Retrenchment is gradual now – perception and consistency are key.
Shapiro 22, director of research at the European Council on Foreign Relations, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 05-27-2022 (Jeremy, "Getting to Restraint, Responsibly," World Politics Review, https://www-worldpoliticsreview-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/articles/29687/in-foreign-policy-united-states-must-get-to-restraint-responsibly, kav)
The right question is not whether reducing America’s global commitments should take place, but how it can be accomplished in the most responsible manner.
This fear often expresses itself as an appeal to American exceptionalism and its unique role in upholding world order. For many foreign policy thinkers in the United States, the long arm of U.S. global hegemony has become necessary for maintaining stability in the world and even democracy at home. “The only hope for preserving liberalism at home and abroad,” Robert Kagan informs us, “is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the only power capable of upholding such an order is the United States.”
A world without U.S. leadership, according to these commentators, is therefore one that is nasty, brutish and usually dominated by China. For the sake of all that is holy and democratic, the United States must therefore maintain its policy of global leadership and alliance commitments around the world, even if it means horning its way into disputes in the South Caucasus that are otherwise irrelevant to U.S. interests.
Among the Washington foreign policy cognoscenti, this vision of America’s role in the world is something of an article of faith. An appeal for less U.S. geopolitical involvement in the world, such as the one I published in April 2021 in Foreign Affairs, immediately elicits questions about whether, in the absence of the United States, stability will persist.
This special U.S. role in maintaining peace and democracy in far-flung regions would no doubt come as a surprise to the residents of many countries that have found themselves on the wrong end of U.S. precision-guided weapons or CIA-sponsored coups. A 2021 poll of 53 countries by the Alliance of Democracies found that globally, 44 percent of respondents believe that U.S. influence threatens democracy in their country, compared to 28 percent for the influence of Russia and 38 percent for that of China.
But it is true that the United States is a massive presence in international politics in almost every region of the world and that global politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Any major change in U.S. policies in volatile regions will create reactions from both U.S. allies and adversaries that will be at best unsettling for those invested in the status quo, and at worst destabilizing.
The net effect of those changes is much more difficult to predict. One can engage in fascinating counterfactual speculations on whether, for example, a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe will stimulate destabilizing Russian expansionism or inspire more effective European defense efforts. The Nagorno-Karabakh outcome suggests that the U.S. role in maintaining regional stability is often exaggerated or even romanticized by American observers. But the sheer alarm of U.S. allies at the prospect of U.S. withdrawal implies that if it is carried out too suddenly, it could inspire all sorts of overreactions. In the end, we cannot know.
Regardless of the effect, however, power shifts and polarized domestic politics have made retrenchment a geopolitical necessity. As Biden’s focus on China implies, the U.S. will want to concentrate its geopolitical efforts in the near future on East Asia, where the rise of China presents a direct threat to the United States that the public seems to accept. Unfortunately, Biden’s tendency to describe that effort as a global, ideological war against authoritarianism, reminiscent of the Cold War, encourages the U.S. to diffuse its efforts all around the world. This tendency to define the war in ideological terms and exaggerate the importance of peripheral theaters was arguably the central strategic mistake of the Cold War and led the U.S. to disasters in Vietnam and Central America. In the geopolitical contest with China, the United States simply cannot afford that diffusion of effort.
If retrenchment is a political and strategic necessity domestically, then it must happen despite the risks to stability. The right question, therefore, is not whether reducing America’s global commitments should take place, but how it can be accomplished in the most responsible manner. Specific political contexts will of course matter, but here are a few principles for responsible U.S. retrenchment.
The U.S. must be clear and declaratory in its intentions, with as long-term a planning horizon in each region as possible. To date, the U.S. is about as opaque and inconsistent as possible on this point, perplexing interested observers at home and abroad. One can understand their confusion.
The Biden administration, for instance, sometimes implies that it intends to reduce commitments in the Middle East and even Europe, and has given life to the idea of retrenchment by announcing a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. But at the same time, it has made clear that the United States intends to remain and even increase its geopolitical presence in East Asia, even as Biden promotes the idea of a new global competition against authoritarianism and repeats the mantras of U.S. global leadership as if nothing fundamental is changing.
If Biden does want to reduce U.S. commitments, he should describe clearly what that means in the major regions of the world and for U.S. leadership globally.
This implies that Washington’s will toward leadership continues unabated, reflecting in part a difficult domestic political dynamic by which any effort to rationalize the U.S. approach to the world, particularly by a Democratic president, is met with charges of weakness and appeasement. Thus, even though the Trump administration also pursued a policy whose ultimate goal was withdrawal from Afghanistan, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell saw a political advantage in labeling Biden’s plan “a grave mistake.”
But Afghanistan, like most foreign policy issues, is a low priority for the voting public. If the Biden administration articulated a principled strategy of responsible retrenchment more broadly, it would certainly occasion howls from various think tanks in Washington and partisan attacks from Republican hawks in Congress, but it would have little impact on the administration’s domestic political standing. If the administration indeed does want to reduce U.S. commitments and pursue, as Biden often claims, a foreign policy for the middle class, it should be willing to describe clearly what that means in the major regions of the world and for U.S. leadership globally.
That could mean many things, but if Biden does intend to follow through on his pivot to Asia, he should articulate a clear and certain timeline for allies in Europe and the Middle East for when the U.S. intends to withdraw forces and military protection in those theaters.
U.S. withdrawal from any of its overseas commitments should be gradual and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. This is related to the first principle, in that the United States can enhance stability in the wake of its departure if, rather than announcing it just months before it leaves, Washington articulates a glide path for a progressive drawdown over the course of several years. The task of removing U.S. troops from Europe or the Persian Gulf, for example, can and should proceed at a measured pace, albeit with interim benchmarks. In the end, it is closer to the work of a decade than of a presidential term. Such a pace will allow U.S. allies and partners, as well as their adversaries, to adjust slowly as well, enhancing their ability to find a new normal and maintain stability in those regions.
The U.S. should consciously and proactively promote adjustment mechanisms for partners and allies. Even as U.S. domestic politics has become suffused with demands for withdrawal, U.S. foreign policy—and the foreign policy establishment—continues to show ambivalence toward efforts by U.S. allies to take greater responsibility for their own security affairs. This is clearest in Europe, where movement toward European strategic sovereignty often elicits worries from U.S. commentators about “decoupling” and even occasionally rebukes from the U.S. government over the issue of defense procurement.