The NATO functions as an independent entity, specifically an international organization with international legal personality---it has an independent volition, isn’t subject to authority, and---this means all of their interpretations that they read in the block are WRONG because the organization is separate from its member states---prefer the only comparative evidence that does a comprehensive legal analysis.
David Nauta 17, 11-10-2017, "The International Responsibility of NATO and its Personnel during Military Operations", https://brill.com/view/book/9789004354647/B9789004354647_004.xml, Brill, Chapter 4, accessed 7-8-2022 \\SYang **text shrunk for readability and figures 2 and 3 omitted
This chapter describes the current institutional framework of NATO and the decision making process for its operations. This will provide further understanding of the powers of NATO and the relationship between NATO and the member States, which is relevant for the question of attribution of conduct of personnel to NATO, troop contributing nations or other international organizations such as the UN. Moreover, the overview provides in insight on whether NATO is an entity separate from its member States, i.e. whether it meets the indicia of an international organization with international legal personality. The conclusions in this chapter will be used further on in Chapters 5 and 7. Paragraph 4.2 gives a brief outline of the various organs of the Alliance, their composition, tasks and their position within the NATO structure. The intention of providing this outline is to facilitate understanding of the political-military structure and how hierarchically NATO is organised. Paragraph 4.3 examines the relationship between NATO and its member States and NATO’s decision-making process. Since the North Atlantic Council (NAC), in which all the member States participate, is the highest political decision-making organ of NATO, it is appropriate to examine both the relationship between NATO and States as well as NATO’s decision-making process. It is important to discuss the decision-making process in the NAC to establish to whom a wrongful act can be attributed: to NATO, to its member States or to both. It can also assist in establishing in which situations – i.e. under which conditions – NATO member States and / or NATO as an international organization will be held responsible. This paragraph will, additionally, examine the relationship between NATO and non-NATO member States, for the same reasons as indicated above and because non-member States regularly participate in NATO-led operations. The outline is followed by an analysis of the relationship between NATO and the UN. The choice to limit the analysis to the relationship between NATO and the UN is made in order to avoid an overly generic or exhaustive study on relationships between NATO and other international organizations or such organizations in general. Moreover, the relationship with the UN is the more straightforward choice to examine as the member States made explicit reference in the Washington Treaty to the context and position NATO takes within the UN system. The context is established by referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter – the right to take collective action against an armed attack – which forms the basis for the establishment of NATO. The Washington Treaty also acknowledges the primary role of the UN Security Council in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Moreover, since NATO relies for its non-article 5 crisis response operations – which consist of the majority of NATO-led operations – on a mandate or authorization from the UN Security Council, the relationship between NATO and the UN is of relevance here. Finally, from a practical point of view, the UN is likely one of the most important partners of NATO. 4.2 Current Institutional Framework of NATO 4.2.1 Introduction NATO consists of two main types of institutional structures: a civilian structure and a military structure. The civilian structure is responsible for policy- and decision-making which provides for the functioning of the Organization both internally and externally. The military structure is involved in the planning and execution of military operations. All NATO operations are decided upon by the civilian structure and carried out by military structure. It means that both parts of NATO participate in the initiation, planning and execution of NATO operations. 4.2.2 The Civilian Structure a The North Atlantic Council The Washington Treaty stands out for its brevity, with a mere 14 articles and does expand a great deal on the structure, tasks and responsibilities of the Alliance. The treaty establishes only one organ, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and attributes the necessary powers to implement the treaty.1 The NAC is the highest decision-making organ in the Organization. The Council is composed of the representatives of all Member States, which holds regular meetings at the level of Foreign- or Defence Ministers (Ministerials), Heads of States (Summits) or Permanent Representatives. As such, the NAC is the most important organ for the member States to express their views and to take collective decisions on political issues of the Alliance. This feature is of relevance to determine whether NATO has international legal personality. An indication that an international organization has international legal personality is – according to the theory of ‘objective legal personality’ which is further described in Chapter 5 – that an organization is not subject to the authority of any other State or organised community. Since the NAC is not subject to the authority of another legal entity other than the participating States, the assumption is that NATO has international legal personality.2 The Washington Treaty does not prescribe the way the Council should take its decisions, but the NAC adopted consensus as the standard. This translates to decisions being adopted without a formal voting procedure, provided that no member raises any formal objection.3 The decision-making process of NATO is described more elaborately when this book examines the relationship between the member States and NATO in paragraph 4.3. It is relevant to note here that decision-making through consensus is both seen as an argument in favour and against the existence of international legal personality of the Alliance. Arguments against such personality put emphasis on the fact that NAC decisions are collective decisions made by its member States, which assumes that the NAC expresses the will of the member States, rather than the Organization. On the other hand, member States have a right to express objections that they may have and block any decision, making the NAC’s decisions entirely reliant on the common agreement of all member States, rather than that of one State. The introduction of the “silence procedure” and opting-out mechanism enhances the autonomy of the Organization – referred to later in this chapter – and alludes to the possibility that NATO may have a volonté distincte from its member States. A volonté distincte, or ‘separate will’, may indicate under certain legal theories that the Organization has international legal personality. It is held here that the consensus rule on itself is not an indicator of either the existence or non-existence of international legal personality. Rather, a more distinguishing factor is to examine in how far the member States retain control in the decision-making process taken by the NAC. A conclusion on the existence of international legal personality of the Alliance will be given in Chapter 5. The Washington Treaty does not prescribe the span of topics which the NAC can decide upon. The Council’s authority is generally confined to the aim of NATO, which is to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples” and to “promote stability and well-being in the North-Atlantic Area”. In that respect, the Washington Treaty leaves ample room for interpretation and discretion in decision-making.6 The founders have left to the discretion of the Council to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.”7 The NAC created a variety of subsidiary bodies, of which the most important here are the Secretary General, the Military Committee and the various organs of the NATO Command Structure. b The Secretary General The Secretary General leads a unified international secretariat to assist the plenary organ – the NAC – and to serve as the Chairman of the Council.8 As such, he is the chief executive of NATO and responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision-making within the Alliance.9The Secretary General is supported by the International Staff, forming the so-called “civilian structure”. The Secretary General is also the representative for external relations. He maintains relationships on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, - Defense and Heads of State during the operations.10 The Secretary General is usually the signatory for international agreements binding the Alliance, e.g. the exchange of letters with the Afghan authorities relating to the Status of ISAF Personnel in Afghanistan is signed on the side of the Alliance by the Secretary General.11 4.2.3 The Military Structure NATO’s military structure consists of the Military Committee, supported by its International Military Staff, and the NATO Command Structure. a The Military Committee The Military Committee (MC) is composed of the highest national military representatives from each Member State, assisting the Council with military expertise12 and works under the overall political authority of the NAC.13 It assists and advises the NAC on military matters and provides military guidance to the NATO Strategic Commanders of the NATO Command Structure. The MC takes its decisions by consensus; this way full commitment is achieved in both the military as well as the political requirements and objectives of the mission. The MC plays an important role in the drafting of NATO strategic concepts and advises the Council of the military situation in countries were NATO is conducting operations. The role of the Chairman of the MC is to represent and defend the consensus-based advice to the NAC. The Military Committee is supported by the International Military Staff. The Committee is an essential link between the political and military structure of NATO. The Military Committee provides the NAC with military advice agreed by all Chiefs of Defence. The consensus among the highest military authorities of NATO represents a firm commitment that the operation is militarily achievable with the forces available from the nations. b The NATO Command Structure The NATO Command Structure consists of two Strategic Commands, Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. In 1950, the NAC created the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)14 and gave it the responsibility to “organize [national units assigned to him] into an effective integrated defence force”.15 Currently, SACEUR is responsible for the planning and commanding all NATO-led operations. He is bound by the political constraints given by the NAC, who maintains political oversight of operations. The command structure enables NATO to plan and execute operations while maintaining strategic military and political coherence throughout the chain of command. SACEUR has at his disposition various subordinate commands which makes up Allied Command Operations, or ACO. ACO includes two Joint Force Commands (JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples), each of which is capable to plan, conduct and sustain a major joint operation16 at the operational level. There are also three other specialised commands (Air Command, Land Command and Maritime Command) directly under SACEUR’s command, which provide support to the Joint Force Command, but are also able to plan, conduct and sustain a smaller joint operation by themselves and report directly to SACEUR. Supreme Allied Command Transformation has the lead role for the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrines in order to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance. SACT does not have a specific role in commanding operations and will not be further examined in detail as it is not of particular relevance to NATO’s responsibilities during its operations. In NATO-led operations, SACEUR will appoint one of its subordinate headquarters to plan and execute the mission (figure 2). One of the Joint Force Commands, or – in case of a smaller mission, the Maritime-, Land- or Air Command – can establish a headquarters in the mission area that will be responsible for running of day-to-day operations. SACEUR will retain Operational
<<<FIGURES 2 AND 3 OMITTED>>>
Command (i.e. the authority to assign missions or tasks, to deploy units and to reassign forces)17 over the mission, while delegating Operational Control (i.e. the authority to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location) to the subordinate headquarters (figure 3).184.3 The Relationship between NATO and Its Member States and the Decision-making Process There is considerable debate on the status of NATO in international law. Some view NATO as an organization independent from its members, capable of having a will of its own.19 Other studies see NATO as a trans-Atlantic forum where member States meet to discuss global security issues.20 As such, NATO is not capable of acting independently and would be deprived of international legal personality. Consequently, if NATO is not a subject of international law, it can not bear international rights and obligations and does not have responsibility under international law. Those studies which hold the view that NATO is a forum or a mere Alliance of like-minded States rather than an independent international organization, base their arguments primarily on the process in which member States take decisions in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO takes decisions by consensus of all the member States and therefore there is no real autonomy of the organization. The consensus rule by itself is not an indicator of international legal personality, as was discussed above. The measure by which the member States control the organization through this decision-making procedure is a better indicator for establishing whether the organization has international legal personality.21 For this reason, the relationship between NATO and its member States and the degree in which member States control decisions made by NATO is further examined below. This chapter will focus on three areas, the consensus-rule in NATO’s decision making, the planning of operations and the contribution of forces to the Alliance. 4.3.1 Consensus-rule NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries.22 A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent. It is important to differentiate between decision-making based on consensus and unanimity. Unanimity requires an actively stated vote in favour of a measure, which the Alliance does not seek. Actually, there is no voting at all in NATO’s decision-making process. Instead, decisions are taken when there is an absence of objection by any member State. Member States can express their objections either privately with the Secretary General, raise them during NAC meetings, or even go public with their disagreement.23 Of course, each choice comes at a political cost. Hence, the role of the Secretary General is essential to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance. To this end, the Secretary General may employ a tactic called the “silence-procedure”. This procedure allows States to reach consensus on those topics that are politically sensitive for some of the member States. It entails that a decision will be automatically passed by the NAC after a stated time-period set by the Secretary General, unless a member State objects by sending a formal letter to the Secretary General thereby breaking the silence.24 In some cases, the political cost for an opposing member State’s representative of openly being identified as blocking the decision may outweigh the benefit of seeing the proposed action stopped. In those cases, a member State may prefer not to block the decision, but rather mitigate its concerns through caveats for its forces or even to choose not to participate fully in the operation. The silence-procedure has proven useful in situations where domestic opposition exists in the member States for a certain military intervention. In Operation Allied Force, public disagreement would have placed NATO member States in a conflict before world media and would play in favour for President Milosevic. The silence procedure allowed Member States not needing to take a public position and permitted NATO to move forward.25 Similarly, the silence procedure provided Germany – which faced public opposition regarding a military intervention in Libya – in an opportunity to avoid to take publicly a position regarding the decision in favour of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector.26 The silence procedure shows that the Alliance can continue to move forward even with the dissociation of one or more of the member States. The decision making procedure is not – by itself – an argument that NATO lacks autonomy and, hence, international legal personality. As stated above, the autonomy depends on the degree of control that the member States exercise over the organization. The consensus procedure illustrates that there is no requirement for member States to exercise such control and thereby allowing the Organization to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. Member States are also free to choose which operations they prefer to participate in. In case a member State has concerns regarding a specific mission, it may decide not to participate in the mission with military forces and materiel, while at the same time choose not to block any decision relating to the operation. In this regard it is also worth mentioning that in some situations, the Troop Contributing Nations’ involvement in the decision making process is limited to the decision whether or not to participate with military forces, without having any role in the formulation of the political aspects of a mission. States which are not members of NATO may contribute with military forces to a NATO-led mission. NATO relies extensively on the contribution of forces from so-called “Non-NATO Contributing Nations (NNCN)”. These are States which are not parties to the Washington Treaty and are not members of NATO, but are willing to contribute forces to a NATO-led operation. From the earliest operations, NNCN have contributed to NATO operations in a substantial manner, notably Russia as the single largest contributor. As of September 2008, approximately 62,500 personnel were deployed in 5 NATO-led operations of which 4,300 personnel were provided by 16 NNCN.27 The Political Military Framework regulates the participation of NNCN in NATO operations. The process starts with an expression of interest by the NNCN in contributing to a specific NATO-led operation. Participation is dependent upon NAC approval, and, once approved, NNCN enter into technical agreements with NATO to work out security, technical and financial issues.28 NNCN will be consulted on all aspects of the operation, but do not have decision making power on, for instance, the concept of the operation, rules of engagement and periodic mission reviews.29 NNCN do not have any political influence on the mission as they do not take part in the decision making process at the NAC, but to allow SACEUR to have Operational Command and Control over their military forces. Even though the NAC enlarged the influence of NNCN in the operations they choose to participate in and are consulted and offered the opportunity to put forward views on all relevant issues of the operations, NATO, still retains full political decision-making authority.30 This shows that NATO as an international organization can act, to a certain extent, independently from States participating in the operation, in particular with respect to NNCN. 4.3.2 Planning Process of NATO Operations A second area where the particular nature of the relationship between NATO and the member States becomes apparent is during the operational planning process. It would be fair to conclude that NATO was effectively an instrument of the member States until the early 1990s. During the Cold War-period, the planning of operations was limited to the development of several regional Standing Defence Plans against one identified potential aggressor. These plans were preapproved by the NAC. The Defence Planning Committee31 set so-called “Force Goals” to which member States commit their forces for a period of 6 years. Member States annually reported on how they intended to meet these requirements.32 Overall, the decisions were taken at the capitals without much need of NATO’s involvement other than being a forum where discussions could take place. NATO relied on the same planning processes that existed during the Cold War for its first “non-article 5” operations in the early 1990s. And in fact, there was no real need to change the planning processes, as the first operations were fairly straightforward. They consisted of monitoring of an arms embargo (e.g. operation Maritime Monitor) or a no-fly zone (e.g. operation Sky Monitor). Neither, the IFOR, SFOR and KFOR required much involvement of NATO in the planning of the operation, as most of the forces were provided by a leader framework nation, which would take the responsibility for organizing the forces necessary in a specific sector. For instance, in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into 3 regions for which each a lead nation was assigned to carry out the operation.33 The planning of ISAF and NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) operations was much more complex. These operations took place much farther away from NATO’s borders adding complexity in logistical planning and defence expenditure. They also took place in much less benign environments. Moreover, both operations went beyond the monitoring of a cease-fire and included tasks such as counter-insurgency activities, reconstruction of civil infrastructure and mentoring of government officials. The increased complexity of the operations required a more sophisticated planning process than the pre-delegation model that was used in previous operations. In the current planning process, when tasked by the NAC, SACEUR will conduct a formal assessment of the identified crisis and will give considerations on the use of the NATO military instrument to assist with a situation resolution. The NAC may then task SACEUR to develop military response options. Subsequently, the NAC may decide whether SACEUR should provide a concept of operations within the political direction given by the Council.34 The member States rely heavily on the planning done by SACEUR’s staff, as its integrated system analysis, planning and assessment tools,35 congregated databases on capabilities and availability of member States’ forces36 and doctrine37 provide planning capabilities that are not easily replicated in the national Ministries of Defense. The planning process does not alter the national autonomy of the member States or their ‘veto’ power at the NAC. The member States retain their authority to disapprove certain proposals and to halt or change a given course of action. However, the incremental decision-making process and the unique planning capabilities of NATO make it more difficult for member States to refuse participation on general grounds and discourages uncooperative behaviour.38 This observation leads to the conclusion that even though the member States retain sovereign control over NATO’s actions, the degree of control is limited on general political aspects of a mission and not on the specifics of each aspect of the operation. 4.3.3 The Command and Control Relationship The third and the last area that is examined here with respect to the relationship between NATO and its member States is the command and control relationship. NATO does not have military forces permanently assigned to the Organization. When a mission is deemed necessary, NATO will request nations to contribute the required forces and materiel to the mission. Nations will inform NATO on their contributions and transfer part of their authority over their forces to Alliance.39 Authority is then delegated throughout the organization at various levels. The degree of authority that each of the levels exercises is defined by the ‘command and control’ structure set in place.40 ‘Command’ is the authority to direct, coordinate or control armed forces to achieve particular objectives. ‘Control’ is the authority to organise, direct and coordinate the activities of the forces assigned to implement orders and directives. NATO differentiates between three levels of command and control, ranging from (a) Full Command, (b) Operational Command and Control and (c) Tactical Command and Control. States normally retain “Full Command”, which is the authority that covers every aspect of military and administration. It is very uncommon for States to transfer Full Command to NATO or any other international organization or State. Full Command includes the authority to decide to participate in a certain mission and to withdraw from participation in accordance with the terms agreed to. It also includes the authority to take administrative and disciplinary measures against personnel of its own armed forces.41 As described in Chapter 2, the Commander of the Kosovo Force ( COMKFOR) did not have the authority to take disciplinary measures against personnel that violated his order not to frequent prostitutes in Kosovo or to be engaged in the act of human trafficking. COMKFOR was dependent on the sending States to ensure that such regulations are enforceable through national disciplinary sanctions.42 States that contribute forces to NATO operations normally will transfer “Operational Command and Control” to the Alliance. Operational Command is the authority to assign missions or tasks, to deploy units and to reassign forces.43 It is the authority needed to effectuate the overall strategic objectives of the whole operation. Operational Control is the authority to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location. This includes the authority to issue binding directives for forces assigned to his command. For example, as illustrated in Chapter 2, the tactical directive issued by COMISAF that restrained the use of force by troops assigned to him is an example of operational control. COMKFOR similarly had the authority to limit the frequenting certain bars and locales by KFOR personnel is the exercise of operational control. ‘Tactical Command’ is also transferred by TCNs to SACEUR. SACEUR usually delegates tactical command to subordinate command. Tactical Command is the authority to assign tasks to forces for the accomplishment of the mission, and Tactical Control is the detailed and local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TCNs will ordinarily transfer Operational Command and Control to NATO, while retaining Full Command – including Administrative Control – over their forces. The transfer follows a formal procedure, which entails the TCN sending SACEUR a ‘transfer of authority message’. This message describes which units are placed under command of NATO and which level of authority is being transferred. After the transfer of command to NATO, the nations are not able to exercise control over their forces anymore, except by re-assuming command and thereby effectively taking their forces out from the mission. States may, however, issue limitations and restriction on the use of their forces, i.e. ‘national caveats’ and ‘red-card holdership’.44 In few instances, TCNs have re-assumed command over their forces during a NATO operation. As described in Chapter 2 of this book, Canada reassumed command over its forces during ISAF, when it assessed that the transfer of detainees captured by Canadian forces to the government of Afghanistan would pose them to the risk of being tortured. The transfer of authority over forces from States to NATO has relevant consequences to the question of responsibility for wrongful conduct during NATO operations, in particular to the aspect of attribution. Attribution of a wrongful act to NATO depends on whether NATO has international legal personality and whether the wrongful act was under the effective control of NATO. These issues are examined more elaborately in Chapters 5 and 7 of this book. It is relevant to note here that when TCNs place their forces at the disposal of NATO, they transfer the authority to assign missions or tasks, to deploy units and to reassign forces. This means that NATO exercises effective control over these forces with respect to mission-related tasks. This effective control, however, may be undermined by the issuance of national caveats, limitations or interference by the TCN involved or when the TCN decides to re-assume command over its forces. NATO’s command and control relationship also illustrate the relationship that the Alliance has with its member States and other TCNs. Nations transfer the authority over their forces to NATO, which indicates that the Alliance has a large degree of autonomy, even if nations still retain the possibility to re-assume command over their forces and the fact that they can impose limitations and restrictions on the use of the forces. 4.4 The Relationship between NATO and the UN NATO’s constituent document refers in several places to the UN, the UN Security Council and the UN Charter, showing the commitment of the founding members to the principles of the United Nations. Certain founding States even suggested to define NATO as a ‘regional arrangement’ in reference to Chapter viii of the UN Charter.45 Under Chapter viii of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council may utilise such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. This suggestion was, however, opposed46 as it could be interpreted as making NATO’s enforcement measures subject to a veto in the UN Security Council, rendering NATO’s existence absurd.47 Any reference to Chapter viii of the UN Charter was therefore intentionally omitted, leaving only Article 51 of the UN Charter as a basis for military action(s) of NATO under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO was not considered to become an organization that would be used to implement measures taken by the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter vii of the UN Charter. The perception that NATO could not be a vehicle for the UN Security Council to implement its mandates, changed after the fall of the Soviet Union, when an institutionalised relationship between NATO and the UN started to emerge. The United Nations was involved in peacekeeping operations since 195648 and saw an enormous increase in missions from 1989.49 These operations were entirely conducted under UN command and control, without participation of any other international organization. Member States would be requested to provide troops and materiel to a un-led mission. The personnel were placed at the disposal of the UN, which were characteristically identified as “blue-helmets”. With the increased demand for missions, the UN turned to lead nations and international organizations to take over some of the burden to plan and lead peacekeeping and peace-enforcements missions. NATO became an important partner for the UN as the UN lacked the resources to implement its peace enforcement measures. NATO, on its turn, found the participation in the UN missions important as it was trying to redefine its tasks and activities and to transform its structure to meet the security challenges which occurred in the post-Cold War period. An important aspect defining the un-NATO relationship in the context of peace operations is the detailed guidance given by the UN Security Council regarding the mandate and the objectives to be achieved of a specific peace operation. The UN Security Council can authorise member States or international organizations50 to implement a specific mandate. In earlier UN Security Council resolutions, this mandate contained detailed guidance on how the objectives of the operation were to be achieved. For instance, UNSCR 1244(1999) listed eight specific areas for which the NATO-led Kosovo Force was made responsible.51 More recent UN Security Council resolutions leave a fair amount of discretionary power to the mandated entity to decide on how it will attain the objectives, basically authorizing to “take all necessary measures” to fulfil the mandate.52 The Security Council does not impose a specific command relationship or hierarchy between the UN and the mandated entity. However, in certain situations it requires States or international organization to coordinate with the UN Secretary General on the measures taken to implement the mandate or to report on the progress of the operation periodically.53 NATO and the UN cooperated quite successfully during operations in the Balkans. Initially, NATO enforced UN Security Council’s embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea54 and a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.55 The cooperation intensified when the Alliance provided air support to the United Nations Protection Force, or unprofor.56 Close air support provided by NATO was made conditional on the approval by the UN, which strained the relationship between the two organizations. Politically divergent views between the UN and NATO on the air support to UNPROFOR resulted in a time lag in the taking of decisions or resulted in no decisions at all. The observed difficulties led to future operations being more independent from each other. For instance, KFOR was placed outside UNMiK’s command and had a separate mandate.57 Subsequent operations also showed that NATO operations and UN operations in the same area have distinct mandates, tasks and command structure. In Iraq, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) is separated from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and in Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan – a peacekeeping mission focusing on recovery and reconstruction58 – was separate from ISAF’s more stand-alone character with its own mandate and its own command structure.59 In 2005, the Alliance proposed a framework agreement with the UN to create a more structured relationship between the two organizations.60 In September 2008, this proposal resulted in a Joint Declaration between the UN and NATO on their mutual cooperation, in particular in the field of information sharing and operational coordination and support.61 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration stipulates that: Understanding that this framework should be flexible and evolving over time, we agree to further develop the cooperation between our organizations on issues of common interest, in, but not limited to, communication and information-sharing, including on issues pertaining to the protection of civilian populations; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support. In conclusion, The UN Security Council is the only institution to authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. A UN Security Council resolution is the legal basis for NATO to conduct non-article 5 crisis response operations, that involve the use of force. UN Security Council resolutions will continue to govern NATO’s non-article 5 operations, but the Alliance remains independent from the United Nations in aspects of command and control in NATO operations. The Security Council will not have any authority regarding the command and control of forces in NATO-led operations. The UN can not assign missions or tasks to NATO personnel, to deploy units or to reassign the forces. This authority will be vested in the commander that has Operational Command, which is SACEUR. This aspect is relevant to the question of responsibility of NATO for violations of international law and will be further examined in Chapter 7. 4.5 Conclusions This chapter has described the institutional framework of NATO. Member States are represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the highest political organ of the Alliance. Decisions on NATO operations are taken by the Council through consensus. The Secretary General of the Alliance is responsible for steering this process of consultation and has several tools at its disposal to achieve consensus, in particular the so-called ‘silence procedure’. Consensus and the silence procedure show that NATO enjoys a degree of autonomy from its member States, as the Alliance can function even without full agreement of all of the members. The NAC, its supporting International Staff and the civilian agencies constitute the civilian structure of the Alliance. The military structure consists of the Military Committee, supported by the International Military Staff, the two Supreme Commands and international military headquarters subordinate to them. Supreme Allied Commander Europe commands NATO operations. SACEUR has “operational command and control” over the military forces assigned to him by the Troop Contributing Nations, which could either be member States or States that are not member to NATO (Non-NATO Contributing Nations, or NNCN). Two aspects are relevant to note here. First, States that participate in NATO-led operations transfer a significant degree of control over military forces to NATO. Chapter 7 will examine in more detail whether the degree of control transferred to NATO by States equates to ‘effective control’. If NATO does have effective control over conduct of forces placed at its disposal, the conduct can be attributed to NATO. Secondly, it is relevant to note that the participation of NNCN in NATO-led operations show that NATO is a separate entity from its member States. NNCN do not take part in the decision-making process at the political level and neither have operational command and control over their forces once they are placed under the authority of SACEUR. This illustrates that NATO can act separately from its member States and enjoys a high degree of autonomy. This feature – further examined in Chapter 5 – speaks in favour of the existence of international legal personality of NATO.