Only retrenchment can avoid the worst effects of US hegemonic collapse
Paul 20 – has a M.A. in English from Jadavpur University and is the senior editor at Open Magazine, 2/21/20 (Sudeep, “Who’s Afraid of Pax Americana?”, Open Magazine, https://openthemagazine.com/cover-stories/whos-afraid-of-pax-americana/, accessed 6/26/22)//jd
The backdrop to American power is now this re-emerging world island. And in a time when the US is largely seen to be ‘in decline’, even by the American public (a March 2019 Pew Survey said that 60 per cent of Americans think the US’ stature in the world will shrink over the next 30 years), what matters, as much for America as for the world, is the choices Washington makes in the near future. In Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment (2018), Paul K MacDonald and Joseph M Parent, analysing the cases of Britain, France and Russia, contend that ‘declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes’. But their most significant find is that, when in decline, ‘states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do’. This can be explained by understanding the truism that what matters is not a state’s own trajectory but ‘how the trajectory changes its position relative to others’. Retrenchment is the commonest response to decline and it reduces costs. A retrenching great power switches to a foreign policy ‘less active, less ambitious, and less burdensome’. In this line of argument, challenging theories of grand strategy and war, the ‘biggest danger may not be the impending Sino-American transition itself, but the widespread belief that it makes war more likely’. So, how does Donald Trump’s withdrawal from Syria square with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani or the Middle East peace plan? To understand US foreign policy in the Trump era, a medium-term background is necessary. The most significant breakthrough for Cold War US foreign policy was under the arch-realist Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor-cum-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when the détente with China was established. Ronald Reagan, not a realist in the Nixon mould, reacting to Jimmy Carter’s shock at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the bungling of the Iranian hostage crisis, abandoned the Nixon-era caution and got away with it. But two things still took America by surprise: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. That surprise, however, soon led to elation and the brief return to realism evidenced in the George HW Bush presidency (who built a coalition of 39 states to eject Iraq from Kuwait and limited the war’s objectives) was replaced by the pursuit of what has been called ‘liberal hegemony’. Building on the Cold War’s culture war, combining hard and soft power through institutions and individuals, this was American foreign policy at its most ambitious and arrogant and it made the three presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama a continuum, notwithstanding the divergences in detail. Under Clinton, the US sought to remake post-Soviet Russia in America’s image—economically, culturally and politically. The failure was epic. In a March 2018 essay in American Affairs, former State Department Russia advisor James Carden wrote: ‘The failure of this project has contributed to the present animus towards Russia and continues to hinder more reasonable diplomatic relations.’ This was a long way from George F Kennan’s 1947 article in Foreign Affairs with which America’s Cold War foreign policy had begun, an article that had called for a firm containment of the Soviet Union, not motivated ideologically but strategically. Managing the post-Cold War was America’s second failure on the world stage (bigger than the hot war in Vietnam). In 1992, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had stopped a military modernisation plan, the need for which was felt soon after. Nevertheless, America did not retrench after the Soviet collapse. In The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), political scientist John J Mearsheimer battles for a new realism because ‘[l]iberal states have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to maintain’. But while he proposes a policy of restraint, Mearsheimer is an ‘offensive realist’ as opposed to ‘defensive realists’ who want to have nothing to do with hegemony. MacDonald and Parent might counter the assumption of defensive realism that a hegemonic power would sooner or later be reduced by a coalition of its rivals, because what matters is the relative trajectory of the declining state. But to extend the idea, even if it somewhat contradicts their thesis on retrenchment, it could also be argued that a reduction in the defence budget and curtailing alliance engagements would not reduce the risks for America. Mearsheimer’s belief that ‘a foreign policy based on realism is likely to be less warlike than one based on liberalism’ was nearly proved by Nixon but while the offensive realist finds the defensive realist proposal of mere ‘offshore balancing’ inadequate and dangerous, there is agreement that the US needs to abandon the crusading liberal hegemony in place since the Clinton years.