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ICJ and member states agree.

Alain Pellet 1, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris X-Nanterre and member of the International Law Commission, December 1, 2001, “L’imputabilité d’éventuels actes illicites – Responsabilité de l’otan ou des Etats membres, inTomuschat”, https://brill.com/view/title/10865 , Kosovo and the international community: A legal assessment, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 198. \\SYang **Translated to English with Google Translate. Original text in French.

The question is therefore left entirely open. 14 The fact remains that, in the absence of certainty and given the extreme rarity of the practice, one can at least use the draft of the C.D.I. by analogy and, in particular, on the one hand articles 4 to 9 and 11 of the preliminary draft of 2000 (which correspond to articles 5 to 10 of the draft of 1996), which relate to the attribution strictly speaking, and , above all, Articles 16 to 19 (27 to 28 old) These latter envisage three hypotheses in which the "responsibility of a State with regard to the act of another State" may be engaged. One clearly seems to have to be discarded: that of coercion (envisaged by the new article 18); it seems absurd to consider that the Member States of NATO were able to exert on it a constraint leading it to commit one or more internationally wrongful acts, and vice versa. Two possibilities therefore remain. That of complicity (aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act - new article 16) and that of "direction and [du] control exercised in the commission of an internationally wrongful act" (article 17 new). In both cases, it seems to me that you have to ask yourself "who controls whom?" (article 17) and "who is an accomplice of whom?" (section 16). In other words, does NATO control the member states? or are the states controlling NATO? Firstly; and is NATO the accomplice of the Member States? or the contrary? on the other hand. Asked in this way, the questions are a little reminiscent of the children's game that is called in France "I hold you, you hold me by the goatee" ... And, to tell the truth, it is possible to support, reasonably, one as the other of the two theses. Member states control NATO - they make the decisions within its bodies and it depends on them for its financial resources, ammunition and men. But NATO controls its Members in the sense that they act on and in accordance with its decisions. That said, an essential element, clearly highlighted in Professor Stein's communication16 and which constitutes the starting point of the 1995 resolution of the Institute of International Law on "The legal consequences for Member States of non-performance by international organizations of their obligations towards third parties",17 must be taken into account: NATO is an international organization and, as such, it enjoys international legal personality.18 It is true that it is rather special organization, the institutionalization of which has been empirical and progressive. legal capacity and privileges and immunities, all of which led the International Court of Justice, with regard to the United Nations, to conclude, in its opinion of 11 April 1949 relating to Reparations for damage suffered in the service of the United Nations, that she was an "international person". "This means that the Organization is a subject of international law, that it has the capacity to be the holder of international rights and duties and that it has the capacity to avail itself of its rights by way of international claim".20 Moreover, this responsibility is objective,21 which means that it forms a screen between the Organization and not only its Member States, not only the third States which have recognized it, but also vis-à-vis other States, in much the same way that a State exists independently of the recognitions of which it is the object. Counterpart of the right belonging to the Organization to seek the responsibility of other subjects of international law, it can also be the addressee of a claim, in particular when an internationally wrongful act can, as in this case, be attributed to it. It alone bears the responsibility for its own acts and it seems impossible - except to deny, in reality, its international legal personality - that the responsibility of its Members be sought for its operations or "through it".

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