Heg is unsustainable and leads to domestic decay
Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA
Crisis Instability Unfortunately, the unipolar era will not be totally free from conflict. Although unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalry, it may increase the risk that crises between the United States and weaker nations will escalate to war.12 The reason is that U.S. military superiority could embolden the United States to stand firm in a crisis while simultaneously inciting weaker opponents to shoot first, in a desperate attempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out their offensive forces.13 Under unipolarity, this dynamic looms over U.S. relations with all nations. It is most dangerous, however, with regard to North Korea, China, and Russia, because these countries can inflict apocalyptic damage on American cities and have ongoing disputes with the United States over territory (e.g., Taiwan, Crimea, the Korean Peninsula), the U.S. military presence abroad, freedom of navigation, and human rights. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and these countries. A primary goal of U.S. security policy, therefore, must be to reduce the risk that such crises escalate to major wars. How? NORTH KOREA The North Korean case is the gravest, but also the simplest, because the United States has no good options and only one nonhorrible option: deter- rence.14 North Korea will never give up its nuclear arsenal, which is its main insurance policy against a U.S. or South Korean attack, and the U.S. military cannot reliably destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons or conven- tional artillery before it has a chance to use them.15 Deterrence may feel unsatisfying, because it places U.S. security at least partly in North Korea’s hands. Like old age, however, deterrence only seems intolerable until one considers the alternative.16 The U.S. Depart- ment of Defense estimates that a U.S.-North Korean war would kill 20,000 people per day in South Korea alone, even if no nuclear weapons were used. It also admits that the U.S. national missile defense system only has a 50 percent chance of intercepting a North Korean ballistic missile headed for the U.S. mainland.17 Given these dire statistics, the United States should learn to live with a North Korean nuclear capability—just as it learned to live with the Soviet and Chinese nuclear arsenals. Deterrence, however, does not mean doing nothing. The United States should continue to make clear that it will “totally destroy” North Korea if it attacks the United States or its allies or transfers nuclear materials to other states or groups.18 To back up these threats, the United States should inte- grate additional terminal and midcourse interceptors to its national missile defense system and develop boost-phase interceptors.19 It also should redouble efforts to improve civil defenses and counterforce capabilities.20 These measures will enhance America’s ability to emerge from a nuclear war relatively unscathed, and thereby hopefully deter North Korea from starting a war in the first place.21 At the same time, the United States should engage in diplomacy with North Korea and contingency planning with China. North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear arsenal, but it might accept limits on that arsenal in exchange for U.S. security assurances. The United States therefore should offer to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, forswear mili- tary strikes, and lift economic sanctions so long as North Korea abides by “three no’s”: no additional nuclear weapons, no improved nuclear weap- ons or delivery vehicles, and no export of nuclear materials.22 To compel North Korea to accept this bargain, the United States needs to tighten sanctions on North Korea, which in turn requires making a side deal with China. Currently the Chinese government looks the other way when Chinese companies smuggle goods into North Korea. China could crack down on these violations, but will do so only if it feels assured that a North Korean collapse, which would be made more likely by tighter sanc- tions, would not result in U.S. forces swarming up the Korean Peninsula toward China’s border. Recent research suggests that China is willing to abandon North Korea, but not if it means American troops on the banks of the Yalu.23 The United States, therefore, should offer China a deal: in return for full Chinese sanctions on North Korea, the United States will let China dictate the terms of a joint contingency plan for a North Korean collapse. As part of this plan, the United States would promise to keep its troops south of the 38th parallel and offer to withdraw its forces entirely from the Korean Pen- insula once the dust has settled if China will accede to a U.S. alliance with a reunified Korea. The U.S. military will probably hate this proposal, because it cedes con- trol of North Korea’s territory and nuclear sites to China without a fight. Allowing China to secure North Korea, however, would keep U.S. troops out of a potential nuclear hellhole and reduce the likelihood of a U.S.-China clash.24 The geographic reality is that Chinese forces can occupy North Korea before U.S. reinforcements even mobilize for an attack—China has at least 150,000 troops perched on its border with North Korea, which is only sixty miles from North Korea’s main nuclear sites and two-thirds of its mis- sile sites.25 Given that Chinese troops will be first on the scene, the U.S. military should stay out of their way. Instead of going to war with China over North Korea’s carcass, the United States should help China secure the area by providing intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear sites and technical expertise to dismantle them. CHINA AND RUSSIA The situations with China and Russia are less dire than the North Korean case, but more complicated, because China and Russia have more ways to hurt the United States but also more to offer it. Even as the United States competes with these powers for influence, it cooperates with them in numerous areas. Adopting a policy of pure deterrence, therefore, would be shortsighted and dangerous. Unfortunately, there is widespread disagreement among strategists about what the United States should do to enhance crisis stability with these two regional powers, aside from some fairly obvious confidence building mea- sures, including codes of conduct for military forces and for civilian aircraft and ships, backchannels for diplomats to work out face-saving compro- mises, crisis hotlines linking the top leaderships, military-to-military exchanges, cyber and nuclear risk reduction centers, and joint peace and humanitarian operations.26 Some scholars argue that the United States should simply retrench from East Asia and Eastern Europe and grant China and Russia broad spheres of influence.27 The most extreme of these proposals would have the United States abrogate its alliances in Asia and Europe and pull its forces out of both regions. Retrenchment has its appeal.28 Indeed, it seems the logical, God-given strategy for a self-sufficient superpower protected by two vast oceans. Yet large-scale retrenchment not only would sap U.S. influence in Asia and Europe, but also reduce crisis stability by undermining deterrence.29 China or Russia might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from their regions and ramp up coercive pressure on their demoralized neighbors. Successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deterrence.30 Retrench- ment is skewed too heavily toward the former. A better way to enhance crisis stability while preserving the territorial status quo in Asia and Europe would be to combine economic and political engagement with an “active denial” military strategy.31 The overarching goal of this strategy would be to create local “situations of strength” that raise the costs of military aggression for China and Russia, but without backing them into a corner.32 Such a strategy would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ AD) capabilities of China and Russia’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The objective would be to turn China and Russia’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying terri- tory to China and Russia but not to take and hold territory themselves.33 In East Asia, this means helping China’s maritime neighbors acquire advanced anti-air and anti-ship missiles plus the platforms and targeting capabilities to launch them. In Eastern Europe, it means prepping the Baltic States to wage guerilla warfare.34 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. forces on the one hand and Chinese and Russian forces on the other. American forces would remain in Asia and Europe and roam wherever international law allows, but they would be stationed in dispersed and hardened bases scat- tered around the periphery of each region, where they could be called on in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of Chinese and Rus- sian forces. Decreasing the number of American soldiers based near China and Russia’s borders would reduce the likelihood of incidents, help reas- sure China and Russia that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on their homelands at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese or Russian preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balances of power in Asia and Europe, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China or Russia to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coercion.35 As described in chapter 5, the United States is uniquely empowered to impose painful sanctions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international ship- ping.36 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to negotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.37 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese or Russian forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese or Russian mainlands. These strikes could be conducted from sub- marines, stealth-aircraft, or road-mobile missile batteries—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese and Russian A2/AD forces than surface ships, nonstealth aircraft, and ground forces. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could escalate horizontally before doing so vertically; that is, by opening up new geographic fronts rather than throwing U.S. forces into the cauldron of the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over China or Russia if it simply unloaded on their bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a war. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knockout punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition.38 Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China or Russia, however, a military posture primed for rapid escalation could be a recipe for disaster. An offensive pos- ture not only risks turning minor disputes into major wars, it also could turn conventional wars into nuclear wars. Some of the systems that support China and Russia’s conventional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support their nuclear arsenals, so Chinese or Russian leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemp- tive U.S. attack on their nuclear deterrents. Moreover, China and Russia have declared that they would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on their homelands. Perhaps these declarations are bluffs. But is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential annihilation of their militaries, one of these nations might fire off a nuclear weapon in the hope of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? Such a scenario might sound alarmist, but Russia’s mili- tary doctrine explicitly calls for using nuclear weapons to “deescalate” con- ventional wars, and Chinese leaders have suggested that the PLA is prepared to do likewise.39 In a multipolar or bipolar world, it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to prevent a peer competitor from overrunning Asia or Europe. Better to nip the problem in the bud than repeat the mis- takes of Munich and empower aggressors. In today’s unipolar world, how- ever, no rival power is capable of going on a Hitler-style rampage across Eurasia, so the stakes for the United States in a war there would be moder- ate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little. Instead of rushing into wars with China or Russia, therefore, the United States should pick its battles, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Imperial Overstretch The theory of imperial overstretch holds that superpowers tend to expand beyond their means and collapse as a result.40 Such overexpansion is driven in part by hubris. As Christopher Layne explains: “A hegemon eas- ily is lured into overexpansion. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it. Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously.”41 In addition to hubris, superpowers also tend to suffer from a pervasive sense of insecurity. As Robert Jervis explains: The very extent of the hegemon’s influence means that all sorts of geo- graphic and ideological disturbances can threaten it. Frontiers can be expanded, but doing so just recreates them. Hegemony thus also ironi- cally magnifies the sense of threat. The very fact that the United States has interests throughout the world leads to the fear that undesired changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere. Disturbances that would be dismissed in a multipolar or bipolar world loom much larger for the hegemon because it is present in all corners of the globe and everything seems interconnected.42 In short, superpowers tend to become paranoid and militaristic, and these impulses, in turn, compel them to expand abroad—thereby creating more “turbulent frontiers” to defend, interests to pursue, and threats to address.43 This self-perpetuating pattern of expansion ultimately exhausts the super- power’s resources because “the costs of empire tend to rise geometrically as its size increases, whereas its resources increase only arithmetically.”44 Is the United States doomed to follow this historical pattern and fritter away its resources on reckless adventures abroad? In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is hard to argue with the assessment that “the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic overextension.”45 Yet, U.S. overextension is not inevitable. In fact, a clear-eyed recognition of the unipolar distribution of power could help the United States temper its imperial temptations. As the world’s only superpower, the United States is exceptionally secure and, therefore, can afford to play wait-and-see, allowing threats to emerge fully before responding. This situation stands in contrast to the Cold War, when anything that happened anywhere in the world seemingly had impli- cations for the U.S.-Soviet power balance. Allies had to be wooed and cod- dled to keep them from joining the other side. Communist advances, even in peripheral areas, had to be countered to maintain U.S. prestige and cred- ibility. Today, by contrast, there are no dominos that must be kept from fall- ing, and America’s survival does not hang in the balance of the crisis of the day. The U.S. military, therefore, can focus on first-order missions— deterring major powers and rogue states that brandish weapons of mass destruction—rather than playing globo-cop. The virtues of strategic restraint might seem obvious, but they often are lost in U.S. foreign policy debates.46 As Fareed Zakaria points out, the Amer- ican media and some policymaking elites in Washington remain wedded to a Cold War mindset that mistakes “activity for achievement.”47 In this view, every crisis abroad and every move by a foreign rival must be countered with a robust assertion of American power. To do otherwise, some pundits and policymakers argue, would abdicate American leadership, embolden enemies, and demoralize allies. Better for the United States to shoot first and develop a strategy later, they argue, then fail to intervene at all. This misguided mindset has kept the U.S. military at war for most of the past two decades—with little to show for it. Of the campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, only the first could be considered a clear vic- tory.48 The combined costs of these conflicts—seven thousand American dead, fifty thousand wounded, and $6 trillion—hardly seem justified. To regain strategic solvency, the United States should take three steps. First, American policymakers should resurrect the so-called Powell Doc- trine and make it the cornerstone of debate before every major military intervention.49 This doctrine, which was originally developed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the 1980s and then elaborated by chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the 1990s, consisted of a series of questions that had to be answered “yes” before sending American soldiers to fight and die abroad: 1. Is a vital national security interest threatened? 2. Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted? 5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7. Is the action supported by the American people? 8. Do we have genuine broad international support? The core assumption of the Powell Doctrine is that the United States rarely needs to rush into war to keep itself safe. It is a doctrine designed to conserve U.S. power, so that when vital interests are threatened, the U.S. military can respond vigorously with forces that have not been chewed up in wars of choice over trivial issues in peripheral areas. In practice, the Powell Doctrine implies that the U.S. military should focus on preparing for wars against China and Russia, which are the only major powers not currently aligned with the United States, and against North Korea, which is the only minor power that currently has nuclear weapons and clear hostile intent toward the United States. The U.S. mili- tary also can allocate some resources to killing terrorists abroad, but this should be done primarily with special operations forces and drones rather than large-scale military occupations. The doctrine further implies that the United States should avoid fighting wars where victory depends on controlling the politics of chaotic countries. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, local leaders will rarely do what the United States wants if doing so conflicts with their interests, and no reasonable amount of American blood or treasure can change that fundamental fact.50 The United States can support local allies in troubled regions with tools short of military occupation, including diplomacy, aid, military training, intelligence, arms, special operations raids, and drone strikes. In general, however, the U.S. military should be allowed to focus on its core competency—destroying enemy militaries—rather than being asked to rebuild tattered nations. Second, Congress should reassert its authority to regulate the use of force.51 According to the U.S. Constitution, Congress is supposed to decide where and when the United States goes to war. The president can order short-term military interventions, but only when the nation’s security is in imminent danger. The United States followed this Constitutional principle for most of its history. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Congress has retreated from for- eign policy. It allowed the Clinton administration to send U.S. forces to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo without congressional authorization; rubber- stamped the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and allowed the Obama administration to double U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009 without a vote and attack Libya in 2011 without a single hearing. In the future, Congress should subject proposals for large-scale military interventions to public debate and a formal vote. The foreign affairs com- mittees could lead the way by holding hearings before each intervention and soliciting testimony from a wide-range of experts. These hearings could be paired with trips to the region in question, where members of Congress could meet with political actors and journalists, researchers, and aid workers. These practices were standard operating procedure in the 1970s and 1980s and should become so again. Congress also should pass legislation limiting the president’s ability to launch a preventive or unprovoked nuclear strike.52 The president should still be able to order retaliatory or preemptive strikes, but preventive or unprovoked strikes should require sober deliberation among multiple offi- cials. President Trump’s casual comments about nuclear war with North Korea underscore the risks of giving him unchecked authority to order an attack. To reduce these risks, Congress should require the unanimous con- sent of a small group of officials—including the vice president, the secre- tary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the four leaders of the House and the Senate—for any preventive or unprovoked nuclear strike. Third, the United States should institute a war tax for any military opera- tions that require supplemental funding. For nearly 200 years, from 1812 to 2001, the United States paid for its wars in part by raising special taxes on individuals and corporations. These “pay as you fight” taxes ensured that all Americans sacrificed for the common cause. Since 9/11, however, the United States has paid for its wars by borrowing, adding trillions of dollars to the national debt. This practice of putting wars on the credit card is not just fiscally irresponsible, it is dangerous, because people are much more likely to support a stupid war if they do not have to pay higher taxes to finance it.53 The flip side is that a mandatory war tax would make American leaders more judicious about when and where to send U.S. forces into battle.54 The three steps highlighted above would almost certainly reduce U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. That would be wonderful. The United States has three important interests in the region—oil, counterter- rorism, and democracy—but none requires a large U.S. military commit- ment. Instead, the United States should adopt an offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East, limiting its peacetime presence to a skeletal base structure, and put boots on the ground only if a local power threatens to dominate or destroy the region.55 The U.S. military does not need to guard Middle Eastern oil reserves, because no state is powerful enough to seize them or seriously disrupt world oil markets: Iraq’s military has already been neutered by the United States; Iran’s military has been ground down by decades of conflict and sanctions; Iranian-backed Shiite militias lack the heavy forces and air defenses needed for large-scale conquest; and Saudi Arabia’s military is geared for internal security and air superiority, not ground invasions.56 Iran could try to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, where most of the oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf is shipped, but rigorous campaign analyses suggest that Iran could destroy only twenty oil tankers, a number far from suffi- cient to shock the oil market, and the U.S. military could break an Iranian blockade with air and missile strikes launched from over the horizon.57 A Saudi civil war could threaten the free flow of oil, given that most of the Kingdom’s disgruntled Shia minority lives in the Eastern Province near the country’s oil production facilities. A mass uprising, however, is unlikely, because Saudi Arabia’s internal security forces are robust, roughly 90 per- cent of Saudi workers are government employees that depend on the mon- archy for their livelihoods, and the Saudi government has huge cash reserves to keep the gravy train running during economic downturns.58 Even if Saudi Arabia succumbs to civil war, sending U.S. Marines into Mecca and Medina would not pacify the situation.59 The United States also does not need a large military presence in the Middle East to contain Islamist terrorism. All of the deadly Islamist terror- ist attacks committed on American soil since 9/11 have been carried out by U.S. citizens or legal residents, so bombing or occupying the Middle East for the umpteenth time is unlikely to reduce the risk of attacks further.60 Moreover, that risk is already extremely low: since 1991, Americans have been four times more likely to drown in bathtubs than be killed by a jihadi.61 The main battles in the war on terror should be fought by U.S. intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement, not by the U.S. mili- tary. In this regard, the United States already does more than enough: it has more than a thousand government organizations and two thousand private companies engaged in counterterrorism, giving it two counterter- rorism organizations for every Islamist terrorist suspect it has ever arrested.62 Finally, the United States should not use military force to promote democracy in the Middle East. If two decades of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything, it is that the U.S. military can- not install liberal democracy where powerful local actors do not want it.63 The United States succeeded in democratizing Germany and Japan after World War II only because their populations were war-weary and desper- ate for U.S. protection from the Soviet Union.64 In the Middle East today, by contrast, most people hate the United States and do not share a com- mon enemy with it. They therefore tend to view U.S. troops stomping around their homelands the same way the Vietnamese did in the 1960s. If the United States is serious about promoting democracy in the Middle East, it should reduce its support for corrupt authoritarian regimes there— that is, by becoming less involved in the region—not by occupying more countries militarily. Domestic Decay According to a tradition of political thought going back to Plato and Aristo- tle, hegemons can become victims of their own success and collapse from within.65 Having vanquished foreign rivals, various clans within the domi- nant nation may turn on each other, resulting in the weakening of national institutions and, in extreme cases, civil war. This pattern—peace abroad fueling conflict at home—has been docu- mented by numerous scholars, including Max Weber, Otto Hintze, Charles Tilly, and Michael Desch.66 These scholars have shown that during periods of great power competition nations tend to develop strong bureaucracies and efficient systems of taxation and espouse a strong sense of patriotism and national unity. During periods of low external threat, however, nation- states sometimes tear apart.67 For example, the relatively tranquil interna- tional environment in Europe from 1815 to 1853 (often called the Pax Britannica) witnessed an unprecedented breakdown in state cohesion and a series of revolutions in the late 1840s.68 Similarly, the benign external threat environment enjoyed by the United States in the 1850s exacerbated internal tensions that culminated in the Civil War.69 By contrast, during the World Wars and the first half of the Cold War, American national unity rose and government institutions expanded dramatically in scope and size.70 Recent trends in the United States fit this historical pattern: since the col- lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, partisan divisions in the United States have surged to levels not seen since the Civil War, and gridlock has become America’s political norm, with recent Congresses ranking among the most polarized and least productive in the post–World War II era (figure 6.1).71 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Moderation Gridlock 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Start year of Congress Figure 6.1. Historically dysfunctional: polarization and gridlock in the U.S. Congress, 1947–2013. Note: “Moderation” measures the proportion of centrist legislators in the House and Senate (lawmakers whose floor votes place them closer ideologically to the center of the chamber than to their own party median), divided by the ideological gulf between party medians. “Gridlock” measures the ratio of failed measures to all salient issues on Washington’s agenda. For an issue to be “salient,” it needed to inspire at least four New York Times editorials in a given Congress. Source: Binder 2003, 2014, 2015. The 9/11 terrorist attacks briefly brought Americans together, but the cama- raderie quickly evaporated, a fact that suggests that the threat of terrorism is not serious enough to mobilize the nation the way a genuine hegemonic rivalry does. If anything, the terrorist threat has probably exacerbated divi- sions within American society by inciting witch hunts for terrorist suspects and igniting vicious debates on immigration, torture, war, and privacy. Without a unifying national mission, Americans have sorted themselves into clans based on social class and culture. Consequently, the two major political parties are divided not just by policy preferences, but also by iden- tity. Rural whites now overwhelmingly vote Republican while most minor- ities and urban whites vote Democrat.72 This crude tribalism leaves little room for compromise. If the partisan divide were merely about policy, the parties could split the difference. Now that American politics has become a clash of cultures, however, both parties view compromise with the other side as immoral and dangerous. For this reason, policymaking in the unipolar era has lurched between grid- lock and partisan overreach, and many of the problems highlighted in earlier chapters have festered, including spiraling entitlement costs; crumbling infra- structure; declining rates of upward mobility and entrepreneurship; racially and economically stratified systems of education and healthcare; a bloated and racially biased criminal justice system; a convoluted tax code that incentivizes tax evasion rather than domestic investment; and a crazy patchwork of federal, state, and local regulations that benefit big firms with armies of lawyers rather than small start-ups or public infrastructure projects. If present trends are not reversed, the United States may slip into a vicious cycle in which partisan gridlock undermines public trust in govern- ment, which incentivizes politicians to starve the government of resources and authority, which leads to even poorer government performance, which leads to more defunding of the bureaucracy. This downward spiral has already begun. Non-defense discretionary spending, a category that includes everything besides interest payments on the national debt and spending on entitlements and defense (e.g. spending on education, infrastructure, transportation, R&D, housing, energy, envi- ronmental protection, job training, food, agriculture, childcare, justice, and international affairs), has shrunk to just 11 percent of the federal budget, down from 25 percent in the 1960s and 1970s.73 As journalist Ezra Klein has pointed out, the U.S. government is becoming nothing more than an insur- ance company with an army.74 Such a weak state might be great for lobby- ists and large corporations, but not for the average American. The United States thus faces a challenge: how to tackle national problems without a foreign bogeyman to unite the country and galvanize collective action. To meet this challenge, the United States needs to empower a cen- trist American majority, and doing that requires structural change to U.S. political institutions. What changes?