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The CIA triad interp is too vague, unnecessarily broad, and impedes the success of cybersecurity operations

Derek E. Bambauer 15, Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, where he teaches Internet law and intellectual property (covers Internet censorship, cybersecurity, and intellectual property) + was a Research Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, “Conundrum”, 04/11/2015 revision date (originally published 4/11/2011), Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 584 /lg

Conceptualizing cybersecurity challenges policymakers and academics. 32 The current theoretical approaches to cybersecurity, though, have proved to be significantly flawed. They employ definitions that are vague and overbroad; they seek to force cybersecurity's issues into the straitjackets of existing doctrines poorly suited to cybersecurity's problems; and they produce concomitant policy recommendations that not only fail to mitigate, but actually worsen, the Internet's security challenges.

Conventional wisdom on cybersecurity identifies the problem as all-encompassing. 33 Scholars, government officials, and journalists tend to view cybersecurity as the "protection of all things Internet" 34 - an approach that impedes practical progress by failing to set priorities. Government efforts at capturing cybersecurity's scope have been particularly overbroad. [*592] President Barack H. Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review offers a representative definition, where cybersecurity is:

strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure. 35

Presidential policies have been strikingly consistent. President Barack Obama's approach to cybersecurity is almost identical to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), the strategy employed by Obama's Republican predecessor, President George W. Bush. 36 Their cybersecurity definitions and programs are closely aligned; indeed, Richard Clarke and Robert Knake call Obama's plan "CNCI redux." 37 Both policies build on the recommendations and definitions (in particular, of critical infrastructure) of President William J. Clinton's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 38 Regardless of political affiliation, American Presidents have taken an expansive view of cybersecurity.

Proposed federal legislation is equally capacious in approach. The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 2010 defines "cyber security activities" as:

[*593]

a class or collection of similar cyber security activities by a Federal agency that involves personally identifiable data that is -

(A) screened by a cyber security system outside of the Federal agency …

(B) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, outside such Federal Agency; or

(C) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, to an element of the intelligence community. 39

The Act conceives of cybersecurity not only broadly - it could include the Federal Trade Commission's anti-spam efforts, for example - but recursively. 40 The Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 defines "information security" as "protecting information and information systems from disruption or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction in order to provide" integrity, confidentiality, and availability. 41 The Homeland Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2011 proposes cybersecurity requirements that cover "an occurrence that jeopardizes the security of data or the physical security of a computer network owned or operated by a Federal agency or covered critical infrastructure," 42 where critical infrastructure includes private sector computer systems identified by the Department of Homeland Security. 43 In short, for government policymakers, there is little that cybersecurity does not cover.

Similarly, legal scholars define the concept expansively. Gus P. Coldebella and Brian M. White see cybersecurity as encompassing "criminality of all stripes, nation state and corporate espionage, and attacks," even while they decry term-creep in the concept. 44 Sean M. Condron, of the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 45 defines [*594] the problem as attacks on critical infrastructure by "terrorists, nation-states, terrorist sympathizers, and thrill seekers," 46 where critical infrastructure comprises networked computer systems "so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." 47 Susan Brenner, in her Article classifying cybersecurity risks based on the actor's intent, defines cyberthreats as those "using computer technology to engage in activity that undermines a society's ability to maintain internal or external order." 48 Milton L. Mueller decries the fact that "the term security now encompasses a host of problems, perhaps too many to fit properly under one word." 49 However, he then proposes a governance-based approach to cybersecurity without offering a coherent definition of the term, and includes spam, phishing, and surveillance as representative threats. 50

Even scholars who purportedly focus on narrower aspects of cybersecurity employ commodious definitions. Kelly Gable, who concentrates on cyberterrorism, defines it as "efforts by terrorists to use the Internet to hijack computer systems, bring down the international finance system, or commit analogous terrorist actions in cyberspace." 51 A 2001 report by Steven A. Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service describes cyberwarfare as "various aspects of defending and attacking information and computer networks in cyberspace, as well as denying an adversary's ability to do the same." 52 Brenner defines cybercrime as "the use of computer technology to commit crime; to engage in activity that threatens a society's ability to maintain internal order." 53 Richard Clarke, former Special Advisor on Cybersecurity to President George W. Bush, and co-author Robert Knake even conceive of cybersecurity as encompassing [*595] intellectual property theft. 54 These definitions of cybersecurity are vague, overbroad, and not helpful. Each attempt at framing the cybersecurity problem implicitly sets a standard for addressing the problem, for prioritizing it relative to competing concerns, and for measuring progress. Inaccurate cybersecurity definitions impede these efforts.

Conceptual failures - shortcomings in theoretical orientation - are largely to blame for what all commentators agree is an utter lack of success in improving cybersecurity. 55 Legal scholarship has thus far approached cybersecurity questions from within well-established, comfortable, yet poorly fitting models from criminal law, national security law, and military law. These doctrinal frameworks push scholars to concentrate upon the identity of actors behind a cyberthreat, and to determine their intent. 56 The problem is that the Internet's design makes attribution extremely difficult. 57 Tracing an attack to a given computer is challenging; deciphering who operated that computer during the attack is harder yet; and discerning motive can be nearly impossible. 58 The chief culprit, for most [*596] scholars, is the lack of an authentication mechanism in the Internet's core TCP/IP protocols. 59 The Internet routes data in best-efforts fashion, regardless of who sent it. 60 Indeed, there is simply no way to verify a sender's identity under TCP/IP; functions such as authentication and error-checking are left to higher-level network layers and applications. 61 This default setting, which permits unattributed communication, is frequently exploited by malefactors - Internet traffic can be generated by botnets of suborned computers available for rent, or from computers specifically compromised for purposes of an attack. 62

Recent cybersecurity incidents illustrate the problem. The cyberassault on Estonia during that country's conflict with Russia in May 2007 originated in part from computers located in Brazil and Vietnam. 63 The July 2009 denial of service attack against South Korea and the U.S., widely attributed to North [*597] Korea, 64 was launched from computers in Austria, Georgia, Germany, and even South Korea and America. 65 In both cases, initial judgments that a State (Russia or North Korea) was responsible dissolved into uncertainty in the face of mixed evidence. Attribution is thus an intolerably hard problem for conventional legal approaches. Worse, it is one that flows directly from the architecture of the Internet. 66

Unsurprisingly, the predominant answer to this perceived shortcoming is to retrofit attribution capabilities into the core of the Internet. Clarke and Knake want to move to new networks where "the user's authenticated identity could be embedded in each packet." 67 Jeffrey A. Hunker too believes that the "existing Internet architecture is fundamentally insecure." 68 He seeks to replace the Internet with a network that allows "different governments to have different rules," where governments "protect their citizens on the Internet the same way they protect them" in other media. 69 Former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell argues "we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment … more manageable." 70 Former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden proposes creating a new, "hardened enterprise structure" for the Internet that [*598] would embed identification capabilities into its architecture. 71 Stuart Biegel states that "code-based adjustments in Internet architecture … can go a long way toward countering cyberterrorism." 72 Greater attribution enables the traditional practice of deterrence, along with traditional distinctions among criminals, terrorists, soldiers, and spies. 73 By building strong attribution into networking protocols, lawyers (and their governments) can apply time-tested ways of thinking and reacting to threats online. However, trying to redesign the architecture of the Internet as a solution has at least three critical shortcomings: difficult implementation, unintended consequences, and loss of generativity.

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