Mearsheimer , PhD, 19
(John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw
The attempt by the United States and its allies to create a liberal international order faced three main problems. First, it required the liberal states in the system, especially the United States, to pursue a highly revisionist and wildly ambitious policy of regime change that was almost certain to fail in an era in which nationalism, with its emphasis on sovereignty and selfdetermination, remains a remarkably powerful force. The policy was also stymied by balance of power politics at both the global and regional levels. Second, by pushing for the free movement of people across borders and the delegation of substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions, the expanding liberal order caused significant political problems inside the liberal states themselves. The results often clashed with beliefs about national identity and sovereignty, which matter greatly to most citizens in modern nation-states. Third, although some people and countries benefited from hyperglobalization, it ultimately caused major economic and political problems inside the liberal democracies, which eventually led to a serious erosion of support for the liberal international order. At the same time, the economic dynamism that comes with hyperglobalization helped China rapidly turn itself into a great power at roughly the same time Russia was reestablishing itself as a great power. That shift in the global balance of power put an end to unipolarity, which is a prerequisite for a liberal world order. In the emerging multipolar world, there is likely to be a realist international order that will be concerned with managing the world economy and also fostering and maintaining arms control agreements. The emphasis in that order will be on facilitating interstate cooperation. In addition, there are likely to be Chinese-led and U.S.-led bounded orders that will help prosecute the security competition that is almost certain to arise between China and its allies, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other. That rivalry will have both economic and military dimensions.