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The pandemic signals a water-shed moment in hybrid warfare. Russian desires a return to greatness and will use info-warfare to undermine Alliance cohesion. That collapses unipolarity and constitutes an existential threat.

D. F. Reding & B. Wells 22, Dale F. Reding and Bryan Wells are both Chief Scientists at NATO, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94825-2, p. 25-43 (under the ch. titled, “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,”) //chico

The COVID-19 pandemic is not a consequence of geostrategic conflict. Never- theless, the pandemic has had a direct and adverse effect on all Alliance nations, particularly their medical, political, and economic systems. Exploiting this crisis, several countries and groups with partisan agendas attempted to create a watershed moment in global security by undermining Alliance cohesion and national resolve. As noted by the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Director-General at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, “We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (Zarocostas, 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an information exploitation opportunity for some strategic actors as part of existing grey zone conflicts. At the same time, this has raised awareness of the enduring challenge of countering misinformation, disinfor- mation and outright propaganda. These attacks can, and have, imposed considerable costs to the nations and has needlessly increased the death rate from COVID-19. However, in any complex crisis, such as that experienced during pandemics, infor- mation transparency and open communication builds trust and ultimately saves lives.

Over the initial phases of the COVID-19 crises, Russian disinformation campaigns focused on stories such as (EEAS, 2021): COVID-19 was developed in NATO labo- ratories, global elites are imposing tyranny, and the EU is disintegrating. As time went on, these attacks expanded to include those designed to increase doubt on vaccine efficacy, safety and availability, accusing countries of genocide for not using the Russian vaccine (Sputnik V), suggesting that migrants (or NATO) have been spreading the virus across Europe, as well as implying that degenerate geopolit- ical and commercial interests were over-riding the interests of European and North American citizens. While some of these attacks are homegrown, there has also been a trend towards amplifying attacks from secondary sources (e.g., right & left-wing groups, Iran, ISIS, China, anti-vaxxers, etc.). This approach maintains a veneer of plausible deniability and evades responsibility for accurate reporting. At the same time, these efforts have presented an inflated narrative of Russian (and to some extent Chinese) generosity and scientific, military and societal strength. This narrative was supported by logistics and medical support provided to groups with deep historical and linguistic ties to Russia or Kremlin-friendly forces (Ozawa, 2020).

In late April of 2020, Russia launched three harmonised disinformation attacks on NATO (NATO, 2020b). First, a fake letter was published, purportedly from Jen Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary-General, to Raimundus Karoblis, Lithuania’s Minister of Defence. The letter noted that NATO had decided to withdraw its multi- national battlegroup from Lithuania due to rising COVID-19 infections. The letters were posted on blogs in English and Lithuanian and were later picked up by various websites and social media platforms. Fake accounts, created days before, were used to spread the disinformation further. Following this, an edited YouTube video was released suggesting that COVID-19 within the multinational battlegroup was the single agenda item for a recent NATO Defence Ministers meeting. Finally, the letter was sent directly to NATO Headquarters via a spoofed NATO e-mail address. Surprisingly, given the care taken to orchestrate this attack, the letter contained many formatting, structural and grammatical mistakes, and was recognized quickly as a fake.

Ultimately the attack was a failure and died out quickly. NATO responded rapidly to discredit the story, as did the Lithuanian Defence Ministry. Early identifica- tion (understand) and rapid reaction (engage) nullified the attack. As noted by the Secretary-General, “They have not been successful because, first of all, it has been clearly revealed that this is a fake letter; secondly, we’ve seen that NATO allies remain committed, remain united, and are actually helping each other in the midst of the coronavirus crisis” (NATO, 2020b).

Disinformation has been a constant threat to the Alliance since its inception. Nevertheless, with the increased use of asymmetric (hybrid) warfare and the attendant growth of social media, disinformation and its institutional twin of propaganda have significantly increased in volume and precision. Moreover, these efforts are part of more significant military and geopolitical trends, such as those presented by hybrid or grey zone warfare, where success is defined through operations in the cognitive sphere.

This infodemic has presented an existential crisis to Alliance nations on par with the COVID-19 pandemic itself. Throughout this crisis, NATO undertook to sustain its military and political mission, operations, and activities while maintaining opera- tional readiness. This included using NATO strategic lift to ensure medical equipment supplies were delivered to the Alliance and partner nations. After the initial stages of the pandemic, NATO developed a refined operational plan, took stock of lessons learned, restocked medical supplies, identified funding and explored ways and means to support Alliance and national resilience. These activities created a solid narrative of an Alliance coming together to support national COVID-19 responses. Never- theless, this positive narrative was challenged by misinformation, overt propaganda, and weaponised information campaigns, i.e., targeted disinformation.

2.4 Countering Disinformation: Engagement in the Cognitive Domain

2.4.1 A Successful Counter-Strategy

Drawing on long experience gained over its seventy-two-year history, NATO has developed a simple bifurcated strategy for countering disinformation. This strategy, built upon the classic OODA loop or Boyd Cycle (observe-orient-decide-act) (Osinga, 2005), consists of understand (observe-orient) and engage (decide-act) phases. Expanding on this (NATO, 2020b):

Understand: NATO “Information Environmental Assessments” systematically track, monitor and assess the information environment germane to NATO operations or policies. This observe-orient function allows NATO to identify information attacks and evaluate the impact of counter-narratives. Engage: Once an attack is understood, a strategic approach is identified, and a fact-based counter-narrative developed. Over the longer term, this builds upon the success and lessons learned from previous disinformation counter-strategies. These counter-narratives and information products are “fact-based, timely, transparent and coordinated” (NATO, 2020b). This enables NATO to deliver a targeted effect within the contested cognitive domain.

The success of these efforts is greatly enhanced when coordinated across the Alliance. Consistency of message, clarity of meaning, rapid and agile reaction, and a fact-based counter-narrative are crucial to building trust and confidence. Ensuring consistency of this narrative and sharing cognitive domain awareness within the Alliance, EU, UN and other allies or partners increases the likelihood of countering a sustained and reactive disinformation campaign while building societal resilience to such attacks. Nevertheless, there are inevitably groups or populations resistant to such measures preferring conspiracy theories or biased narratives. The goal is not to convince everyone but to reach an audience receptive to a facts-based approach, thereby building trust within such communities and minimising the damage inflicted by misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda. In the end, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman” (Brandeis, 2014).

2.4.2 Understand: Cognitive Domain Situational Awareness (CDSA)

Situational awareness is the key to operational success, or more generally, success- fully applying the instruments of national power, be they diplomatic, information, military or economic (DIME) (Worley, 2012). The famous military theorist Sun Tzu noted, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles” (Tzu, 2018). However, the modern cognitive information battle- ground exists in a complex web of worldwide intersecting and interconnected socio- technical networks, with state, non-state actors and empowered individuals seeking influence and attention. NATO’s cognitive domain situational awareness provides it with actionable insights, helping to shape its communication response and inform the nations and partners. To counter disinformation attacks, NATO recommends that consumers of information: check the credibility of the source; assess the emotional tone; look for alternate sources, check for doctored images/video and curb their own biases (NATO, 2020b).

Regarding COVID-19, many state, non-state and agenda-driven individuals have used the crisis to spread misinformation, disinformation, and outright propaganda. These efforts are often not accidental or ill-considered. In many cases, they are delib- erate actions designed to exploit modern marketing stratagems and are highly devel- oped, employing sophisticated cyber and psychological warfare approaches. They seek strategic effects, attempting to provide a (false or misleading) narrative to create an alternative worldview for calculated impact. Such attacks are also characterised by inconsistent messaging, rapid evolutionary improvements based on message success and a shotgun approach, i.e., wide-area attacks. However, building upon modern methods, these attacks are also developing in sophistication, becoming even more targeted and effects oriented as they build upon commercial approaches, including automation.

State actors, such as Russia, employ a broad spectrum of such approaches in remarkably sophisticated fashion. Media outlets, controlled by the Russian govern- ment, such as RT (Russia Today) or Sputnik, use a broadband strategy of disinfor- mation through a mix of news stories that blend fact with demonstrable falsehoods (NATO, 2020b). At the same time, they employ fakes sites, automated bots, and burner accounts to amplify and normalise narratives while creating momentum and uptake by other media. These later approaches may be highly targeted at specific receptive groups defined by ideology, geography, or demographics. However, the aims of such attacks are long-term and strategic, aiming to discredit NATO, the nations and Alliance values or the value of the Alliance. Sadly, in this regard, not much has changed since the cold war, except the volume, automation and targeting effectiveness of such disinformation attacks. Trust has always been challenging to build and harder to maintain.

At the start of the COVID-19 crisis, several actors took the opportunity to launch disinformation attacks on the Alliance. A surge in such attacks occurred between March and June of 2020, although the volume and nature of these attacks morphed over time. To put this in perspective, from December 2019 to April 2020, over eight thousand cases of disinformation were noted (Ozawa, 2020) by the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force (European External Action Service, 2021b). A review of the same database for December 2019 to May 2021 notes 11,787 instances of pro-Kremlin disinformation, with approximately 203 related to COVID or the pandemic and 1388 associated with NATO.

2.4.2.1 Russia

The use of disinformation as a Russian strategic weapon was honed during the cold war. Then again, Russia’s skilful use of propaganda and disinformation goes back to Lenin (Ball, 2017) and arguably even further back to Potemkin (Montefiore, 2005). Indeed Lenin is quoted as saying, “A lie told often enough becomes the truth” (DiResta, 2018). Using disinformation as a strategic tool returned, with a vengeance, following the ascension of Vladimir Putin. In 2014, Russian—NATO relations were seriously strained due to the Russian annexation of Crimea. This territorial appropri- ation was built upon a long campaign of disinformation in the region (Ball, 2017) as part of the skilful use of hybrid warfare tactics, which included the use of “little green men” (Pifer, 2019) to spearhead the process. As noted at the Wales summit in 2014, by General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at the time, “[Russia is conducting] the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” (Pomerantsev, 2014). Lever- aging new technologies and social media has enabled highly effective information campaigns whose implications are only beginning to be appreciated and understood (Chabuk & Jonas, 2018).

Since that time, Russian disinformation campaigns have focused on the predictable goals of undermining Alliance cohesion and stability, bring into disrepute NATO’s military or political actions, spreading panic and undermining democratic processes (Monaghan, 2020; Ozawa, 2020). Strategically these efforts are designed to weaken the economic and military capability and capacity of the Alliance while creating a multi-polar world order more conducive to Russian interests as well as leaving Russia and others in a more advantageous military, economic and political position (Ozawa, 2020). In the context of COVID-19, disinformation activities that ultimately delay, weaken, prolong, or confuse will extend and amplify the pandemic and its adverse effects while provoking panic. This could eventually undermine soci- etal bonds and degrade the geopolitical strength of Europe and North America. As noted (Pomerantsev, 2014), “The new Russia doesn’t just deal in the petty disinfor- mation, forgeries, lies, leaks, and cyber-sabotage usually associated with informa- tion warfare. It reinvents reality, creating mass hallucinations that then translate into political action.” Given the insignificant resource costs and minimal negative consequences of such a disinformation campaign, such a strategy is being pursued vigorously. Consequently, it is no surprise that the COVID-19 crisis became just another opportunity to be exploited.

In Spring 2021, Latvia was subject to a Russian disinformation attack, accusing Canadian Forces troops operating in Latvia of spreading COVID-19 to Latvia (NATO, 2020b). This disinformation attack consisted of a fake interview, modified screen- shots from the battlegroup’s FaceBook page, and an attempt to solicit a nega- tive response from the Latvian Minister of Defence through a spoofed journalist’s account.

Poland was also targeted at the same time (NATO, 2020b). In this case, a forged letter was planted, via a cyber-attack, on the Polish War Studies academy’s website from Brigadier General Ryszard Parafianowicz. This letter criticised US forces in Poland, and in particular, the associated DEFENDER-Europe 20 military exercise. Once again, multiple blogs and sympathetic media outlets were used to spread the message, spoofing an e-mail from a former Polish parliamentarian to Polish media outlets.

While these targeted disinformation attacks were ongoing, in the spring of 2020, Russia continued to spread disinformation through state-influenced or controlled media channels on the nature and scope of NATO exercises in Eastern Europe in the Spring of 2020 (NATO, 2020b). NATO was accused of continuing to hold large- scale exercises with no regard for the health and safety of national populations. NATO forces were also accused of ignoring travel restrictions and safety protocols, spreading COVID-19 throughout Europe. Starting in early January of 2020, and perhaps in an even more egregious disinformation attack, pro-Kremlin media explic- itly accused NATO (and the US in particular) of having engineered the COVID-19 as a biological warfare agent in secret laboratories in Latvia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova or Ukraine. The COVID-19 pandemic was portrayed as a “biological Cher- nobyl”. As late as May 2020, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov was quoted as saying, “Washington’s unwillingness to ensure the transparency of its military biological activities in various parts of the world raises questions about what is really going on there and what the actual goals are” (NATO, 2020b).

Across all these targeted attacks, NATO worked with the countries involved to identify and counter the disinformation attempts before they could gain a foothold within broader media circles (NATO, 2020b). NATO also provided facts to counter the information wide-area attacks made through Russian media. In all cases, these have helped build a more fact-oriented narrative within the Alliance and Eastern Europe more specifically. However, the impact on counter-NATO narratives within Russia has perhaps been less successful (e.g. Schaffner & Flood, 2020), in no small measure due to state control or influence on major media outlets (Ball, 2017).

These Russian targeted disinformation campaigns follow a broadly similar pattern (NATO, 2020b). Such attacks employ forgeries (doctored letters, fake social media posts and bogus interviews), use burner accounts to create false personas or exploit that of a credible individual, generate explicit falsehoods and amplification of disin- formation by arms-length but pro-Russian news and social media sites, engineer leaps from the originating language to English language media, and spoof e-mails to NATO, as well as governmental or media sources to provoke a reaction designed to add fuel to the controversy.

Russian disinformation has also taken on a more threatening tone (NATO, 2020b). In March of 2020, Russia offered and deployed aid supporting Italy’s COVID-19 response, building upon a narrative of a responsible global actor reaching out to help Italy in its hour of need after having been abandoned by its NATO allies. Such donation diplomacy was arguably staged as a pure propaganda exercise (Weiss, 2020). Still, it must also be noted that NATO and the EU were slow in responding to Italian requests for aid, thus creating an opportunity to be exploited. As such, the Italian government initially welcomed this assistance as a good-faith gesture. Soon, however, questions were being asked in mainstream Italian media about the usefulness of such aid, initial deployment near a NATO airbase far from the centre of the outbreak and the potential embedding of GRU agents within such support (NATO, 2020b; Braw, 2020). Following a strategy of “the best defence is a good offence”, senior Russian officials condemned the reporting, accusing the Italian media of spreading false news and disinformation (NATO, 2020b). The original author of the critical reporting was threatened on Facebook by the Russian Ministry of Defence Spokesperson, Igor Konashenkov. Soon after the Spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Maria Zakharova, accused multiple US media outlets of spreading disinformation on Russian COVID mortality rates, threatening action unless the articles were retracted. In the context of these events, NATO leadership reiterated that the fourth estate has a responsibility to check and assess information on behalf of free societies. By taking an open and fact-based approach to disinformation NATO demonstrated its willingness to put itself under a microscope. Action, ultimately, it is hoped, speaks louder than words. Disinformation is a strategic priority within Russia. Such disinformation has two strategic objectives. First, Russia’s return as a great power, with a commensurate return of Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the collapse of NATO as an effective organisation (Ball, 2017). Second, to preserve the Putin regime by protecting it from the contagion of western-oriented revolutions (Ball, 2017). To achieve these objectives, a false narrative is presented where the US is a demonic military-industrial force for global tyranny, EU members are at each other’s throats, Eastern Europe is a hotbed of ethnic tension, NATO is threatening an imminent attack on Mother Russia, Ukraine (with a population approximately 28% of Russia) presents a credible military threat, Alliance democracies have failed to tackle the COVID crisis and western vaccines are dangerous and produced by corrupt manufacturers. This picture is contrasted with a militarily and politically strong Russia, prepared to counter NATO aggression, a friend always willing to lend a hand during a crisis, leading the world in developing COVID-19 vaccines, and providing an effective national response to the situation. Such a Potemkin narrative has real power based on a blend of carefully selected facts, half-truths, cultural bias, outright falsehoods and wish fulfilment. Note that while there is an overarching strategy to use disinformation, there is also an element of opportunism. “Putin is not a “cool genius ... His system is ‘adhocracy,’ in which lackeys do not receive direct instructions but instead rely on hints and guesses to determine what will please the boss” (Galeotti, 2019; Lipman, 2019). Putin is an opportunist without a master plan, but with a commitment to restoring Russian greatness. Russian actions during the COVID-19 crisis are simply the most recent example of this ad hockery.

Beyond the COVID-19 crisis, Russia views disinformation campaigns as a funda- mental aspect of ongoing grey-zone or hybrid warfare. In this world, “truth is nego- tiable ... a popular uprising a fascist coup and ... [support to] a Syrian dictator becomes an anti-terrorist operation” (Ball, 2017). The Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, is quoted as saying, “interstate confrontation’s foundation has come to consist of non-military measures including political, economic, and informational ... [Total conflict] has spread to all spheres of activity in modern society, diplomatic, scientific, sport, and cultural and, in fact, has become total in scope” (Ozawa, 2020). This comment contains the echoes of a cold-war long thought confined to history.

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