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Removing TNWs destroys alliance commitments and leads to WMD prolif.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 778-780. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)

Possible consequences of a rupture with established arrangements

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe.

Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO's nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

The United States has been engaged in nuclear force cooperation with its allies in Europe since the 1950s, and this half-century of history has a certain political weight. If the United States unilaterally withdrew its remaining nuclear forces, the European allies would recognize that something fundamental had changed in their relationship with Washington. If the withdrawal was undertaken at the behest of the Europeans, US political leaders could for their part come to question the commitment of the European allies to bear their share of the risks and responsibilities associated with the alliance's nuclear deterrence posture. Withdrawal of the remaining US weapons could lead to an erosion of confidence on both sides. Some allied observers are concerned that depending on offshore and distant US central strategic systems to protect the European allies would not have the same political significance as continued allied involvement in risk- and responsibility-sharing.

NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements help to maintain a common security culture within the alliance and to prevent a division between the allies that possess nuclear arms and those that do not. The involvement of non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear-sharing arrangements creates a quality of engagement and solidarity distinct from that which would be feasible without that involvement. The political dynamics of the alliance might well change without US nuclear weapons in Europe—and not for the better, in the view of some allied observers. Over time the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies would almost certainly have less expertise regarding nuclear issues and less influence over (and less insight into) US policy-making.70 Some allied observers fear that with no US nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States might be less likely to engage in consultations with allies in defining doctrine and in making operational decisions.

In short, some allied observers are concerned that giving up the shared nuclear response capability could weaken the bonds that tie the NATO allies together as a security community. Because the US extended deterrent provides NATO with a capability that is jointly owned and operated, there is a high level of cohesion based on shared risks and responsibilities, particularly among the NATO DCA states. Moreover, some allied observers maintain, some current non-nuclear weapon-state NATO allies cannot be protected from aggression or coercion without nuclear deterrence capabilities. If the allies gave up the current nuclear sharing arrangements and relied solely on the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the alliance's nuclear deterrent posture could be seen as less credible by the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies, if not by potential adversaries. A security gap dividing the nuclear-weapon-state allies from non-nuclear-weapon-state allies could emerge in the perceptions of the latter group of countries. Indeed, if the British and French forces were reduced further, the political gap between the United States and most of its NATO allies in nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing could be widened.

Moreover, the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe could be seen as a break with the historic transatlantic bargain whereby the United States plays a leading role in return for providing a security guarantee. It could contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment to the collective defence pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a time when the meaning of collective defence is being reconsidered, owing in part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyberwarfare. Some European allied observers hold that the complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would be interpreted, at least in some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso facto weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent. The implications for assurance of the NATO European allies could therefore be profound.

The consequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe would include the loss of the crisis management options provided by an alliance deterrent posture involving aircraft from multiple allies. This arrangement makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signal—one of a united and resolute alliance—distinct from a US (or British or French) national action. It is difficult to imagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent benefits for alliance cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but the examination of other approaches may well be an issue in the alliance's Strategic Concept review. In this review assurance and extended deterrence will be considered in a dynamic context involving other NATO policy challenges—including missile defence, relations with Russia, the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms control and disarmament, and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made remain to be seen.

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