Disinformation causes truth decay----system wide approach by NATO is key to prevent it.
Kathleen J. McInnis 21, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative; Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021_final.pdf, cy
Beyond these US, UK, and Finnish examples, comprehensive approaches to political warfare among NATO members and partners are less prominent. Perhaps in part owing to bureaucratic stovepiping and policymaking preferences, many capitals of NATO member states that are targets of these campaigns tend to view each of Moscow and Beijing’s actions discretely rather than as constituent parts of a holistic strategy. Failure to consider these activities and their implications holistically—and, therefore, failing to address their respective behaviors in a likewise holistic manner— risks the United States and its allies taking actions that achieve short-term successes at the expense of longer-term gains. Progress on areas like the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), for example, which seeks to replace bilateral trade agreements between EU members and China with a common EU-wide investment framework, can present longer-term strategic risks to European states, including increased vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion and influence campaigns—not to mention heightened tensions in the transatlantic relationship due to increasingly divergent strategic approaches to China.47 In other words, a strategic-level approach between NATO, its member states and partners, the private sector, and like-minded multilateral organizations like the EU is needed, as is a framework to turn strategic consensus into concrete action. Fortunately, both by treaty and by recent operational practice, NATO is well positioned to serve as a bedrock for both. The Alliance can, therefore, usefully serve as a catalyst for developing a Comprehensive Approach to combat coercion and political warfare.
Article 2 and the Art of the Political: NATO’s Strategic Role in Countering Political Warfare
NATO stepping up to take on a larger role in countering political warfare has its trade-offs, and some might reasonably express concern about the knock-on effect that such an approach might have on the conduct of military affairs. Some concerns may include: first, if NATO is predominantly a military alliance, then it doesn’t have a significant role to play in countering political warfare, which is the realm of politicians, statesmen, home departments, departments of commerce, and so on. Second, to assign political warfare as a supporting task to militaries, and military institutions like NATO, would likely dilute their focus on their essential defense functions (which are hard enough to perform on the best of days). It might also lessen the pressure on NATO allies and partners to effectively share the costs of hard defense. In the minds of critics, adding political warfare to the growing list of NATO’s tasks means diminishing Alliance effectiveness.
These arguments—however well-intentioned—are unhelpfully divorced from both NATO’s history and current realities. NATO is, and always has been, a political-military alliance in large part because contemporary alliances are themselves an inherently political-military construct.48 To argue for the disaggregation of the military from the economic and political spheres is a conceit, arguably framed by present bureaucratic realities rather than institutional history. The post-World War II order, of which NATO is a part, was designed to be a proactive, forward-looking answer to the security dilemmas and distrust that had previously characterized alliance politics.49 “Despair, disorder, decay from within—these were the likely dangers, not a Soviet invasion.”50 As the USSR’s aggressive intentions became more clear, NATO itself became a solution to enabling European integration and economic revitalization rather than an end in and of itself.51
As NATO was established, reconstituting the economic and political health of its member states was seen as inextricably linked to military strength; military strength was one important pillar of a comprehensive strategy to counter Soviet influence and aggression. 52 NATO’s purpose, therefore, as established in the Washington Treaty, is not only to grapple with military and defense challenges, but also to foster and protect the values core to its mission and that distinguish NATO as an alliance of like-minded nations. This is why NATO not only convenes military leaders and defense ministers at regular defense ministerial meetings,53 but it also hosts foreign ministers at the same regularity54 and heads of state and government roughly once a year at summits or Leaders Meetings.55 Protecting the rights of its members as free and self-determining nations means, in essence, NATO allies have committed to upholding the integrity of the very institutions that are vulnerable to political warfare. This is why Article 2 of the Washington Treaty exists. It reads:
“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”56
Article 2 of NATO’s founding charter is sometimes viewed as the “Canadian clause” or a throwaway paragraph in the Washington Treaty.57 Yet negotiators of NATO agreements know that they should never discount a good diplomatic “hook,” especially when it might be used to prompt positive action. Viewed in that light, Article 2 holds enormous utility in supporting and justifying much-needed NATO action on the political warfare challenges allies face on a routine basis. NATO has forgotten how to exercise its political arm to proactively contend with political and economic coercion as effectively as it does its military arm. Article 2 is critical to establishing an effective counter-political warfare response from NATO.
Specifically, in Article 2, allies have pledged to:
■ Shore up free institutions;
■ Establish public understanding of the principles undergirding institutions;
■ Promote stability and well-being; and
■ Eliminate conflict from international economic policies
and promote economic collaboration.
These Article 2 principles are the very areas at risk from Russian and Chinese political warfare today. NATO allies and partners have fallen behind in combatting the political and economic components of political warfare across the spectrum; as a result, NATO should rethink the mandate it already has and reinvigorate Article 2 to help empower and enable a more effective, comprehensive response to future political warfare campaigns.
This leads to the second concern articulated above, namely, that expanding the aperture of NATO’s activities will inherently dilute the Alliance and its military capabilities. This logic perhaps makes sense in the narrower context of burden sharing and defense planning. Yet the military is not an end in and of itself; rather, the object of the military is to be one means toward the promotion of national security and prosperity. Promotion of stability and security—and, therefore, (if indirectly) prosperity—has been interpreted in a variety of manners over the course of NATO’s history: from deterring Soviet aggression to responding to crises in the Balkans and the Middle East to overcoming Franco-German and Greco-Turkish differences. Further, identifying and countering political warfare is largely an intellectual endeavor; organized appropriately, the cost of building a NATO counter-political warfare capability would be miniscule in comparison to the cost of purchasing defense equipment and acquiring capabilities. Given that today the stability, security, and prosperity of NATO allies and partners are being directly challenged by both Russia and China, this marginal investment would likely yield enormous strategic dividends.
Economic and political coercion campaigns have important linkages to national security—linkages that are often difficult for agencies and institutions to fully appreciate on their own. Trade ministries have a different set of priorities than defense ministries, but they both work on matters that have a direct bearing on the security and well-being of their states. A greater cross-pollination of government efforts improves assessments of the threat and development of potential solutions.
Taking Stock: Assessing Existing Alliance and Partner Efforts to Counter Political Warfare
NATO might usefully seek to build shared understandings of, and approaches to, countering authoritarian coercion in two key areas: disinformation and election interference, and coercive diplomacy and economic subversion.58 What follows is an assessment of the current state of play and areas ripe for multi-stakeholder collaboration on these key issues. Current efforts underway by the Alliance and its members tend to focus on discrete areas of political warfare rather than the full gambit. Countering disinformation and cyber defense are the two most advanced areas of the transatlantic response to hybrid warfare, yet NATO allies and partners lack advanced strategies to mitigate coercive diplomacy and predatory economic practices.
Disinformation and Election Interference
Alliance-Wide Efforts
Disinformation is one of the most nefarious challenges NATO faces. False news and the spread of “alternative” facts and narratives creates confusion, foments distrust in democratic institutions and government itself, sharpens societal divisions, and creates negative psychological and emotional responses that can be used to manipulate people’s viewpoints and beliefs. Across Europe, nations come under near-daily attack from state-supported and rogue actor disinformation, from Russian-language campaigns, Chinese propaganda, social media swarms, and online bots. As Russia and China seek to shape the information environment in their favor,59 NATO allies have put various initiatives in place to help combat disinformation and build societal resilience. Allies have pursued different national initiatives and the Alliance has worked to share best practices. It is worth noting that NATO is further advanced in its understanding and response to Russian disinformation than it is of Chinese disinformation which is much less analyzed and understood in a transatlantic context.