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Perceptions of backsliding US power are leading Beijing to pursue a policy of stable “strategic competition” now – but they want assurance that the US won’t try to suppress China

Clarke and Sussex ‘22 – Professors of Foreign Policy [Michael Clarke and Matthew Sussex; Professor Michael Clarke is a UTS:Australia China Relations Institute Adjunct Professor and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research at the Australian Defence College. His major areas of research and publication include: the history and politics of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China (PRC); Chinese foreign and security policy; American grand strategy; and nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. Associate Professor Matthew Sussex is a Fellow at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affair. His research is primarily focused on Russian foreign and security policy, Asia-Pacific geopolitics and Australian foreign policy. He is editor, with Michael Clarke and Nick Bisley, of “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific” (Lexington Books, 2020).; 1-11-22; "The U.S.-China Rivalry According to China”; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30238/the-conflicting-viewpoints-behind-u-s-tensions-with-china-ccp; World Politics Review; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

Much has already been said about the recent heightening of U.S.-China tensions and its potential fallout. What gets less attention is how the U.S. and China themselves perceive the status of their relationship, and how that affects their plans for the future. An analysis of prevailing elite opinion in the U.S. and China—starting with reactions to the Nov. 16 virtual summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping—can shed light on how each side understands the root causes of the current competition, and why they believe they can overcome them. For the United States, the rivalry is driven by China’s challenge to U.S. power and leadership, as well as its belief that Beijing is trying to alter the international order for its own benefit. For Beijing, it is driven by the United States’ continued “hegemonic” pretensions amid what Chinese elites see as its inevitable decline. While both Washington and Beijing believe that their relationship will be primarily defined by competition rather than cooperation for the foreseeable future, there are nonetheless indications that both states are hoping to protect themselves by establishing new “guardrails” to provide strategic stability, even as they continue to compete with one another. But doing so will be difficult. A Study in Contrasts Both the U.S. and China framed the Biden-Xi virtual summit of Nov. 16 as a “polite” but “straightforward” exchange on major areas of contention. Yet a comparison of the two sides’ readouts of the discussion also demonstrates that each country has a fundamentally different understanding of their positioning relative to one another, in addition to their divergent objectives. The White House statement is brief, comprising a mere four paragraphs. It begins by noting that Biden and Xi acknowledged the “importance of managing competition responsibly,” framed by an understanding of where their “interests align,” and where their “interests, values, and perspectives diverge.” According to the White House, the U.S. and China align on climate change; on regional security challenges such as those posed by Afghanistan and North Korea; and on “managing strategic risks” in the bilateral relationship. In particular, Biden emphasized the need for “common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication open.” From there, the Biden team devoted far more attention to the divergences, naming specific topics like Taiwanese sovereignty, ongoing trade disputes and human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. The memo is prefaced with the statement that the U.S. would “continue to stand up for its interests and values and, together with our allies and partners, ensure the rules of the road for the 21st century advance an international system that is free, open, and fair.” For the United States, then, the defense of its “interests and values” is inextricably bound to the future of a “free, open and fair” international order. Biden’s team sees stabilizing the U.S.-China relationship as a significant part of its broader efforts to restore U.S. global leadership and revitalize U.S. power after the chaos of former President Donald Trump’s term. More importantly, the readout underscores the fact that Biden sees China as an obstacle to achieving those goals. Beijing’s readout, which is much longer, also notes areas of shared interest like climate change and expresses a desire to establish “guardrails.” While “it is only natural that China and the United States have differences,” the statement says, both share an interest in “constructively” managing relations to “avoid expansion and intensification” of disagreements. But the Chinese readout also bears stark contrasts to that of the Biden administration, particularly when it comes to three issues: its view on China’s current global status, its conceptions of international order and its assessment of U.S. intentions. First, Beijing repeatedly emphasizes a fundamental equality of status and role between the U.S. and China. The opening paragraph claims that “as the world’s top two economies and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,” Beijing and Washington “should strengthen communication and cooperation,” not only for the benefit of their own citizens, but to “also shoulder our due international responsibilities.” According to Beijing, then, both countries already share global leadership. Second, Beijing disputes the implication that China is trying to spread its authoritarian system of government to other countries, thereby posing a challenge U.S. values and interests, as well as the broader international order. It asserts that while China’s development and modernization is an “inevitable historical trend,” China “has no intention of selling its own path to the world.” Instead, Beijing says it would encourage other countries “to find a path of development that suits their national conditions.” Rather than an international order defined by “interfering in the internal affairs of other countries through human rights issues,” as the Chinese readout puts it, China’s preference, according to Xi, is for both China and the U.S. to “safeguard … an international order based on international law and basic norms of international relations” that derive from the “purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.” This reflects Beijing’s historical emphasis on the U.N. Charter’s guarantees of non-interference and state sovereignty over its guarantees of human rights, the tabling of which it portrays as an instrument by which the U.S. is trying to stifle China’s rise. Third, the Chinese readout quotes Biden as stating: China was already a great power 5,000 years ago. I want to reiterate clearly that the U.S. does not seek to change China’s system of governance, does not seek to counter China through alliances and has no intention to have conflict with China. The U.S. government is devoted to pursuing the long-standing One China policy, does not support Taiwan independence and hopes that the Taiwan Strait will remain peaceful and stable. This quote does not appear in the White House version, and Biden’s team has not confirmed or denied its accuracy. Nonetheless, its inclusion is significant, because it sheds light on what China would like to hear from the United States: recognition of China’s great power status; assurances that the U.S. does not seek to overthrow the ruling Chinese Communist Party or go to war with China; and assurances that the U.S. still abides by the One China policy, which Beijing frames as supporting Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. A Struggle for Two Orders In light of these differences, how should tensions between the U.S. and China be managed? The views of each country’s foreign policy specialists can provide some clues here. What is striking is that they tend to be mirror images of one another, suggesting that “strategic competition” may remain the default posture for the foreseeable future.

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