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A social deconstruction of disability fails. It erases difference and forecloses progressive social policy.

Jenks 18 – PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware [Andrew. “Crip theory and the disabled identity: why disability politics needs impairment.” Disability & Society, Vol 24, Issue 3 (2019). Oct. 31, 2018.]

Negotiating disability identity: the case against social deconstruction

Law professor Bruce Pardy’s (2016) contention that students with disabilities who are allowed accommodations of extra time by Queen’s University on law school examinations have an unfair advantage caused a stir. Equating the extra time on an examination to a ‘head start’ in the 100-m sprint in the Olympics, Pardy (2017) questions the realness of those students’ disabilities. Implicitly, he is arguing that some impairments are less ‘real’ than others. Pardy would not, for instance, suggest that a student who was blind and needed to take examinations with a school-supplied reader should not be entitled to extra time. So, what makes a disability real? Disability politics, as originally articulated in the 1970s, was based on the premise that disability itself is a social creation. The issue Pardy is highlighting here is not about whether a disability is real, but whether these students have an impairment which is real.

Credited to Mike Oliver (1983) and others, the scholarly work which produced the social model of disability would be challenged by sociologists and scholars from other disciplines in the 1990s and those whose work fits under the umbrella term Critical Disability Studies. Sherry argues that ‘Impairments are often surrounded by quite specific medical and cultural discourses which need to be carefully analyzed to identify the multiple layers of power in which they are embedded’ (2016, 734–735). The distinction between impairment, some physical condition of the corporeal self which limits function, and disability, the inability or difficulty participating in social, political, and economic life, is thus obfuscated and challenges the basis for the emancipatory politics of 40 years ago.

But what is the basis for disability? After all, means testing is still used in the legal definition of disability in the United States. The ADA, as amended in 2008, uses the verbiage of ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities’ as the first prong in defining disability. The language of impairment is interwoven with the layperson’s conception of disability. The ‘medical model of disability,’ which the social model simultaneously opposes and builds off, considers disability as an individual medical condition. Coinciding with the professionalization of the medical profession in the early twentieth-century, western understandings of disability as a condition of the individual body, impairment served as the basis for labeling people as disabled. Labeling of a body as impaired meant the individual was occasionally entitled to social welfare from the state, while simultaneously acquiring the ‘privileges’ of their disabled status. While the ways in which ‘disability’ as a concept is socially constructed, and the labeling of individuals as disabled has often led to marginalization, interrogation of the social construction of impairment has created a serious rift in the study of disability.

An ontology of impairment

Hughes and Patterson (1997) argue that a phenomenological lens must be used to deconstruct what has been posited as the form of impairment which jumps to the forefront of discussion on disability: functional limitations of the body. As an example, at the individual level, speech impairments and impediments only present themselves when one must interact with another individual. The lebenswelt, or life-world, is embodied (Hughes and Patterson 1997, 604). Norms of communication are also, then, embodied. Disabled speech or communication is something which does not exist independent of social interaction, and is thus socially constructed. This example challenges the social model of disability in its postulate that disability can be separable from impairment because there is not something physically or observably ‘wrong’ with an individual who speaks in a way considered abnormal. This condition is disabling when it presents itself. Speech impediments as a disability, again, only present themselves in the context of human social interaction. What about those impairments that UPIAS members had where they argued so vociferously for an emancipatory politics which separated their individual corporealities from the barriers society constructed around them?

Sherry’s (2016) call for not only an examination of the social forces which produce impairment, but also those which produce diagnoses, questions the ‘realness’ of impairment which has been so integral to the politics of and policies around disability in the latter half of the twentieth century. The work of Simo Vehmas, a philosopher who is a self-proclaimed critical realist, has provided a counter to a deconstructionist trend in much of disability studies scholarship in the past 20 years. Vehmas has questioned the deconstructionist, post-structuralist, and interpretivist nature of which much disability studies scholarship has trended toward. I use the term ‘deconstructionist’ to differentiate the newer vein of disability studies scholarship which goes beyond elucidating the social construction of disability, and labeling it as such, like social model proponents did. It goes further in deconstructing relations of power and the construction of terms like access (see Titchkosky 2011), the creation of ableism (Campbell 2009), and the concept of the dis/ability (Goodley, 2014). This can be problematic for the application of these emancipatory statements in relation to the creation of social policy.

How can we renegotiate the impairment/disability divide without relying on materialist distinctions between individual corporealities and the built environment? Or worse, how can we lose progress made by those who have affected social change by arguing for the social constructionist view? Vehmas & Mäkelä (2009) attempt to theorize impairment using John Searle’s work. Distinguishing between what is epistemologically subjective (this article is an example of fabulous scholarship submitted to this journal) and epistemically objective (this is an article submitted to this journal), Vehmas and Mäkelä reiterate Searle in saying these distinctions are but a matter of degree. However, the distinction between what is ontologically objective and ontologically subjective is more germane to this discussion:

In the ontological sense, objective and subjective are predicates of the entities in the world, types of entities and their mode of existence. Objective entities exist independently of any perceiver or mental state, whereas subjective entities are dependent on perceivers and mental states. So, in the ontological sense, pains are subjective entities because their existence depends on the subject’s experience.

But mountains, for example, are ontologically objective because their mode of existence is independent of any perceiver: mountains would remain in the world even if all the humans and other subjects with senses disappeared from the earth. (Vehmas & Mäkelä, 2009, 46)

They go on to make the distinction between intrinsic and observer-relational qualities of the realness of things. The example of a wheelchair is presented by the authors. Wheelchairs as a thing are epistemically objective, but ontologically subjective, as they are only ‘wheelchairs’ because of their relational character. So, what does this have to do with disability and impairment?

Searle distinguishes between two kinds of facts. Brute facts are intrinsic. They exist independent of human naming, social construction, and so forth. They do not require naming for their existence. Institutional facts are those which must be named. The ‘fact’ that a couple is married is offered as an example of an institutional fact (Vehmas & Mäkelä, 2009, 48). The authors use the example of Down’s syndrome to illustrate the ontologically objective, or brute fact, that someone has an extra chromosome 21. This is not Down’s syndrome in a world of brute facts, but its realness as Down’s syndrome is undoubted. This brute fact imparts a great deal of meaning on the life of that person, and the decisions made regarding how they will be educated or treated socially. The ‘brute fact of a body often determines an individual’s institutional life in a way that can be depicted as brutal’ (Vehmas & Mäkelä, 2009, 49). While Vehmas’ work has been criticized for having a ‘western-centric gaze’ by Soldatic (2013, 753), who focuses on the ways in which disability in the Global South has been influenced by western concepts, which do not necessarily reflect disability in non-North states, the notion that there is some kind of ontologically objective impairment challenges current trends in Critical Disability Studies. Thus, my comments and this article should be understood in the context of the United States and not as an attempt to speak universally to disability politics.

Figure 2 shows where the various models discussed, thus far, fit along a continuum from a positivist, empiricist approach to an interpretivist, socially deconstructed approach. This illustration shows how the project of social deconstruction McRuer engages in is nearly purely interpretivist and should be recognized as being at an extreme of a continuum. This purely interpretivist model is favored by ‘critical disability studies’ and is focused on elucidating power relationships by way of socially deconstructing impairment and disability. The focus on social deconstruction, I argue in the final substantive section of this article, obfuscates disability politics at best, and at worst harms it. I will advocate for a return to focusing efforts in disability studies on educating the public (and public officials) on the utility of the social construction of disability, as it pertains to issues of impairment.

Figure 2. A continuum of three types of models of disability.

Note: CDS, Critical Disability Studies.

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Why disability politics needs impairment

Disabled people, in 2018, both exist and are often in better physical states relative to a hypothetical universe without medical intervention. They exist in the sense that diseases, infections, and conditions which would have meant certain death just a century ago are countered with expert medical care. Backlash toward the medical model of disability was focused on its efforts to hide disabled people, to warehouse them, strip them of their rights, and make them less than full citizens because of their corporeal embodiments. Practices like these, based on eugenic principles, still happen. They affect people who are poor, women, racial and ethnic minorities, queer, indigenous, and members of other minority groups at horrifyingly disproportionate rates. People with disabilities fill our jails and do not receive adequate medical care. I am not endorsing these practices. However, I want to stress that impairment matters, especially in the context of disability politics. In this final substantive section, I raise two recent examples of disability-related action and activism. The first concerns the impacts an extreme deconstructionist understanding of disability can take in the case of the scholarly commentary on the Anna Stubblefield rape trial. The debates around this case, especially on a disability studies listserv, show the consequences of an extreme interpretivist understanding of disability and impairment. The second is the recent protests around the defunding of the Affordable Care Act which depends on visibly impaired people to frame its political message. I frame this in a broader history of the visibility of disability in the public sphere, arguing that disability protests and social movements are not possible without making claims based on impairments.

Reactions to the Anna Stubblefield case

Response to the 2015 rape trial of Anna Stubblefield illustrates how support for a purely social deconstructionist understanding of disability can raise serious ethical concerns for the lives of people with disabilities. A well-regarded, white, able-bodied philosophy professor and advocate for persons with disabilities, Stubblefield was accused of raping a Black, disabled man, who was also the brother of one of her former students in a 2015 case. The victim, John Roe, has multiple disabilities and is unable to speak or use an assistive device in order to communicate. The defense argued Roe consented to sex acts with Stubblefield through the use of facilitated communication. Stubblefield was originally sentenced to 12 years in prison. This sentence was overturned in 2016 as the judge in the original case had thrown out expert testimony on whether Roe could have consented using facilitated communication (Engber 2018).

Facilitated communication is a controversial practice where people who are unable to communicate verbally have their hands guided by someone else in order to type what proponents of the practice say are the words of the disabled person (Sherry 2016b, 974). Sherry (2016b) recounts the horrifyingly unapologetic posts on the primary disability studies listserv in the United States, for the Society for Disability Studies, where facilitated communication and Stubblefield were defended unblinkingly. I do not bring this last point up in order to perform any kind of academic mudslinging. However, many scholars of disability suggested the Society for Disability Studies fully support Stubblefield in this case. The inclusion of this case in this article was influenced by the unwavering support for someone who has committed an action which she later admitted was a criminal offense. Stubblefield has since pleaded guilty, in a retrial of this case, to aggravated assault in the third degree and was sentenced to four years in prison. This most likely means she will serve no more jail time (see Engber 2018). While Stubblefield’s conviction had been overturned on the grounds that the judge in the original trial unfairly excluded all testimony concerned with the validity of facilitated communication, a much more serious problem exists. It goes beyond the arguments Mintz (2017) makes in a response in Disability & Society which revolve around the court not allowing testimony from the victim himself and its implications for the agency of people with intellectual impairments collectively. There is no doubt the judge was hasty in their decision to not allow any evidence of the utility of facilitated communication. Expert knowledge often uses terminology which can be extremely offensive to people with disabilities, especially activists and scholars. Sherry elaborates:

Disability studies scholars have been on stronger ground when critiquing the language used in the case. In court documents, John Roe was described as ‘suffering’ from cerebral palsy and ‘mental retardation,’ with ‘the mental capacity of a toddler.’ Unfortunately, the language of the court system is often disablist. Given that the courts need to use the specific language of the criminal code in their verdicts, alternative language to the term ‘mental retardation’ was not possible in this case, but it would have been possible to use an alternative word other than ‘suffering’ to describe the experience of having cerebral palsy. (Sherry 2016, 978)

As Sherry (2016b) notes, the labeling of disability as ‘severe,’ extreme, total, and so forth is highly problematic for disabled people because experts have done a lot of harm to people with disabilities historically. Furthermore, in the context of the North American disabled person’s experience, centuries of warehousing, needless experimentation and torture, and sterilization perpetrated by state officials makes claims of disability experts questionable in many instances. Much of the work critical constructivist disability studies scholarship has done revolves around breaking down the logic that an individual’s capability for participating in public life is so easily determinable based on impairment (see Bérubé 2003, 2009). Even the parents of a disabled person have at times not had the best interests of their child in mind. Parents do not always protect the rights of their disabled children, or represent their best interests. For example, the case of Tracey Latimer, a disabled Canadian girl who was murdered by her father in the 1990s because he believed it would end her suffering. His ‘decision’ was found to be popularly supported in a public opinion poll at the time (Stienstra 2012). In another case, an American court considered the case of the hysterectomy, hormone therapy, and removal of breast buds of a small child with developmental disabilities, ‘Ashley X,’ in the 1990s in Seattle, Washington. An investigative report concluded this surgical intervention was in violation of the child’s civil rights and there was no legal right for her parents to have authorized these procedures (Carlson & Dorfman, 2007). Discussions of sex and disability that revolve around mental age and ability to consent are complicated, to say the least. Sherry continues:

Disability studies scholars have convincingly critiqued the notion of ‘mental age’ and identified its disablist underpinnings (Gill 2015). These scholars would also undoubtedly be concerned about any conflation of physical impairment with cognitive capacity. However, to be fair, there was distinct testimony about communication and cognition during the trial. John Roe’s guardians asserted that he was physically, intellectually, and legally incapable of consent. (Sherry 2016b, 978; emphasis added)

Sexual assault of people with disabilities is a real, tangible, political problem. Like all cases of sexual assault, it can be assumed that reports of sexual assaults occur at much lower rates than the assaults themselves (Barger et al. 2009). Regardless, rates of sexual assault amongst people, especially women, with intellectual disabilities are staggeringly high (Sobsey and Doe 1991; Barger et al. 2009; Davis, 2011). Perpetrators are often relatives or care workers (Davis, 2011), victims face barriers when reporting crimes to police (Keilty & Connelly, 2001), and sometimes need to seek help in being able to articulate their experiences with assault (Hollomotz, 2009). An examination of sexual assault in Taiwan showed reported cases amongst people with disabilities increasing over time at a rate much higher than the national average, with cases of intellectual disability making up more than half of those reported overall (Lin et al., 2009).

Professional (medical expert/practitioner) literature on the topic of sexuality and people with intellectual disabilities is often critiqued for its ableist assumptions concerning the ways in which disabled people should act. Michael Gill’s Already Doing It (2015) tackles what he calls ‘sexual ableism’ around subjects who are intellectually disabled. Major foci include dispelling ableist myths of the asexual disabled person, documenting the tools of control which have been used to force birth control and sterilization on people of all ages, and the ‘problem-led’ approach within a ‘service-centric risk-hierarchy’ within which many people with intellectual disabilities interact in the form of group or community homes (2015, 17–18). Sexual agency is as important to Gil’s story as is the ability for individuals to communicate their desires to others. Mintz (2017), centering his bodily experiences with both severe cerebral palsy and sexual assault, advocates for the right of the victim to be able to communicate, and the normative need for the justice system in the United States to make this a possibility. As a response to Sherry (2016b) Mintz cites Nussbaum’s (1999) capability framework’s ‘freedom of sexual satisfaction and affiliation’ as the reason for stating that justice will not be done until the non-verbal man at the center of this case is given the opportunity to be heard. Both Mintz’s direct response and Gill’s book do not help us navigate the reality of the situation. The intellectually disabled subjects Gill studies, and Mintz’s own experience as someone with ‘severe’ cerebral palsy, have something John Roe lacked according to the court, the ability to legally consent to sex. I recognize this has serious implications for the control others have over the agency of a disabled individual. However, universal application of this work to all disabled people’s experiences is dangerous.

Disability visibility and impairment-based claims for access: not just identity politics

Just as feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe asks us to think about the question ‘where are the women?,’ we must similarly ask ‘where are the disabled people?’ De jure examples of ‘unsightly beggar ordinances’ from the streets in the early twentieth century hold some answers to where the disabled are not (Schweik 2009, 9), and de facto exclusion from the public sphere has existed for centuries. Discernible impairment makes people ‘unsightly.’ While these laws extended to cover many disabled people, not just the discernibly disabled, social movements over time have relied on disability visibility to promote social change.

The PBS film Lives Worth Living (Gilkey and Neudel 2011) captures the imagery that the disabled people’s movement in the United States capitalized upon to achieve the passage of disability rights legislation. Claims were not based on a marginalized identity. People chained themselves to inaccessible buses, held sit-ins at inaccessible offices established under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, spent nights in jail cells that were not equipped for their power chairs, and performed countless other acts to show lawmakers that social policy needed to change (Barnartt and Scotch 2001). The image of Jennifer Keelan struggling to make it to the top steps of the Capitol building in Washington, DC was captivating. The eight year old who has cerebral palsy, which affects the functioning of her limbs so that she cannot walk, moves in a determined manner. She uses every part of her body to inch upward, including her chin, twisting and flopping and heaving her small body, with ambulatory off-screen participants providing her sips of water from a cup. ‘I’ll take all night if I have to,’ she exclaims (Gilkey and Neudel 2011).

Historically, some of the most visible disability organizations, including user-led organizations (like the Autism Self-Advocacy Network) as opposed to professional-led organizations (like Easter Seals or Special Olympics), are single-disability or similar-disability organizations which organize around the shared experience of individuals who identify as having similar impairments. The National Federation of the Blind in the United States, for example, does not advocate for the rights of all disabled people, and neither does the Canadian National Industries for the Blind in Canada. Both of these groups have advocated for provisions solely for the blind in disability social policy in their respective countries, which oftentimes occurred many years before inclusion of other groups or still exist as blind-only policies (Crichton and Jongbloed 1998; Erkulwater 2006).

While a pan-disability consciousness may exist amongst members, these organizations function much more like political interest groups which must fight for their particular members’ interests, sometimes in contradiction to other single-disability organizations. Articulations of crip theory, which presuppose a disabled identity based on shared feelings of societal oppression, fail to capture this reality of the landscape of disability interest group politics, which has existed since the early parts of the twentieth century (Nielsen 2012). Watson (2002) notes that having an impairment becomes part of the everyday experience of the disabled person. One’s notion of their self is not always based on discursive practice, as Butler (1993) would suggest. These kinds of academic claims of an identity which are not necessarily based on anything other than discursive practice which set up antagonisms (self/other, us/them) are often not felt by disabled people (Watson 2002; Engel and Munger 2003). In fact, claiming this identity, even under protection of civil rights law, is often consciously avoided (Engel and Munger 2003). This is how crip theory bends the empirical reality of the lives of disabled people and forms it into a neat exploration of the sites of shared oppression.

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