most capital-intensive and $ billions worth of upfront investments would be needed to catch-up to market leaders.17 Fabrication is concentrated around a few global players, with market leaders being Taiwan’s TSMC and Korea’s Samsung. The third and last step – assembly - is comparatively labour intensive and reaps lower profit margins. Over the years, this market has consolidated across countries and firms and Taiwan is by far the leader in the sector with several top firms, notably ASE Group, while the US has only one assembly firm, Amkor Technologies. In this sector, China managed to increase significantly its market share with firms such as JCET. Along these production steps, machinery, inputs of raw materials such as silicon and chemicals are required, corresponding to markets that are also very concentrated. The US, EU and Japan are the biggest suppliers in those peripherical markets and leading EU firms include Dutch ASMLA (machinery), German Aixtron (chemicals) and French Riber (machinery)18. Overall, the high degree of specialisation and concentration as well as the capital-intense nature and high degree of cross-country interdependence of the semiconductor sector expose its supply chain to political risks. Due to its strategic nature, it has been a target for sanctions by the US administration. The lack of availability of substitutes makes export bans particularly effective for impacting production lines. US export bans on American-made technologies have put a dent in Huawei’s production capacities19 and in SMIC’s (China’s most promising foundry) ambitions to produce high-end semiconductors20. Leverage over bottlenecks have been used by others too, and Japan imposed export bans on crucial components to South Korea in 201921. These sanctions have ripple effects through the entire industry and on its customers. Shortages caused by increased demand for ICT goods during the pandemic have been aggravated by stockpiling by Chinese firms in reaction to US sanctions, leading to shortages in 202022. As a result, the car manufacturing industry is reportedly facing challenges in upholding its production lines, as technology companies are favoured in semiconductor deliveries23. While the US uses its central position in these supply chains to exert leverage over China, China is trying to catch-up and become technologically independent. China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ plan includes the stated goal of a 70% semiconductor market share for Chinese companies in 2025. However, when looking at the intermediate goal for 2020, it becomes clear how large the challenge is: while China aimed at a 40% market share by 2020, it had only reached 19% share in 2019 in the assembly, and it seems highly unlikely that it will gain the leadership in all segments targeted by the State Council for 2030. The Chinese state plans to invest $118 billion in government funds over 5 years into domestic production24. While this investment is considerable, it seems insufficient to achieve technological leadership in this highly specialised and competitive sector. The global investment into R&D by the industry alone was $68 billion in 202025, and capital investment is considerably as well: TSMC announced capital spending of $25 to $28 billion for 202126. 2.2 Consequences for the EU and its Digital Sovereignty The semiconductor industry is characterised by a high degree of interdependence between China, Taiwan, South Korea, the US and the EU. While the US is currently leading in cutting-edge chip design and also fabrication, value chains are highly integrated across the jurisdictions. Recent US actions have indeed put these integrated value chains into distress. China has responded by investing into its own capacities but reportedly is still some years away from being able to become self-sufficient. Although the EU is making headway in defining what it means by ‘open strategic autonomy’27, in strategic sectors like the semiconductor industry more tools and a clear vision are still needed. This is especially the case considering that other global leaders (US, Taiwan, Japan, China) have endorsed roadmaps and invested massively to support this strategic sector28. On the one hand, the EU is committed to keeping its markets open to foreign competition and ensuring cheap supplies of valuable input into its productions processes and consumer goods markets. Some may even argue that the ‘tech war’ between the US and China offers an opportunity to free-ride on cheap products, as both countries subsidise their tech sector. On the other hand, the EU is likely to be vulnerable to significant pressure from both the US and China in the coming years when it comes to the digital sector. In our view, a central pillar in the EU’s strategy needs to be substantial investments in research and production capacities in the sector. These investments need to be protected from technology transfers through a strong investment screening mechanism. The recent case of the US pressuring the Dutch government to cancel the sale of semiconductor machinery to China29, whether for economic or security purposes, begs questions of what the EU strategy is. At the same time, the highly specialised nature of this key sector exemplifies the benefits of global value chains. A strategy to reach full independence from foreign inputs in the sector seems not only extremely costly, but also unfeasible for Europe, China and even the US, at least in the coming years. In our view, European industrial policy should create more domestic production capacities without aiming at import substitution. Rather than import substitution, diversification of supplies, both with new domestic supplies as well as additional foreign supplies, would reduce vulnerabilities. Moreover, a greater weight of EU-based production capacities in global supply chains can give the EU leverage. A threat by a trading partner to interrupt supplies could then be counteracted with threats to equally disrupt supplies. Crucially, this leverage should be used to improve the resilience of this industry through plurilateral cooperation and by strengthening multilateral trade institutions. In practice, the real question is whether the EU could have the instruments and the political capacity to retaliate with such threats. Strategic sovereignty implies an ability to jointly take stock of economic and security interests. The EU manages separately sectoral policies and this fragmentation of tasks between member states and the EU is a weakness in today’s world of increased geopolitical tensions. Medium term, the EU needs to consider changing its decision-making processes in foreign policy related matters. The European Commission President’s idea to reconsider the unanimity requirement in foreign policy is worthwhile, though with major implications beyond the scope of this chapter.

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