TNWs are key to deterrence---they link US nukes together.
Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 768-769. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)
The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces
The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world's first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America's will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap' controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO—and for Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. The recent Perry—Schlesinger report suggests that such a debate may be on the horizon.3 A polarizing internal US debate (perhaps stimulated by the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review) could lead to public questions about the reliability of US nuclear forces, and this could undermine allied confidence in US extended deterrence. By contrast, US consensus on investment in sustaining and modernizing the nation's nuclear weapons and infrastructure could support allied perceptions of the continued reliability of the US nuclear posture. Indeed, the continued viability of what some Americans call the US nuclear 'enterprise' may be more reassuring to US allies than the overall size and specific characteristics of the nuclear force. For US allies in Europe and elsewhere, short of a grave crisis that would test the resolve and operational capabilities of the United States, the overall health of the US nuclear enterprise and the US nuclear force posture remains significant for extended deterrence.