Overly pessimistic frames of disability deconstruction preclude future resistance and weaken political gains achieved by disability activists.
Jenks 18 – PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware [Andrew. “Crip theory and the disabled identity: why disability politics needs impairment.” Disability & Society, Vol 24, Issue 3 (2019). Oct. 31, 2018.]
Robert McRuer’s (2006) Crip Theory contends that the systemic factors which enforce compulsory able-bodiedness in society are not just thoroughly interwoven with compulsory heterosexuality, but these are mutually contingent upon each other. Crip Theory has taken the emancipatory message of a disability politics embraced by cross-disability organizations in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and centered that message as one which can be the basis for examination of the forces which cause the oppression of marginalized social groups. Early disability organizing in the United States was not always done across disability groups and scant resources necessitated competition amongst some groups (Nielsen 2012). A collective disability consciousness does not necessarily even exist, or exist in the ways in which scholarship purports it to (Watson 2002; Engel and Munger 2003; Heyer 2015). While I acknowledge and encourage the uncovering of systemic, biopolitical forces which produce the corporeal able-bodied standard, or normate, subject, a thorny problem presents itself: does a coherent disabled identity or even an identifiable disability identity exist? An identity which McRuer relies heavily on in his presentation of the notion of a ‘queer/disabled’ subject. Contributions of Crip Theory and subsequent texts which explore cultural locations of disability like Alison Kafer’s (2013) successful and groundbreaking Feminist, Queer, Crip rely on this logic to articulate a pan-disability social identity.
Political science as a discipline largely ignores disability. Public opinion polling rarely includes discussion of people with disabilities. Two examples, an online Harris Poll from 2015 referencing the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a 1999 Pew Millennium Survey question on the status of disabled people compared to 50 years ago, both found those surveyed thought disabled people were better off than in the past (Pew Research Center 1999; Shannon-Missal 2015). Literature on electoral participation by Lisa Schur has found disabled people are over time (since 1998) participating at rates comparable to non-disabled people (Schur et al. 2002; Schur et al. 2017). Political theory has recently developed a burgeoning interest in disability centered around issues of care, vulnerability, inclusion and exclusion, and incorporation into frameworks of capability (Knight 2014a, 2014b; Clifford 2012, 2014; Simplican 2015; Hirschmann 2012; Arneil 2009). This article largely deals with literature and debates outside of the purview of political science but that does not mean its content is not germane to the politics of disability, and the lives of disabled people.
Perhaps crip theory’s most important contribution is its attempt to address the pluralism which exists amongst the disability community and highlighting of the shared oppressions which disabled people feel. Embracing all perspectives is key to intersectional political movements where those whose opinions and lived experiences are doubly and triply marginalized (non-white, straight, articulate, male, etc., disabled people) are actually valued. With this being acknowledged, I fear the academic sub-field of Critical Disability Studies’ over-reliance on social deconstruction of disability and impairment could have disastrous consequences for disability rights movements in the future, and a weakening of the political claims and gains those who are disabled have advocated for and won. Throughout this article I am referring to the book by McRuer and the academic literature which uses a similar post-structuralist articulation of the identity category. I am not challenging popular culture articulations of coming out crip or of crip as a social identity.
This article proceeds in three sections. The first lays out central components of disability theory as it reflects social movements around disability rights and subsequent academic theory based on these articulations including the materialist ‘social model’ of disability and the post-structuralist ‘crip theory.’ The second section presents the case against extreme ‘social deconstruction’ of disability. The final section presents two empirical examples of how crip theory can obfuscate disability politics. One is the highly publicized rape case of a man who was unable to consent legally to sexual contact. The second case, broadly conceived, contends that disability visibility is central in the fight for rights concerning access for people with disabilities. Concluding thoughts ask the reader to consider disability studies which takes the study of politics seriously.
Here I make a note on language choice as well as choosing to disclose my close personal connection to the subject of this article. ‘Disability’ is often used in reference to a social category assigned to people who are viewed as not possessing desirable traits. This ‘disablist’ understanding of disability, that it is a social trait that one does not want to possess, dominates how people think about disability. Rarely do able-bodied people think of themselves as only ‘temporarily able-bodied,’ which we all are (Knight 2014b). While I often focus on the ‘negatives’ of being disabled I do not mean to overshadow the positive, emancipatory politics and embrace of the disabled identity. I identify as being disabled (I am legally blind) and not having a strong cross-disability consciousness. This identity and my participation within and in the study of the Paralympic movement certainly play a part in my arguments. Previous work (Deal 2003; Jenks and Jenks 2016) also shows that disabled people themselves create hierarchies, and blindness is not seen as ‘desirable’ or a condition which is necessarily identifiable as being particularly disabling. This also influences my decision to discuss disability which is ‘discernible’ rather than ‘visible’ when the opportunity presents itself. I do not observe disability like other people do, with their eyes. This influences how I think and write about disability which is not discernible to others. I do discuss ‘visibility’ as a separate concept in the third section of this article.