Russia challenging the US over Ukraine marks the end of US heg
Walt, PhD, 4/14/22 (Stephen M., a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, He receives his bachelors from Stanford University, and his masters and PhD from UC Berkeley, published 4/14/22, accessed 7/7/22, published by Foreign Policy, “The Ukraine War Doesn’t Change Everything”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/13/ukraine-war-realism-great-powers-unipolarity/)//lexmw
Whatever the outcome, many observers believe the war will have a . They see the war in Ukraine as a watershed moment: a giant fork in the road. If Russia loses big, the “liberal world order” will get a new lease on life and the forces of autocracy will suffer a setback. If Putin ekes out some sort of win, however, they foresee a . Existing norms against the acquisition of territory by force will be eroded, and other autocrats will presumably be empowered to launch similar campaigns whenever the geopolitical stars align in their favor. I see it differently. The war in Ukraine is a significant event, but not because the outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power or the normative environment that states have constructed (and sometimes adhere to). Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief “unipolar moment” (1993-2020) when the United States was the world’s sole genuine superpower and because it heralds a return to patterns of world politics that were temporarily suppressed during the short era of unchallenged U.S. primacy. The end of that era was in sight long before Russia invaded Ukraine, however, and the war itself is more of a punctuation mark. (For a similar take, see Stephen Kotkin .) I am less inclined to see the war in Ukraine as a transformative moment because I’ve heard that song too many times in recent decades. We were told that “everything had changed” when the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union imploded, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. A new world order was at hand, the “,” mankind had supposedly reached the “,” and liberal capitalist democracy (preferably the American version) was now the only game in town. But then “everything changed” again on Sept. 11, 2001, and we were suddenly in a “global war on terror,” which some tried to repackage as “.” But hold on! “Everything changed” yet again when financial markets collapsed in 2008 and Wall Street’s “masters of the universe” were revealed to be gullible, fallible, and corrupt. And then “everything changed” once more when Donald Trump became president and began trampling every norm in the U.S. political playbook. So forgive me if I have trouble seeing the war in Ukraine as a decisive turning point in the history of humanity. For all the damage and suffering that have already occurred, it has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of destruction wrought by the wars in Indochina, between Iran and Iraq, or in —or by the . The war could still get there, of course—especially if weapons of mass destruction are used—but the odds are against it (a prediction that I fervently hope turns out to be correct). More importantly, what is different about the current war is that for the first time since the early 1990s—but hardly the first time in history—there are rival great powers on the opposite sides of a major war. But this is a reversion to familiar patterns of great-power conflicts (and proxy wars) and not something novel or unique. As suggested above, this war is more accurately seen as marking the official end of the brief quasi-peace that followed the end of the Cold War. War didn’t disappear in that period—the United States fought in a bunch of them and started several—but the conflicts during this period were either civil wars, wars between minor powers, gross mismatches between major powers and minor powers, or some combination of all three. Direct great-power competition was muted because neither Russia nor China was strong enough to openly resist the United States. Dartmouth College political scientist William Wohlforth was partly right when he wrote of the “”: Few countries wanted to face the “focused enmity” of the United States or take actions that might bring the United States into the game in opposition. Where Wohlforth erred was his prediction that unipolarity might last even longer than Cold War bipolarity. That misjudgment was not entirely his fault, however, as he could not have foreseen the repeated blunders that hastened the end of the unipolar era. U.S. primacy and unipolar stability would have lasted longer if U.S. policymakers had been smarter, less ideologically driven, and more realistic (in every sense of that term). Instead of preserving U.S. power, resolving conflicts wherever possible, and working to ensure that no peer competitor emerged, U.S. officials mostly did the exact opposite. They and squandered trillions of dollars in . Instead of extending liberal institutions gradually through mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace, they expanded NATO with scant regard for Russian concerns and blithely assumed that Moscow could or would do nothing to stop it. Instead of taking a more measured approach to globalization and making sure its benefits were widely shared inside the United States, they embraced neoliberal approaches to global trade and investment and did not do enough to insulate endangered sectors of the U.S. workforce from globalization’s consequences. And instead of working overtime to make American democracy a model that other societies might want to emulate, U.S. politicians—and here I refer primarily to the Republican Party—repeatedly trampled on the principles and norms that are essential for true democracy to survive. The unipolar moment was never going to last forever, but repeated sins of omission and commission—for which no one was ever held accountable—brought it to a premature end. So where will this leave us? In the immortal words of Talking Heads: “.” First, it is a world where hard power still matters, as everyone has now been reminded. If Russia succeeds in incorporating the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and a land bridge to Crimea, it will be because its military forces were able to accomplish that mission despite their earlier miscalculations and missteps. If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. If the much ballyhooed “norm against conquest” gets reinforced, it will not be because Putin suddenly remembered that norms ought to be followed but because the combination of Ukrainian nationalism and effective weaponry proved too much for Moscow to overcome.