Europe can handle Russia without the US – their ev doesn’t account for Europe’s vast types of units.
Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of numerous articles and three books, 12-2-2020, (Barry, "Europe Can Defend Itself," Global Politics and Strategy, 62(6), p. 7-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1851080, kav)
If the IISS front-wide 1.5–2:1 force-ratio heuristic is valid, NATO European forces seem competitive. NATO’s publicly announced rapid-reinforcement objective for ground forces is 30 mechanised battalions in 30 days.38 In Western militaries, this would typically imply ten brigades. If ten brigades is NATO’s official solution to the Russia problem, and if the IISS heuristic roughly captures the thinking of NATO planners, then NATO is unlikely to have assessed the plausible Russian force in theatre as larger than 15 brigades.
Changing the mission from offence to defence, however, also permits NATO Europe to take advantage of the large number of ‘light’ infantry units in Western armies (see Table 3). These units typically have no tanks, and though they can have light armoured vehicles, these are not well suited to offensive operations. Some are airborne units, which in most Western armies are considered elite troops. While these units are often among the readiest in any army, ‘Defending Europe’ rightly does not count them as useful for the counter-attack scenario. Most NATO European armies maintain one or more additional infantry brigades. Some of these specialise in mountainous terrain and are considered elite. There are also many infantry brigades that travel by truck or light armoured vehicle, and fight on foot. For defensive operations, especially where urban or forested areas are available for cover and concealment, these units can be effective, even against mechanised forces. Indeed, they are sometime preferable.39 Such brigades are not the equal of armoured brigades in open country, but assigning them half the combat power of their heavier brethren when fighting defensively on ground of their choosing seems fair. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK collectively have at least another dozen of these types of brigades.40 If half are assumed ready, then six more brigades are available to fight, and even if their combat power is discounted by another 50%, three brigade equivalents can be added to the NATO total, bringing the Russia–NATO force ratio down to 14:14, or one to one.
Airpower and air defence
Whether NATO’s objective is to recapture territory taken by Russia, or to defend Poland, airpower will be a critical element of the campaign. This has been true of modern ground-force operations since the advent of combat aircraft early in the First World War. Airpower is particularly important in mechanised warfare, in which the responsiveness of airpower can be a useful counter to the sudden changes on the battlefield that armoured and mechanised clashes often produce. This dynamic could prove particularly salient in any campaign in Eastern Europe under present conditions, because, in contrast to the Second World War and the Cold War, the ratio of ground units to space is low, producing a greater possibility of fast-moving battles of manoeuvre.
‘Defending Europe’ uses the same front-wide force-ratio heuristic to assess European airpower as it does to assess land power. ‘All other things being near equal’, say the authors, ‘platform numbers around parity favour the defender strongly. A force structure 50% larger than that assessed to be currently deployable would offer an uncertain outcome, while a deployed force double the size of the current estimate would provide a generally favourable outcome.’41 They cite no source for this statement and I could find none myself. After counting available Russian and European aircraft, they conclude that NATO needs an additional 264 top-quality tactical fighters in combat units to achieve a 2:1 superiority and thus be able to take the offensive with hope of success.42 The study offers a narrative about the kind of air operations that would attend a NATO counter-offensive. Quite rightly, it notes that they would be complex and demanding, as modern Russian surface-to-air missile systems are quite good, and Russian forces would be fighting on their own ground, with hardened and redundant communications systems and an integrated air-defence system. These assets would need to be suppressed in order to operate aircraft against ground targets while avoiding potential losses that could be high enough to scuttle the operation. If we apply the IISS heuristic that the attacking air force should outnumber that of the defender by 2:1, NATO would experience no shortage of aircraft for a major defensive operation in Poland. ‘Defending Europe’ credits Russia with roughly 296 combat aircraft, and NATO with 400, a ratio of 1.35:1 in NATO’s favour, which would be defending.43 By the very criteria of the IISS analysis, Russian air forces are plainly inadequate to support a ground offensive deep into Poland. This is not to say that Russia could not attempt such a ground offensive. Russia has many assets to put in play, including cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.44 And Russian ground forces typically drag along with them mobile air-defence assets that would give NATO’s supporting aircraft a tough time. Nevertheless, establishing a NATO defensive umbrella over Poland, and employing tactical aircraft to directly support NATO’s ground forces in that country, are much easier tasks than trying to crack open prepared Russian air and ground defences in Belarus, Kaliningrad and Lithuania.45 Indeed, NATO’s air forces should, in some measure, be able to compensate for the mobile surface-to-air missile systems largely missing from NATO’s ground forces.46