Military cooperation is key to countering disinfo in the force
Raphael Cohen 21, Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE; Nathan Mustafaga, associate policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Joe Cheravitch; Defense analyst at the RAND corporation; Alyssa Demus, associate international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation; Scott Harold, political scientist and Associate Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Jeffrey Hornung, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation; Jenny Jun, Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia; Mike Schwille, senior policy analyst at RAND; Elina Treyger, political scientist at the RAND Corporation; Nathan Vest, adjunct research assistant at RAND, “Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4373z1.html, cy
Train for Disinformation, Focus on Key Demographics, and Minimize Widespread Bans on Smart Phone and Social Media Use
The joint force has made significant strides toward incorporating counter-disinformation efforts on social media into their regimen. One way has been to simulate the social media environment through such programs as ION. Another has been to make real-world information environment monitoring a part of regular training exercises, such as Trident Juncture. There are pros and cons to both approaches, but detecting and responding to disinformation needs to be built into training programs—from the unit level down to the individual service member level—particularly as disinformation on social media becomes a staple of great-power competition.
This expansion of disinformation training will push the joint force to reach new audiences, possibly in uncomfortable ways. U.S. adversaries do not target all service members equally; they might not even narrow their focus to just service members. China tends to base its disinformation campaigns on ethnic lines, placing Chinese- and Taiwanese Americans at greater risk of attack.7 Russia targets military family members. In 2015 and 2016, several military spouses—many of whom led military family support groups or wrote about military family matters— received death threats on Facebook and Twitter from a group claiming to be “Cyber Caliphate” but actually tied to Russian intelligence, possibly in a bid to deflect attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine and encourage support for Russia’s action to fight the Islamic states in the Syrian conflict.8 Both Russia and China could launch disinformation campaigns that do not target U.S. audiences at all but still hamper the joint force’s ability to operate by targeting local communities where the joint force bases overseas. Properly training for disinformation campaigns requires reaching out to new audiences (such as family members and base communities) and tailoring modules for specific at-risk groups.
Training all service members and family members to recognize disinformation campaigns is a herculean task. A simpler solution would be to ban the use of smartphones and social media during periods of conflict. However, such a policy could prove impractical. As Ukraine’s experience during the height of the conflict in the Donbass demonstrated, smartphone bans, even for front-line soldiers, proved difficult to enforce because bored soldiers found ways to smuggle phones to the front. 9 Theoretically, the joint force could pursue limited technological solutions (e.g., jamming reception or blocking access to certain sites) or selectively enforce bans for certain key units for limited periods of time, but improving force resiliency against disinformation will still depend mostly on training.