French nuclear umbrella fails---it’s underdeveloped, and allies say no.
Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 761-762. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)
Alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces
The hypothetical alternative of relying on French nuclear forces instead of US protection has been evoked repeatedly since France became a nuclear power in the 1960s; but the option has never been taken up by the non-nuclear-weapon state allies. For example, in 1985 Manfred Wörner, then the West German Defence Minister, said, 'France's nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal Republic [of Germany]. We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella.'21
Some Germans have argued that the French should participate in NATO nuclear consultations rather than establishing a consultation arrangement (as the French have intermittently proposed since 1992) limited to Europeans, excluding the United States and implying that US nuclear commitments are unreliable. As Karl Heinz Kamp observed in 1996, 'From a German viewpoint any European nuclear entity can only be one part of a European-transatlantic security structure.'22 In 2004 Peter Schmidt wrote, 'For Germany, a European solution could only be sound in the near future if it was associated with the [NATO] Alliance's nuclear policy.'23 In 2007 it was reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had rejected French President Nicolas Sarkozy's offer to give Germany a say in French decision-making on nuclear weapons.24
Expert observers from non-nuclear-weapon-state European allied nations have historically expressed several reservations regarding French proposals for a European Union dialogue on nuclear deterrence. First, the EU member states have not yet made alliance-like collective defence commitments to each other. Second, two EU members that are not NATO members (Ireland and Sweden) are among the countries that have long called in international forums for 'the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines'. In their view, 'the possession of nuclear weapons' should give way to 'nuclear disarmament and ... a nuclear weapon-free world.'25 As a result, the willingness of Ireland and Sweden to be associated with an EU arrangement implying support for policies of nuclear deterrence is unclear. Third, some allies regard French (and British) nuclear capabilities as inadequate to provide a deterrent force to protect the EU and (aside from French and British national purposes) useful mainly as a supplement to the US extended deterrence arrangements with NATO members.2 Fourth, making France the guarantor of the European Union's security would elevate France's political status to a level unacceptable to Germany, Italy, and other EU countries. Fifth, despite their repeated proposals, the French have in practice shown little willingness to accept nuclear consultation obligations and mechanisms. For example, concrete implementation arrangements for President François Mitterrand's 1986 promise to consult with the West German Chancellor before using nuclear weapons on German soil evidently never went very far.27
Rather than welcoming an opportunity to grapple with the demanding political and strategic issues that would be raised in an attempt to pursue the hypothetical alternative of depending on French or Franco-British nuclear protection, the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies have preferred to rely on US extended deterrence arrangements in NATO, supplemented by the British nuclear commitment to NATO.