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EU strategic autonomy solves multilateralism, which solves econ, climate, and tech---US foreign policy swings undermine it.

Alcaro 21, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “European Strategic Sovereignty and Multilateralism: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Dea”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf) //CHC-DS ‍

The notion that the EU and its member states should pursue greater autonomy in international affairs has gained increasing salience in intra-EU debates. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy elevated the attainment of a higher degree of autonomy in security and defence to a strategic imperative.37 In 2018, the Juncker Commission38 embraced a view of strategic autonomy that extended to other policy areas, such as the economy and trade, climate and energy, as well as digital and technology regulations. Strategic autonomy has remained since a dominating theme in official EU discourse, as attested to (amongst others) by the selfdepiction as ‘geopolitical’ of the Von der Leyen Commission39 and the HR/VP Josep Borrell’s call on the EU to embrace power.40 While increasingly salient, strategic autonomy has also been controversial. Detractors dismiss it as a misleading notion that creates the illusion of an EU capable of achieving independence from the US, which remains the ultimate security guarantor of several (most) EU member states.41 While understandable, such concerns are misplaced. Autonomy is not about independence. It is about reducing the vulnerability of the EU and its member states to the political use of asymmetric interdependencies by other countries, starting with systemic rivals but including also allies. Examples include Russia’s leveraging its energy supplies, China using access to its market to force technology transfers, and the US weaponising financial interdependencies through extraterritorial sanctions.42 It is not by chance that autonomy has become increasingly tied to the notion of ‘European sovereignty’.43 This connection does not stem from a (non-existent) demand to confer statehood on the EU, but points to the strengthening of the Union as the best way to enable EU member states to act according to their own norms and laws. In these terms, greater autonomy of the EU is tantamount to a stronger defence of the sovereign rights of its member states. Partly, the demand for stronger autonomy results from the evolution of the EU into an ever more integrated polity, endowed with more competencies and correspondingly greater ambitions. Arguably more important, however, has been the emerging multipolarity of international politics. The latter is usually ascribed to the growing economic prowess of such countries as China, which seek to promote their own models of governance of global issues. Yet, an equally decisive factor has been the difficulty of US policymakers to forge an enduring consensus on how the US should conduct itself in international affairs. The ever-wilder oscillations of America’s foreign policy have emboldened its rivals and disoriented its allies. Critically, US foreign policy swings have eventually resulted in a diminished commitment to the system of multilateral institutions, treaties and regimes that the US itself did the most to create in the decades after World War II.44 This trend peaked during the Trump years, when the US deliberately pursued a policy of contestation (of the World Trade Organisation and the International Criminal Court, to mention just a few) and disengagement (a partial list of international arrangements the US left under Trump include the Paris Accord on climate, the World Health Organisation, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces and Open Skies treaties, as well as the Iran nuclear deal). As the US distanced itself from multilateral institutions, China made efforts to increase its sway within them, targeting in particular technical agencies such as the International Standards Organisation and the International Telecommunication Union to bring global technology standards closer to Chinese ones.45 Seen from the EU, this is a vicious cycle in which multilateral institutions are simultaneously undermined from without (by the US) and within (by China). The outcome may be a dysfunctional multilateral order or one that more closely reflects China’s model of authoritarian capitalism. 46 Either outcome would negatively affect the EU and its member states’ security and prosperity, as it would reduce European influence in existing multilateral institutions. The strengthening and expansion of the latter are therefore essential in making the EU and its member states capable of navigating the agitated waters of a more competitive international system. The ability of EU member states to live by their own laws and rules is thus inextricably linked to multilateralism.

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