Current NATO counter-disinformation tactics fail, BUT the plan’s approach centered around strengthening both national and international resilience by coordinating best practices and integrating effective tactics into NATO doctrine solves.
Linda Sanchez 21, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United States House Representative from California’s 38th District, active competitor in the annual Congressional Baseball Game, October 2021, “Bolstering the Democratic Resilience of the Alliance Against Disinformation and Propaganda,” https://www.illiberalism.org/linda-sanchez-bolstering-the-democratic-resilience-of-the-alliance-against-disinformation-and-propaganda/, RMax
1. Increase NATO’s capacity to understand and respond to threats in the information space
66. Member states should expand NATO’s human, financial, and technological resources dedicated to fighting disinformation and propaganda to match both the level of the threat and the Alliance’s ambitions to counter it. Such resources would help strengthen NATO’s capacity to monitor the information environment in which it operates and respond to any hostile information activity.
67. NATO and its member countries should improve their understanding of the domestic vulnerabilities to disinformation and propaganda faced by the Allies. In particular, the Alliance should better account in its counter-disinformation efforts for the role of citizens within its borders in the spread of disinformation. Additionally, NATO should carry out regular in-depth assessments in all 30 member states to identify and monitor specific national vulnerabilities to disinformation and propaganda, similar to the surveys that it carries out every two years to assess the state of civil preparedness in Allied countries. These assessments could be carried out by peers or a group of experts. Based on the insight gained in such assessments, NATO should shift from a broad and one-size-fits-all communication strategy to a more tailored approach better targeting the groups most vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda in each Allied country. As such, these assessments would help NATO make the most of its limited resources and give member states a better understanding of the shortfall areas in which they could focus their efforts. In addition to this regular monitoring, member states should make more frequent use of the NATO Counter-Hybrid Support Teams to identify vulnerabilities to disinformation ahead of or during sensitive events, such as elections. Similarly, Allied countries should actively use the expertise of the relevant NATO centers of excellence, including the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
68. NATO should step up its response to the disinformation and propaganda campaigns launched by authoritarian states, particularly Russia and China. As many of the false or misleading narratives promoted by these actors are predictable, NATO should increase its efforts to prebunk such messages at early stages before they spread widely, rather than debunk them once they have achieved broad circulation. At the same time, careful consideration must be given to which claims should be actively refuted and which should not. Indeed, disproving claims that have not yet been widely disseminated can be counterproductive as it may inadvertently give them increased visibility.
69. NATO and its member states should further bolster their efforts to increase public knowledge about the Alliance. Better educating Allied publics about the Alliance’s values, objectives, and benefits would indeed contribute to countering disinformation about NATO. To achieve this goal, however, NATO and individual member countries should shift the primary focus of their communications strategies from countering negative narratives to actively communicating positive narratives about the successes of the Alliance. They should continue promoting NATO’s achievements and solidarity, as they have successfully done in the context of the response to the pandemic.
70. NATO should further increase the coordination of counter-disinformation efforts between Allied countries and with partners. The wide-reaching nature of disinformation campaigns means that responses should be transatlantic in scope and inherently collaborative. NATO can play a more active role in coordinating national efforts and in sharing best practices amongst member states and partner countries for possible replication. To that end, NATO should develop a taxonomy of national measures adopted by NATO member states and partner countries, as well as countries that are not NATO partners but have experience in countering disinformation.
2. Create a framework that places democratic resilience and efforts to counter disinformation and propaganda at the center of NATO’s future
71. NATO and the Allies should ensure that countering disinformation and propaganda, and strengthening democratic resilience more broadly, are part and parcel of the ongoing discussions on NATO’s future, including the NATO 2030 process and the update of the Strategic Concept.
72. The Allies should reaffirm their shared commitment to democratic values and principles by establishing a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO, as suggested by the NATO PA President Gerald Connolly and subsequently recommended by the NATO 2030 Group of experts (Connolly, 2019; Group of experts, 2020). Structurally similar to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, this Center would provide technical and research support to member states in strengthening democratic resilience, ensuring greater societal cohesion, resisting hostile interference, and responding to disinformation from external and internal actors. To do so, the Center would, first, monitor, identify, and highlight vulnerabilities in member states in the areas of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Second, the Center would assist member states, upon request, in the development of institutions, laws, and policies to tackle corruption, foster trust in elections, and respond to other governance challenges. Through these two strands of work, the Center would play a key role in supporting member states in recognizing and remedying democratic vulnerabilities that could otherwise be used by malevolent actors to spread disinformation and propaganda within the Alliance. Although institutionally part of NATO, the Center would harness the experience and knowledge of civil society experts and think tanks and could include an advisory group of external experts. The creation of the Center for Democratic Resilience, as a structure within NATO, would symbolize the enduring commitment of all Allies to uphold the founding democratic principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.
73. Member states should support the development of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience in Romania. This Centre, although not a NATO structure, constitutes a useful international resource for NATO, Allied countries and their partners to discuss threats to their resilience, including in the information space; to develop analytical tools and best practices to counter these threats; and to increase joint education and training activities in this area. The development of this Centre and the proposal to create a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO should not, however, be opposed, as both institutions will play complementary roles. The Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience focuses on analysis, exchange, training and cooperation (including with partners outside the organization, notably neighboring countries and the EU), whereas the Center for Democratic Resilience will internally assist member states in operationally responding to threats to democratic values.
74. NATO should make the ongoing development of a counter-hostile information and disinformation toolbox for Allies a priority. In addition to outlining key definitions, approaches, and response options at the national level, it could be used as a basis to establish NATO-level standards for resilience to disinformation and propaganda. Member states could use such standards to set national targets and compare their progress to that of other Allies. This could include common standards in terms of the institutional structure designated to address disinformation threats, the financial and human resources allocated, and the legal framework.
75. NATO and Allied countries should reflect on options for a more offensive counter-disinformation approach. The Alliance should consider developing a strategy that would impose greater costs on malevolent actors aggressively disrupting the information space. NATO has recognized that a serious hybrid attack, such as a cyberattack, could trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, where an attack against one Ally is treated as an attack against all (Stoltenberg, 2019). Attention should be paid to the conditions under which a disinformation or propaganda campaign could be considered a possible trigger. The Alliance cannot remain passive in the face of hostile information activity which threatens to undermine the foundations of our democratic institutions and societies.