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Michael Beckley provides an inaccurate picture of US-China relations

Shifrinson 13 [Winter 2012/13, Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson’s teaching and research interests focus on the intersection of international security and diplomatic history, particularly the rise and fall of great powers and the origins of grand strategy. He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia., “Debating China's Rise and U.S. Decline”, The MIT Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41804177?seq=3]//AA

Michael Beckley’s article deserves attention for challenging the view that the United States is declining because China is rising.' Its ambiguous definition of decline, how- ever, sends the wrong impression about the distribution of economic and military power between the United States and China. Without being explicit, Beckley implies that the United States is not declining because the absolute difference of economic, mili- tary, and technological capabilities between the United States and China is growing. In contrast, both theory and history suggest that it is more important that the relative dis- tribution of economic and military capabilities between the United States and China is falling: as I propose below, decline is best defined as a decrease in the ratio of economic and military capabilities between two great powers. As a result, even if the United States maintains a large advantage in absolute capabilities, the fact that U.S. capabilities are decreasing relative to China’s means that (1) China will find it easier to advance its interests where U.S. and Chinese goals diverge, while (2) the United States’ ability to pursue its own interests in world affairs will be increasingly constrained by Chinese power. The remainder of this letter proceeds in four sections. First, I challenge Beckley’s definition of decline and emphasize the need to analyze the relative distribution of ca- pabilities when assessing the decline phenomenon. Using historical examples, I next demonstrate that the relative distribution of power better captures the ability of states to compete with one another. Subsequently, I show that the United States is declining relative to China across several measures of economic and military power. Finally, I propose that the United States’ relative decline suggests a different response to China’s rise, namely, U.S. retrenchment. DEFINING DECLINE AND MEASURING POWER In his article, Beckley does not define what he means by “decline.” He implies, how- ever, that decline occurs when the absolute difference in capabilities between two states falls (pp. 44-55). For example, Beckley states that it is “significant that the average Chi- nese citizen is more than $17,000 poorer relative to the average American than he was in 1991” (p. 59). Particularly important for Beckley is the difference in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and measures of technological sophistication: larger absolute differences between the United States and China in these indicators mean an economi- cally and militarily stronger United States (pp. 58—59, 63—65). This definition, however, sets an artificially high bar by which to assess decline, one that mischaracterizes the debate over American decline and makes limited theoretical sense. Instead, decline is better defined in terms of the relative distribution of economic and military capabili- ties between two great powers: decline occurs when one state’s economic and military capabilities increase at a faster rate than the other’s, such that the ratio of capabilities between the two falls. As such, it is more important for assessing the current distribu- tion of power that the ratio of American per capita GDP to Chinese per capita GDP fell from 67:1 in 1991 to 9:1 in 2011, than it is that the difference in per capita GDP rose from $37,300 in 1991 to $41,600 in 2011 (in constant 2010 dollars).° Few participants in the decline debate argue that China is likely to overtake the United States across all measures of economic and military power.3 More representative of mainstream views in the debate is the National Intelligence Council’s Global 2025 re- port, which argues, “Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength [...] will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. 4 In other words, the policy discussion centers on whether China’s growth is making it relatively harder for the United States to pursue its interests without other states opposing its actions—not whether the United States is losing out to China in absolute terms. Furthermore, for purposes of international relations theory, scholars usually distin- guish between decline as an absolute loss of power and decline as a relative loss of ca- pabilities.5 Many also assume that there is a threshold above which a state is a great power, defined as an actor with sufficient aggregate economic, military, technological, and geographic resources to influence others’ behavior on an international scale. De- cline occurs when a state above this threshold increases its capabilities at a faster rate than another state, such that the ratio of capabilities between the two shrinks. This change matters in two ways. First, the relative loss of capabilities between states A and B requires A to struggle to maintain its international position by improving economic performance or building military forces. Second, B’s improved capabilities make it more difficult for state A to challenge state B’s interests than had previously been the case-A is constrained by B’s growing power—while B can more readily compete with A if their interests conflict.

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