Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Information sharing often weakens cybersecurity

Eli Dourado & Andrea O’Sullivan 15, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and advisor to the State Department on international telecommunication matters who has served on several U.S. delegations to UN treaty and policy conferences & feature writer at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “’Information Sharing’: No Panacea for American Cybersecurity Challenges”, 06/22/2015, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/technology-and-innovation/%E2%80%9Cinformation-sharing%E2%80%9D-no-panacea-american-cybersecurity /lg

Information sharing initiatives are not novel. A 1998 presidential order authorized the formation of public-private partnerships to share threat information within critical infrastructure industries. Dozens of such Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) have coordinated cyberthreat information flows among public and private entities since that time. Additionally, at least 20 federal offices already carry out missions that prioritize information sharing and public-private cybersecurity coordination. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Center (NCCIC), a DHS cyberthreat coordination center, houses the US Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT), which has served as the primary cyberthreat collection, assistance, and notification center since it was founded in 2003. President Obama created the CTIIC in February 2015 to advance information sharing goals along with the NCCIC, the Federal Bureau of Intelligence’s National Cyber Investigative Task Force, DOD’s US Cyber Command, and “other relevant United States Government entities”—which could amount to several dozen offices. Such overlapping roles and unclear lines of communication results in waste, inefficiency, and poorer security outcomes.

Despite the ample resources devoted to this task, the federal government has struggled to effectively collect and share incident information internally and with the private sector. ISACs can cease to operate if members do not actually share valuable information. A DHS Inspector General Report finds that the NCCIC faces large challenges in effectively sharing information among the appropriate parties. As of October 2014, the NCCIC had not even developed a common incident management system to coordinate information sharing—five years after being formed to do so. US-CERT has yet to develop performance metrics to gauge and improve effectiveness, despite serving as the main federal cybersecurity consultant for over a decade. Additionally, private sector threat analysis efforts often outpace US-CERT in breach notification. Indeed, DHS has at times been unable to even adequately share threat information within its own offices. In March 2013, DHS’s own US-CERT issued a warning about Windows XP vulnerabilities to government and private sector partners. But by November of that year, DHS’ Inspector General reported that several DHS computers were still running a vulnerable version of Windows XP, even after other DHS representatives ensured they had stopped running that version.

The Congressional Research Service notes “greater information sharing may, in some instances, effectively weaken cybersecurity by creating an overwhelming amount of information, eliminating the capacity to pay attention to truly important alerts.” The federal government sought to overcome this challenge by developing technological tools to surveil network activity, called the “EINSTEIN” projects, yet these projects often run over cost and perform worse than anticipated. Indeed, the EINSTEIN projects failed to identify the recent OPM hack. However ambitious their design, these programs have so far proven too technologically crude to handle the complex central identification and communication efforts intended to protect federal systems. There may never be enough EINSTEINs in the world for DHS, DOD, and DOJ to adequately coordinate and respond to the massive amounts of private data that would be collected under CISA.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.