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Information warfare manipulates the behavior of citizens—grid shut down and blackouts

Gururaghav Raman et al. 2020, PhD in Computer Engineering and Research Fellow at Future Resilient Systems Programme; Bedoor is an Assistant Professor of Computational Social Science at New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE. She received her PhD in Interdisciplinary Engineering in 2017 from Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, and her MSc in Computer Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Marcin Waniek is a Post-Doctoral Associate at New York University Abu Dhabi; Talal Rahwan is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science in 2007 from The University of Southampton, UK, where he received the Dean’s Award for Early Career Researcher; Jimmy Chih-Hsien Peng received the B.E. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical and computer engineering from The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, in 2008 and 2012, respectively. He is currently an Assistant Professor in electrical and computer engineering with the National University of Singapore, Singapore.; “How weaponizing disinformation can bring down a city's power grid”, Aug 2020//SK

Social media has dramatically altered the ways in which conflicts are fought. By allowing belligerents to command the public narrative, these technologies have created a paradigm wherein the most viral information can influence the outcome of wars [1]. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by social media algorithms that value virality over veracity [2,3]. Unsurprisingly, many notable skirmishes in recent years have used disinformation to manipulate peoples' behavior [1,4]. Such campaigns have become particularly effective due to the ever-increasing prevalence of big data and machine learning techniques that allow the behavioral patterns of the masses to be analyzed with unprecedented precision. Among the clearest manifestations of such campaigns are the alleged Russian interference into the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum [5,6]. These incidents suggest that the microtargeting capabilities provided by companies such as Cambridge Analytica [7] can be weaponized [8] to influence the long-term decisions of a society. While many studies have analyzed campaigns targeting long-term social behavior manipulation [2,9-12], little attention has been given to targeted attacks that use disinformation as a weapon to manipulate social behavior within a limited time span.

One particularly sensitive target that is vulnerable to behavioral manipulation is critical infrastructure, the attack of which may have drastic implications nationwide. For instance, despite high levels of security, human operators proved to be the weakest link during the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear program, unwittingly introducing malware into the facilities [13,14]. Another attack of this kind that drew concern from governments worldwide was the Ukrainian power grid cyberattack of 2015 [15,16]. In this incident, attackers deliberately cut off the power supply for 230,000 residents for several hours using operator credentials harvested through one particular form of disinformation, namely, spear-phishing [17].

In this study, we focus on the power grid-a choice motivated by the devastation caused by historical power outages including human casualties and massive financial losses [18-20]. Yet, while numerous blackout prevention and mitigation strategies have been proposed in the literature [21-32], the link between disinformation and blackouts has never been studied to date. Driven by this observation, we seek to answer the following question: can an adversary bring down a city's power grid using disinformation without any physical or cyber intrusions? The main contribution of this analysis is to assess whether an adversary could attack the power distribution system not by targeting its hardware or software infrastructure, but by focusing entirely on manipulating individual consumers' behavior.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the mechanism of a disinformation attack on the power grid, and then evaluate the impact of such an attack considering the distribution network of the Greater London area as a case study. Subsequently, to quantify the risk posed by disinformation attacks, we perform analyses to estimate what disinformation follow-through rates could be achieved by an adversary in reality. We conclude by highlighting the implications of our study.

Attack impact on the power grid

We consider an attack in which an adversary attempts to manipulate the behavior of citizens by sending fake discount notifications encouraging them to shift their energy consumption into the peak-demand period. Such a shift may result in the tripping of overloaded power lines, leading to blackouts (see Methods). An overview of this attack and the disinformation message are shown in Fig 1. Ultimately, the success of such an attack depends on the follow-through rate , i.e., the fraction of people who behave as intended by the attacker. We analyze the impact caused by such behavioral manipulation on the power grid. To this end, we modeled the power grid of Greater London (see S1 Note in S1 File) and simulated the behavior of residential energy consumers. Importantly, our model considers residential electric vehicle (EV) adoption since the owners of such EVs control a substantial amount of deferrable energy, and thus can cause greater harm when manipulated by an adversary. We vary the EV adoption level in the city, and model the capacity upgrades that are necessary for the grid to support the demand corresponding to each such level [33-35]; see Methods. Note that although the EV charging demand is only one component of the total deferrable demand, it nevertheless accounts for a significant part of the latter. Therefore, in the following analysis, we use increasing EV adop-tion level as a synecdoche for the increasing amount of deferrable demand in the grid.

Fig 1. An overview of a disinformation attack on the power system. Illustrating how the disinformation attack is launched from an attacker, thereby altering the energy consumption patterns of a portion of the population. Importantly, not every recipient follows-through on the notification. [see PDF for image]

We consider a scenario where the grid is heavily loaded and any distribution line can sustain at a maximum a 10% increase in the peak demand through it (see Methods). Fig 2a presents the percentage of consumers who experience a blackout given varying follow-through and EV adoption rates. As can be seen, increasing the EV adoption up to 20% increases the system vulnerability to the attack, whereas beyond 20% the system resilience increases, i.e., it requires a greater follow-through rate to achieve the same attack magnitude. This trend is caused by two opposing forces: (i) increased vulnerability due to the consumers controlling more deferrable energy, and (ii) increased resilience due to the grid's upgraded capacity to cope with the increased number of EVs. When the EV adoption is smaller than or equal to 20%, the former force outweighs the latter, and hence we see an increase in the system vulnerability. The opposite is true when the EV adoption exceeds 20%, leading to the observed increase in resilience. Next, to get a sense of the distribution of the blackout across the city, we depict the state of the system corresponding to two different cells in the heat map; see Fig 2b and 2c. As can be observed, the impact is dispersed throughout the city rather than being concentrated in very few massive pockets.

Fig 2. Impact of an attack on the power distribution network of Greater London. a: The percentage of consumers suffering from a blackout as a result of the attack given different follow-through rates and EV adoption rates. The figure also highlights the columns corresponding to projected EV adoption rates for the UK in the years 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050. b: Visualization of the status of every power distribution line in the system for a follow-through and EV adoption rates of 0.17 and 0.20, respectively. Grey indicates active lines, whereas red indicates lines that have tripped as a result of overloading. c: The same as (b), but for follow-through and EV adoption rates of 0.12 and 0.20, respectively. [see PDF for image]

We then study how the grid's vulnerability depends on the peak overloading capacity of the distribution lines. Say the overloading capacity is increased from 10% to 15%. Simulating the system for follow-through and EV adoption rates of 0.17 and 0.20 respectively, we find that the attack results in only 5.9% of consumers being offline. This is in contrast to 35.4% of consumers that were affected by the blackout when the line capacity was 10% (see Fig 2b). Further increasing the overloading capacity to 20% reduces the size of the blackout to 1.4% of the consumers. The heat maps corresponding to these scenarios are presented in S2 Note in S1 File. To obtain more insight, we analyze the grid in terms of the line capacity upgrades that are necessary to support increasing EV adoption. The results shown thus far are for the case where, for any given EV adoption rate, the grid is assumed to be upgraded to support exactly that rate. However, if the grid is upgraded to support more than this rate, the impact of the attack will be substantially alleviated, and vice versa. Taking the year 2025 as an example, if by then the grid was not upgraded since 2020, then a mere 5% follow-through rate can bring the grid down completely. On the other hand, if the grid in 2025 was upgraded to support the projected EV adoption until 2030, then even a 100% follow-through rate would cause a blackout for less than 20% of the residents. These results highlight the need for future grid upgrades to not only be dictated by the technical aspects governed by physical laws, but also consider the behavioral aspects of the consumers who may act unpredictably and irrationally, especially when subjected to disinformation. However, since grid upgrades come at a high cost to the power utility [35], perhaps a more realistic solution would be to focus on increasing the awareness of the consumers and immunizing them against disinformation.

Estimating disinformation follow-through

Having assessed how the power grid is affected by the consumers who follow-through on the fake notification, we now estimate what follow-through rates could be achieved by an attacker in reality. Here, the social aspect could play an important role, since people may unknowingly amplify the attack by forwarding the disinformation notification to their friends; see Fig 3a for an illustration. (Note that the term "friend" is borrowed from the context of social media to refer to any "acquaintance".) In this context, Goel et al. [36] analyzed a billion diffusion events, and found that (dis)information is unlikely to become viral through social media, since the vast majority of the studied events terminated either right after the initial broadcast itself, or after a single step of propagation through social media. As such, assuming that the attack considered here has similar limitations, our analysis considers only a single step of propagation, whereby the initial recipients of the notification consider forwarding it to some of their friends.

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