Cybersecurity includes proactive measures
Craig et al 15 [Amanda N. Craig is a Senior Cybersecurity Strategist, Microsoft Corporation Scott J. Shackelford is an Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Stanford University. Janine S. Hiller is a Professor of Business Law, Richard E. Sorensen Professor in Finance, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech. Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis. American Business Law Journal, 52, 721. https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5HRG-66D0-00CW-H0YN-00000-00&context=1516831]//LP
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, despite continued legal uncertainty in the United States and globally, debates about active cyber defense began to shift. More frequent cyber attacks increasing anxiety likely contributed to this change of perception; for instance, by 2010, more than forty percent of companies surveyed by Symantec reported that cybersecurity incidents topped their lists of concerns. As was mentioned above, one watershed moment was Operation Aurora, a sophisticated campaign using spear phishing attacks and at least one zero-day exploit exposed by Google in early 2010 The attacks were noteworthy for at least two reasons: the type of intellectual property that was stolen (including Google's source code--that is, its "crown jewels" 116Link to the text of the note) and the illustration of the extent to which state-sponsored attacks--or other highly organized and well-financed attackers--had begun targeting private firms. 117Link to the text of the note According to Dmitri Alperovitch, then-vice president of threat research at the antivirus firm McAfee, Operation Aurora "totally" changed the threat model, representing the first instance in which private firms (outside defense contractors) experienced "that level of sophisticated attack." 118Link to the text of the note Moreover, in Google's private investigation, the company gained access to a computer, located in Taiwan, "that it suspected of being the source of the [Aurora] attacks." 119Link to the text of the note When it saw evidence of attacks involving other U.S. companies, Google alerted and collaborated with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to trace ultimate responsibility for the [*750] attacks back to mainland China. 120Link to the text of the note As such, Google may have "set a precedent of what is allowable" to defend against APTs--even as "one could imagine similar scenarios that could lead to civil or criminal charges." 121Link to the text of the note Operation Aurora did much to introduce the private sector to the concept of APTs, a term that, like "active defense," was borrowed from the military. 122Link to the text of the note In 2011, McAfee defined APTs as "sophisticated, covert attacks bent on surreptitiously stealing valuable data from targeted and unsuspecting companies" and claimed that such "targeted attacks are on the rise." 123Link to the text of the note Yet defining APTs may be a malleable and circumstantial exercise--and may even represent a politically or economically minded euphemism. In 2011, for example, the CEO of security firm HBGary said that the definition of an APT varies depending on "who you ask," and the terminology really only emerged because the U.S. Department of Defense and Air Force needed a "nice way" to refer to Chinese state-sponsored threats. 124Link to the text of the note Likewise, McAfee has argued that "the motive of the adversary … is the primary differentiator of an APT attack from a cybercriminal or hacktivist one" and agrees that APTs are targeted attacks "carried out under the sponsorship or direction of a nation-state [*751] for something other than a pure financial/criminal reason or political protest." 125Link to the text of the note Yet this statement fails to appreciate that determining which motive dominates can be an even more daunting challenge than establishing attribution. Even though some industry experts have suggested that "APT hysteria" was overblown, and "some who [thought] that they [were] victims of APTs [were] really the victims of organized criminals, hacktivists, glorified script kiddies, and their own mistakes," evidence clearly demonstrates that malware has become more "customized," meaning anything from a simple repackaging of existing malware to "code written from the ground up for a specific attack." 126Link to the text of the note By 2013, more security experts claimed that sophisticated, targeted attacks posed the greatest information security "danger" for businesses that traditional defense technologies were "slowly losing relevance" because they were ineffective, 128Link to the text of the note and that companies were increasingly frustrated by attempting to protect themselves "with a purely defensive posture." 129]APTs are built to circumvent passive cyber defenses like firewalls and antivirus software. Private sector actors' self-reporting suggests that most advanced attacks go unnoticed for more than one year (and are often ultimately noticed by a third party); a reasonable conclusion is that APTs often circumvent purely defensive postures. In the early 2010s, continuing "massive cases of cyber exploitation," including GhostNet, Night Dragon, and Shady RAT, significantly harmed companies and advanced both media exposure and private [*752] sector cybersecurity concerns, 131Link to the text of the note reinforcing the perception that APTs were the new norm. 132Link to the text of the note Moreover, APTs tipped cyber offense-and-defense asymmetry even further in the attackers' favor. Attackers already benefitted from the comparatively small risk of being caught and prosecuted; conversely, defenders already were forced to make significant investments and accept greater risks when deciding how to defend their networks. The rise of APTs enabled attackers to access greater resources and more advanced technologies (such as from a state sponsor or criminal organization) while private sector defenders continued to struggle to increase IT security budgets and employ less sophisticated technologies. According to security expert Keren Elazari in a report prepared for CrowdStrike, Simply put, the bad guys are gaining the upper hand. Cybercrime and corporate espionage attackers are persistent--and they only need to get in once… Advanced attackers are using previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities and self-mutating, evasive, and polymorphic malware while detection rates of existing protection mechanisms are falling. Defenders are facing more malware and more sophistication. Attacks are as lucrative as ever for advanced and commonplace adversaries. Clearly, the time has come for a strategic shift of focus for cybersecurity. Active defense has emerged as the new security paradigm that can help defenders resolve the gap between detection and response and make life more difficult for attackers. In the face of escalating numbers and sophistication of cyber threats, and the imbalance between attackers and defenders, active defense emerged post-2010 as a practice that allows companies to increase the costs to adversaries attacking them---just as, in the physical world, allowing individuals to engage in self-defense increases the potential costs for would-be attackers, therefore possibly dissuading some attackers. However, even though active cyber defense is increasingly emerging as a [*753] sensible or "logical" approach by which the private sector can shift a greater burden to attackers, what has been less clear is how the broader cybersecurity industry is evolving to support more proactive measures. The cybersecurity industry is an essential part of the evolution, as expertise and cybersecurity best practices reside in this space. Part II picks up this debate by couching it in the experience of dozens of cybersecurity companies and then focusing on four case studies before pivoting to consider some of the implications for businesses and policy makers in Part III.