Beijing’s view of declining US power is fueling aspirations for a peaceful rise
Clarke and Sussex ‘22 – Professors of Foreign Policy [Michael Clarke and Matthew Sussex; Professor Michael Clarke is a UTS:Australia China Relations Institute Adjunct Professor and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research at the Australian Defence College. His major areas of research and publication include: the history and politics of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China (PRC); Chinese foreign and security policy; American grand strategy; and nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. Associate Professor Matthew Sussex is a Fellow at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affair.His research is primarily focused on Russian foreign and security policy, Asia-Pacific geopolitics and Australian foreign policy. He is editor, with Michael Clarke and Nick Bisley, of “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific” (Lexington Books, 2020).; 1-11-22; "The U.S.-China Rivalry According to China”; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30238/the-conflicting-viewpoints-behind-u-s-tensions-with-china-ccp; World Politics Review; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]
In China, meanwhile, foreign policy specialists’ views about engagement with the U.S. have gone through several stages since the 1990s, each of which corresponded to a different view on what U.S. “hegemony” means for China. During the 1990s, the consensus view was that China had to marshal its “comprehensive national power” to resist U.S. pressure during Washington’s “unipolar moment.” In the subsequent decade, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Chinese analysts began to see the key inflection points of the era—the global war on terrorism, the 2003 Iraq War and the 2008 global financial crisis—as opportunities for China to take advantage of Washington’s distraction. Beijing began to embrace a strategy of “peaceful rise,” with rhetoric assuaging regional concerns about its intentions. The next shift, toward a more proactive approach, came during Xi Jinping’s first term as China’s president, starting in 2013. Under the overall goal of “national rejuvenation,” Beijing sought to harness Chinese power to build a “community of common destiny,” allowing it to shape the international order. During this time, some Chinese foreign policy specialists claimed not only that the U.S. was in decline, but that so too was “hegemony” as an ordering principle of international relations. This view made it possible to present Xi’s proposed “community of common destiny” concept not as China’s own hegemonic project, but as a vision for a more pluralistic world that would replace U.S. hegemony. Finally, in the past five years, during Xi’s second term, Chinese elites have realized that Washington would not go quietly into the night. Instead, they began to see the U.S. as a “declining” hegemon lashing out at its supposed challengers. The “conventional wisdom,” as the influential foreign policy specialist Wang Jisi noted, now holds that the U.S. is “driven by fear and envy to contain China in every possible way,” making it “the greatest external challenge to China’s national security, sovereignty and internal stability.” In this sense, Chinese specialists frame their country as being in a struggle for “two orders”: the domestic order, which would be secured through continued CCP rule, and the international order, where China needs to defend against efforts to limit its influence. This view of U.S. aggression was clearly expressed in Chinese analysts’ assessments of the Biden-Xi summit. Zhao Minghao, for instance, described a U.S. that, “having failed to win the trade war,” is now “maliciously” playing the Taiwan card to “interrupt China’s peaceful rise through a war.” Others, like Wang Honggang, note that while Biden appears more interested in multilateralism than Trump, the “beginning and end of the Biden administration’s strategic thinking is still to preserve American hegemony.” He argues that the Biden administration is seeking to signal that it “has strength” out of fears that the Trump years damaged the United States’ credibility and influence. In fact, he argues, it is a “weak government.” Finally, Huang Renwei of Fudan University has argued that U.S.-China relations are following the three phases of war identified in “On Protracted War,” Mao Zedong’s 1938 treatise: strategic defense, strategic stalemate and the strategic counteroffensive. According to Huang, U.S.-China relations are currently in the phase of “strategic stalemate” and may stay there for some time, since the U.S. “does not have the ability and will to devote all its resources to the confrontation with China, thus limiting the scale of the confrontation.” That gives China the upper hand, Huang says, because if the U.S. “continues to intensify its efforts against China over a period of time, its expended resources and costs will overwhelm the U.S. itself, at which point the strategic stalemate will shift in China's favor.”