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Russia and China threaten liberal democracy—US social media exploited for information warfare—US gov key

David L. Sloss 2022, He is a professor at Santa Clara University School of Law, received his JD from Stanford University, MPP from Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, and BA from Hampshire College. He worked as a litigation associate at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto and clerked for Senior Judge Joseph T. Sneed, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, San Francisco. He also worked for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for nine years before he attended law school., “Tyrants on Twitter”, pg 3-5// SK

Similarly, in the modern era of social media, many techno- utopians mistakenly believe that any government regulation of social media is an unwarranted infringement of individual liberty. In fact, such regulation is necessary to protect our body politic from the threat posed by Russian and Chinese information warfare. Let us be clear: Liberal democracy is under attack, not just in the United States but around the world. As of 2019: “For the first time since 2001, there are more autocracies than democracies in the world.”2 To protect our cherished liberties, we need to protect democracies from Chinese and Russian cyber troops because democratic self- government is the foundation of individual liberty. The big technology companies are not up to the task. We need government regulation so that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media companies do not continue to function as Trojan horses, allowing the virus of information warfare to infect and ultimately subvert liberal democracy. In the current geopolitical and technological environment, proponents of liberal democracy and liberal internationalism— and I openly declare myself a proponent of both— confront a difficult choice. Advocates of liberal democracy are committed to freedom of expression, with minimal government controls. Advocates of liberal internationalism are committed to reducing barriers to transnational fl ows of people, goods, and information. Russia and China are working “to upend the Western liberal order by turning Western virtues of openness . . . into vulnerabilities to be exploited.”3 Unfortunately, their strategy is working because democratic governments have failed to regulate social media to protect democracy. If we want to preserve both liberal democracy and liberal internationalism, Western democracies must restrict the ability of Chinese and Russian cyber troops to exploit social media to conduct information warfare. Until now, democratic governments have given social media companies carte blanche to decide who is entitled to create and operate accounts on their platforms. The companies have adopted open- door policies, allowing almost all people from all countries to create social media accounts. Consequently, Chinese and Russian cyber troops have developed an active presence on U.S. social media platforms. Russia has taken advantage of U.S. social media platforms to interfere with democratic elections and to erode faith in democratic institutions.4 China has exploited U.S. social media platforms to disseminate foreign propaganda extolling the virtues of its authoritarian system and highlighting the flaws of liberal democracy.5 By granting Chinese and Russian agents unrestricted access to U.S. social media platforms, democratic governments are inadvertently making a significant, albeit indirect, contribution to the worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms. For the foreseeable future, the world will be divided between democratic and authoritarian states. The United States will continue to be the most powerful country in the democratic camp. China and Russia will be the most powerful countries in the authoritarian camp. The United States and its allies will engage in geopolitical competition with China and Russia in both military and economic domains. However, the present era differs from the Cold War in several respects. Most importantly, for the purposes of this book, due to the spread of information technology, the domain of information operations has become a much more significant battleground in the broader geopolitical landscape. As one commentator noted: “The new great- power competition won’t necessarily take place on battlefields . . . it will happen on smartphones, computers, and other connected devices and on the digital infrastructure that supports them.”6 Currently, U.S. social media platforms— primarily Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram— are critical battlefields in the ongoing competition between democratic and authoritarian states. Russian citizens use VK to communicate with each other via social media, but Russian agents exploit U.S. social media platforms to conduct information warfare in foreign countries. Chinese citizens use Sina Weibo and other platforms to communicate with each other, but Chinese cyber troops often use U.S. social media platforms to disseminate foreign propaganda. (Chinese agents also use WeChat, a Chinese platform, for this purpose.7 ) The power of democratic governments to regulate social media could potentially give liberal democracies a major strategic advantage in the information warfare domain. Until now, Western democracies have squandered that advantage by granting Chinese and Russian agents unrestricted access to U.S. social media platforms. Those platforms are some of the most powerful weapons available in the modern information warfare arsenal. Chinese and Russian cyber troops are deploying those weapons with great effect to undermine liberal democratic norms. U.S. technology companies are effectively subsidizing their information warfare activities by granting them access to U.S. social media platforms.

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