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Europe’s NATO military can handle Russia alone – it’s more efficient and money-wise than the US.

Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of numerous articles and three books, 12-2-2020, (Barry, "Europe Can Defend Itself," Global Politics and Strategy, 62(6), p. 7-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1851080, kav)

The main security problem for Europe is Russia. We should be curious as to how Europe’s situation could be so bad, given that Europe’s main military inputs – people and money – exceed Russia’s. Including Turkey and Canada, and excluding the US, NATO has nearly 1.9 million military personnel. Excluding Turkey and Canada, NATO has nearly 1.4m military personnel.7 Russia has about 900,000 troops in the active forces, and another 500,000 in paramilitary units, the main purpose of which is internal security, for a total of 1.4m.8 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute assesses that Russia spent perhaps $65 billion on defence in 2019, measured at market exchange rates.9 The non-US NATO members spent roughly $300bn on defence that year, about $280bn without Turkey and Canada. Indeed, combined German and French defence spending alone is $100bn, which exceeds that of Russia. In crude terms, then, the Europeans out-resource Russia in military inputs. Furthermore, Europe draws its inputs from a much larger and more diverse base. The pre-Brexit GDP of the EU (which excludes NATO members Canada, Norway and Turkey, and includes neutrals such as Finland and Sweden) was about $16 trillion, compared with Russia’s $1.7trn. The pre-Brexit population of the EU was 513m, while Russia’s is about 145m. Overall, then, any inability on the part of European members of NATO to muster the military wherewithal to oppose Russian aggression involves more than a mere incapacity to allocate sufficient national resources to the challenge. It would be a defence-management failure of truly heroic proportions. 

Two reasons are generally offered to explain why Europe would logically get less for its total defence spending than would a single country. Firstly, whether counting NATO members or EU members, every European state has its own defence ministry and its own array of military headquarters, schools, depots and bases. Given that some of these countries are quite small, considerable duplication of effort is plausible. The superficial evidence does not support the argument that superfluous European civilian employees are the problem, however. The ratio of civilians employed by EU ministries of defence to the number of troops under arms is considerably lower than that of the United States. The US has 758,000 direct-hire civilians, 1,363,000 active troops and 804,000 reservists. Even if all reservists are included, the ratio of civilians to military personnel is 0.35. Europe employs 372,000 civilians to manage 1,400,000 troops, for a ratio of 0.25. Thus, by the numbers, Europe appears to be more efficient at management and support than the US.10 This may seem off base intuitively, but the similarity in the ratio of civilians to uniformed personnel is suggestive. 

Secondly, European spending might yield suboptimal results due to a lack of standardisation in the acquisition of weaponry and the consequent loss of scale economies of production. This too seems plausible. A frequently cited, though methodologically opaque, study by the European Parliament suggested that in the early part of the last decade, eliminating such inefficiencies would save $26bn a year.11 Nevertheless, there is reason to question the extent of Europe’s inefficiency. European sources are fond of claiming that the Europeans collectively field 17 different types of main battle tank to the United States’ one.12 This is a false comparison, as it arrays many different types of European armoured vehicle against only one US type, the M1 Abrams main battle ank. More tightly comparing like to like, European militaries field five types of modern tank, almost half of them the excellent German-designed and -manufactured Leopard II tanks.13 Many former members of the Warsaw Pact, now in NATO, still field some of the Soviet-designed T72s, which are still widely in service in Russia.14 The same kind of argument is often advanced with respect to combat aircraft. Europe is credited with 20 types and the US with six, which again exaggerates the disparity: most EU combat aircraft are US-designed F16s and European Tornados, Typhoons and Rafales. And only the latter two were acquired since the end of the Cold War. Tornados and Typhoons were produced by European consortia in reasonably long production runs. European military procurement may be less efficient than the United States’ because higher US spending enables longer production runs. But how much less efficient is unclear. All modern fighter aircraft are wildly expensive, no matter where they are produced. European militaries would doubtless profit from greater standardisation from the standpoint of both efficient acquisition and ease of maintenance and supply on the battlefield. However, these shortfalls seem insufficient to explain the general pessimism about Europe’s autonomous military capabilities. 

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