The aff doesn’t expand NATO but even if it did there would be no long-term damage to the US/Russia relationship
Lanoszka 20 Alexander Lanoszka (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. His research addresses issues in American foreign policy, alliance politics, nuclear strategy, and theories of war, with a general regional focus on Central and Northeastern Europe), 04-07-2020, "Thank goodness for NATO enlargement," Springer Nature International Politics volume 57, pages 451–470, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8
Meaningful cooperation remained possible with NATO enlargement. Indeed, NATO and Russia collaborated extensively in Afghanistan, and the United States attempted to cultivate closer ties with Russia after Barack Obama won the presi-dency in 2008. Contrary to Mearsheimer’s fatalistic predictions about nuclear reduc-tions, the ‘reset’ by the Obama administration even involved both countries signing and ratifying the New START Treaty, an arms control agreement that cut 30% of their strategic nuclear arsenals and capped them at deployed weapons each. Rus-sia did violate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated land-based cruise missiles and launchers of ranges from 500 to 5500 miles, but it has previously complained of the constraints imposed by that treaty for reasons relating to China, not NATO (Gates 2014, 154).Tensions did erupt between the USA and Russia, but the causal impact of NATO enlargement is probably much less than what the conventional wisdom suggests. Some, like Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, argue that domestic political and economic developments drove Russia to be more confrontational toward the United States. Putin justified political repression at home with reference to the threat alleg-edly posed by the USA (2015, 169, 178).The argument that NATO enlargement has provoked Russian aggression against its neighbors is likely wrong. In one study of Russian leaders’ foreign policy rhetoric from 2000 to 2016, Maria Snegovaya (2020) finds that Russian leaders articulate anti-Western statements most when oil prices are high, suggesting that—like other petrostates—they are emboldened to press their claims against their neighbors under these circumstances. She uncovers little evidence that NATO enlargement drives anti-Western rhetoric. Another study finds that Russian diplomats consistently adopt a competitive posture vis-à-vis other envoys in various international organizations (Schmitt 2019). NATO enlargement does appear to have played a role in the lead-up to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, though the alliance rejected giving a Member-ship Action Plan to Georgia partly because of worries about being dragged into a conflict with Russia. Territorial disputes and strong personalities made that bilat-eral relationship ripe for conflict (Lanoszka 2018). NATO also rejected Ukraine’s application for a Membership Action Plan in 2008. Similarly, NATO played a much lesser role in stoking tensions with Russia than some accounts suggest because it posed at most a very limited threat to Russia. Operationally, national caveats sty-mied NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan while a large majority of its members spent far less than 2% of their gross domestic products on defense (Saideman and Auerswald 2012; Stanley-Lockman and Wolf 2016). The US and NATO military presence east of Germany was (and remains) threadbare, con-sisting mostly of elements making up a missile defense system that even Russian observers like Alexei Arbatov (2016, 168) acknowledge would not undermine strate-gic stability. During much of the Obama administration, the USA was withdrawing military forces from Europe so as to concentrate more fully on East Asia (Simón 2015). Crucially, NATO enlargement was a non-issue when the Maidan movement began in Kyiv in late 2013. At stake was Ukraine’s signature of the Ukraine–Euro-pean Union Association Agreement, which was similar to what long-time Rus-sian protégé Serbia had negotiated earlier that same year. This agreement did not even guarantee that Ukraine would be a European Union member, but would have spurred closer economic and political ties. NATO membership remainder at best a distant prospect.