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Multipolarity is the only way to ensure world peace. Pursuing hegemony is detrimental, emboldening aggression and chaos.

Köchler, PhD, 17

(Hans, professor of philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Peace in a multipolar world, April 20,

http://hanskoechler.com/Koechler-Peace-Multipolar-World-Current_Concerns_2017-25-07.pdf)

Multipolarity: power parallelogram of peace? Perhaps we should pause here briefly and make sure we understand the nature of order in relations between states. In the era of globalization, it is an ever more complex system of interaction and dependence on different levels. As a multidimensional framework of interaction, including the economic, political, socio-cultural and military dimensions, it is dynamic from the outset. It exists in no other than the dynamic form. In this sense, the stability of world order is always to be understood as relative. Stability sensu stricto is an unattainable ideal. The respective world order is a parallelogram of forces that results from the complex interaction of the interests of state actors and – in our increasingly globalized world – non-state actors alike. This necessarily implies a perpetual struggle for influence, in fact a struggle for power that results from the collective will of the citizens of all states. As I have indicated earlier, this collective will is not per se ethically motivated – oriented, for example, at the principle of mutuality, or mutual respect. Rather, it is guided by the natural pursuit of advantage, aimed towards the benefits the respective governments promise their citizens in order to legitimize their rule. Whether we like it or not, the reality of international relations is such that normative considerations are of secondary importance. Only when more and more people become aware that the reckless pursuit of interests by each state, acting in isolation, is ultimately detrimental to all, will normative ideas gain traction. Acknowledging the constraints of realpolitik, but without giving up on the ideal, one thus might be resigned to the wisdom of “better late than never.” The aspect of mutuality is essential for international law as well. Mutuality is, above all, the normative foundation of the sovereign equality of states. Philosophically speaking, the principle of sovereign equality can, in theory, also be derived from the universal validity of human rights. In actual fact, however, the continually changing world order, centered on the state as sovereign agent, is the result of the articulation and assertion of interests by a multitude of actors and on multiple levels. It is not a deliberately created system of inter-state relations based on rules on the normative validity of which all would agree. If this were the case, the history of conflicts would have come to an end with the entry into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Since its very foundation, the ultimate goal of the world organisation has been the safeguarding of world peace. According to the binding norms and strict procedural rules of the Charter, especially the provisions of collective security under Chapter VII, a state of peace should thus have prevailed from this point onwards. It is also an undeniable fact that world order is often the result of a war which reconfigures, or redefines, global power relations, at least for a certain time. The creation of the League of Nations after the First and the United Nations Organization after the Second World War are testimony of this. Both organizations came into existence as result of global armed conflict, and their statutes reflected – resp. reflect – the power constellation after the preceding war. With regard to the UN, this notably applies to the veto privilege of the five states that were the victorious powers of World War II. Writing that privilege into the organisation’s Charter (Article 27),6 they aimed to eternalise the position of power they enjoyed at the time, trying, as it were, “to stop time.” (The Charter cannot be amended without the consent of those states.) However, the actors, as ambitious as they may be, here too have come to the bitter realization – I say this not without irony – that time cannot be brought to a halt. Today’s power constellation is no longer that of 1945. The community of states has entered a phase of radical change, indeed global interregnum. The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order has become more and more obvious – as “unintended consequence” of an unrestrained, often militarily enforced, assertion of power. Collective security in a multipolar world In these times of global change, the United Nations Charter might gain new relevance nevertheless: namely as normative framework, or body of rules, for the emerging multipolar balance of power. The UN system of collective security could well serve as a blueprint of a future order of peace. However, progress in that direction will only be possible if the structure of the Security Council is adapted to the new realities. Vested with almost unlimited powers, the supreme executive organ of the UN – of which Hans Morgenthau spoke as the “Holy Alliance” of our time – is indeed construed along the lines of a multipolar balance of power. The five veto-wielding permanent members were meant to hold each other in check in all decisions on the maintenance or restoration of peace. The Charter of the United Nations does not provide a framework for unipolar rule, but embodies the multipolar constellation of 1945, with the five great powers of the time as permanent members (United States, France, Great Britain, China [initially: Republic of China], Soviet Union [now: Russia]). Because of the veto, the Council is only able to act on the basis of consensus among those states between which there should ideally exist a balance of power. This was the expectation of the founders of the organization in the final phase of the Second World War. In the course of the Cold War, however, the multipolar architecture of the Charter became outdated rather quickly. The development of military technology led to an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. This resulted in a bipolar balance of power between these two antagonists, which, in turn, meant the marginalisation of the role of the other permanent members and, ultimately, a paralysis of the Security Council due to the mutual blockage of these two veto-wielding states. What was conceived in 1945, albeit with different intention (for the sake of perpetuating the power constellation of the moment), is, nonetheless, still relevant today. ” Peace between a multitude of sovereign actors, i.e. in a multipolar framework, can only be secured cooperatively and not through an unrestrained competition for power and privilege. This is, I believe, the essence of the system of collective security according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Decisions on the maintenance of peace, i.e. the enforcement of the prohibition of the threat or use of force between states, must be reached by way of unanimity between the permanent members. The real meaning of the “veto” – a word nowhere to be found in the Charter – is consensus among the most powerful states who bear special responsibility because they possess the means of enforcement. 7 In statutory terms, the veto is certainly not about bolstering an agenda of power politics in the interest of each of the permanent members. In order not to create false hopes, one must emphasize here that the rule that prescribes unanimity among the permanent members in matters of collective security only makes sense if a party to a dispute is obliged to abstain from voting. This is not the case under the present statute. (Most observers of international affairs are not in any way aware of it.) According to the Charter, a permanent member that launches aggression against another country can prevent a decision of the Council in this matter by simply vetoing it. Would the basic legal principle of bias be ignored in such a way at the domestic level, any person having committed a violation of the law could be judge in his own cause. Whichever way you look at it, this is actually the case under the decision-making rules of the UN, according to the wording of Article 27 of the Charter.8 The idealists who expect nothing but good of the UN easily tend to overlook the so-called fine print in the text of the Charter. After all, the UN is not as perfect as one would wish it to be – and it never will be, even if the provisions of the Charter were implemented up to the last comma. Because of the dictates of power politics, the text contains serious normative contradictions that undermine the very system that the UN is supposed to promote.9 In view of this systemic inconsistency it is of particular importance that the Charter – reflecting the power balance between the victors of World War II – should be adapted to the newly emerging multipolar constellation. The development towards multipolarity has become more and more apparent in the wake of the regional crises we mentioned earlier; for the time being at least, it is not a result of World War III. One can only hope that this will remain so in the future. The adaptation of the Charter would mean that decisions of the Security Council on the maintenance or restoration of peace are reached on the basis of consensus among the global regions. In a multipolar world it will no longer be possible to exclude entire continents – Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia – from the decision-making processes. Should this continue to be the case, systemic instability in the emerging multipolar framework will further increase and the United Nations Organization will, so to speak, abolish itself, i.e. make itself obsolete. Accordingly, the United Nations Organization must undertake a process of reform that will give regional intergovernmental organizations the status of permanent members in the Security Council. Possible candidates would be the African Union or the European Union (the latter replacing France and the United Kingdom as state members). If one were to keep the veto rule, decisions on war and peace, i.e. coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force, would have to be taken by way of consensus among the global regions. Such a procedure might also better protect the interests of a weaker state party, being part of a larger regional grouping, in a bilateral confrontation with another state, whether within or outside that grouping. Whatever the system of intergovernmental rules or procedures may be, one has to admit that genuine peace cannot be established by executive fiat. In conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, orientation towards the consensus principle is decisive. It is also more realistic in a multipolar framework than in a unipolar one where stability is achieved by pressure and coercion.

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