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Heg is unsustainable and causes long-term economic decline

Layne 12 [Layne, Christopher, Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and the Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His fields of interest are international relations theory, great power politics, U.S. foreign policy, and grand strategy., “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, Texas A & M University, https://www.carlanorrlof.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/This-Time-Its-Real-The-End-of-Unipolarity-and-the-Pax-Americana.pdf]//AA

Revisiting the 1980s’ Debate on American Decline: The ‘‘Declinists’’ Were Right Of course, this is not the first time that the United States has been gripped by fear of decline.5 In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers triggered an intense but brief debate about whether America’s power was in relative decline (Kennedy 1987). In arguing that the United States was experiencing the relative decline of its economic power, Kennedy was not alone. Other prominent scholars making this case included Chace (1981), Calleo (1982), Gilpin (1987), and Huntington (1988b). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers reso- nated because it dovetailed with popular fears that the United States, enervated by the costs of the Cold War, was being surpassed economically by Japan and West Germany. While Kennedy’s thesis struck a chord with the public, the US foreign policy elite lashed out at the notion that the United States was declining. Two leading establishment scholars, Harvard profes- sors Samuel P. Huntington and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., went so far as to label Kennedy and the others as ‘‘dec- linists’’—a subtle twist of the English language imply- ing that they were advocates of US decline rather than dispassionate analysts of what they regarded as worrisome trends in the United States’ great-power trajectory (Nye 1991; Huntington 1988a).6 Contrary to the way their argument was portrayed by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that the United States already had declined steeply, or that it soon would undergo a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and economic drivers that were in play and which, over time, would cause American economic power to decline relatively and produce a shift in global distribution of power. The declinists con- tended that the United States was afflicted by a slow—’’termite’’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy.7 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on United States’ world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote, ‘‘The task facing American statesman over the next decades. .. is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage’’ (Kennedy 1987:534; my emphasis). When one goes back and re-reads what the 1980s declinists pinpointed as the drivers of American decline, their analyses look farsighted because the same drivers of economic decline are at the center of debate today: too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current account deficits; chronic federal budget deficits and a mount- ing national debt; and de-industrialization. Over time, 1980s declinists said, the United States’ goals of geopolitical dominance and economic prosperity would collide. Today, their warnings seem eerily pre- scient. Robert Gilpin’s 1987 description of America’s economic and grand strategic plight could just as easily describe the United States after the Great Recession: With a decreased rate of economic growth and a low rate of national savings, the United States was living and defending commitments far beyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power back into balance once again, the United States would one day have to cut back further on its overseas commitments, reduce the American standard of liv- ing, or decrease domestic productive investment even more than it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was threatened by a potentially devastating fiscal crisis. (Gilpin 1987:347–348) In the Great Recession’s wake—doubly so since it is far from clear that either the United States or glo- bal economies are out of the woods—the United States now is facing the dilemmas that Gilpin and the other declinists warned about. Counterfactual questions—‘‘What would have hap- pened if?’’—are difficult to answer. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask where the United States might be today had the warnings of the ‘‘declinists’’ been heeded. Perhaps the United States would have taken corrective economic and fiscal steps two decades ago that would have ameliorated the crisis in which it now finds itself. However, the debate about US decline ended abruptly when, in short order, the United States’ main geopolitical and economic riv- als—the Soviet Union and Japan, respectively—expe- rienced dramatic reversals of fortune. The Soviet Union unraveled, and in the early 1990s Japan’s eco- nomic bubble burst, plunging it into a cycle of defla- tion and low growth from which, two decades later, it has yet to recover. Seemingly overnight the threats to the United States’ military and economic suprem- acy were removed from the international chessboard. The 1990s subsequently witnessed a euphoric American triumphalism that wiped away any thoughts of US decline. On the contrary, the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ and the ‘‘end of history’’—along with the emergence of the so-called Washington consen- sus—seemed to confirm that both America’s power and its ideology were unchallengeable in the post- Cold War world (Fukuyama 1989; Krauthammer 1990–1991). The Great Recession has put paid to such fantasies and put the spotlight on the domestic drivers of American decline. Domestic Drivers of American Decline: Debt, Deficits, and the Dollar’s Uncertain Future China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and fiscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ down- grading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difficulties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US fiscal crisis are com- plex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabili- ties needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and sup- plying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difficult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can finance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domes- tic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by bor- rowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deficit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious ques- tions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Reces- sion, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitle- ment programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel lau- reate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Sti- glitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal govern- ment expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congres- sional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt ⁄ GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustain- able fiscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subse- quent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the grow- ing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining for- eign investors’ confidence in the United States’ abil- ity to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is spe- cial because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and ⁄ or prints money to pay them. The Uni- ted States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reduc- ing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on interna- tional economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially significant and underappreci- ated restraints upon contemporary American politi- cal and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008). Although doubts about the dollar’s long-term health predated the Great Recession, the events of 2007–2009 have amplified them in two key respects (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2008). First, the other big players in the international economy now are either geopolitical rivals like China or ambiguous ‘‘allies’’ like Europe, which has its own ambitions and no longer requires US protection from the now- vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American assets (more than $2 tril- lion), is worried that America’s fiscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no confidence in the dollar’s future is reflected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the ren- minbi’s gradual ‘‘internationalization,’’ and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its fiscal house in order. Alarm bells about the dollar’s uncertain status now are ringing. In April 2011, Standard & Poor’s warned that in the coming years there is a one-in-three chance that the United States’ triple A credit rating could be reduced if Washington fails to solve the fis- cal crisis—and in August 2011 S& P did downgrade the US credit rating to AA. In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deficits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank declared that the dollar probably will lose its status as the primary reserve currency by 2025 (World Bank 2011). In the coming years, the United States will have to defend the dollar by reassuring foreign lenders (read: China) both that there will be no runaway inflation and that it can pay its debts. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitle- ments reductions, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke off growth, there will be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expen- ditures (and entitlements), because, as Figure 6 shows, that is where the money is. With US defense spending currently at such high levels, domestic political pressures to make steep cuts in defense spending are bound to increase. As the Cornell international political economist Jona- than Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of US defense expenditures is ‘‘more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending’’ (Kirshner 2008:431). In the spring of 2011, the Obama administration proposed to cut US defense spending by $400 mil- lion over eleven years. But that is a drop in the bucket, and cuts of a much larger magnitude almost certainly will be needed.10 Big defense cuts mean that during the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be compelled to scale back its overseas military commitments. This will have two conse- quences. First, as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global commons will diminish. In this respect, America’s fiscal crisis and the dollar’s uncertain future are important drivers of American decline. The End of the Pax Americana US decline has profound implications for the future of international politics. Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Militarily, the hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and for guarding the global commons (Posen 2003). Econom- ically, the hegemon provides public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the global economy, and providing a reserve cur- rency (Kindelberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). As US power continues to decline over the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be progressively unable to discharge these hegemonic tasks. The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to fifteen years the looming fiscal crisis will compel Washington to retrench strategically. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to com- mand the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. How- ever, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is sup- posed to be the lender of last resort in the interna- tional economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibil- ity for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global eco- nomic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to gal- vanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an eco- nomic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent exam- ples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda set- ting’’ capacity in international economic manage- ment include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to reva- lue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

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