Fundamental strategic divergence means neither carrots nor sticks get Turkey on board
Kontos 19, [Michalis Kontos, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law, University of Nicosia, Cyprus, CYPRUS AND THE GREAT POWERS AN EVALUATION OF RUSSIAN-CYPRIOT RELATIONS IN THE NEW EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENVIRONMENT]
The study of contemporary Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East verifies, to a large degree, the validity of these theoretical assumptions. The structure of the international system is changing due to uneven growth dynamics, which cause respective adaptions at the level of perceptions and prestige. In that sense, US overexpansion and its consequences forced Washington to a strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which, subsequently, changed the way others saw the US and transformed its prestige accordingly. Consequently, Russia exploited this situation in order to establish its presence and increase its influence in the region, which led to a redistribution of power and triggered a struggle for the formation of a new regional balance of power. In this framework, realignment of interests and reconfiguration of bilateral and multilateral relations was a natural outcome of the changing power distribution and perceptions. If we focus our microscope on bilateral and multilateral relations between the US, Russia, Turkey and Cyprus we may observe two independent variables, which define the direction of the overall set of relationships, which are mutually reinforcing: Turkey’s post-Kemalist foreign policy and the degree of tensions between Russia and the US/NATO. It seems that the more Turkey distances itself from its Western allies the more impetus its relations with Russia may gain. On the other hand, the more US-Russian relations worsen, the more Russia is motivated to embrace Turkey aiming to put NATO’s internal unity to the test. At the same time, Turkey’s independent regional agenda and hegemonic aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean tends to disturb its relations with regional States. Whether Washington’s decision is (or will be) to change its partners in the region, or to try to bring Ankara back on board through a stick-and-carrot strategy, US interests will more or less favor the convergence between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. Moreover, the more Washington is engaged in containing Russia’s influence in the region the more its cooperation with these countries will be enhanced. Therefore, we may assume that the more Ankara and Moscow converge and the more Washington and Moscow clash, the more US-Turkish relations will be disturbed and US-Cypriot relations will improve.