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Congressional oversight solves – Courts are the worst of all worlds – judicial scrutiny of foreign affairs undermines effective responses to terrorism, climate change, disease, and democratic backsliding

Martin 15 (David A; Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law Emeritus at the University of Virginia, former principal deputy general counsel of the Department of Homeland Security, member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, J.D. from Yale Law School; 2015; “Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures”; https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1013&context=olr; Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1; accessed 6/26/18; TV)

Justice Field, of course, does wind up treating the political branch’s conclusions, in this particular setting, as conclusive on the judiciary — but he does not rest that outcome on the idea that immigration control is a sovereign power outside the reach of the Constitution. Instead, he offers a statement about institutional roles seen as appropriate for the respective branches of government in this specific domain. In the foreign arena, he writes, as a matter of “self-preservation,”34 the government has the “highest duty” to “preserve . . . independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment.”35 To achieve these ends, the government is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. . . . The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.36 In other words, in 1888, the political branches judged necessary the application of a new absolute rule excluding Chinese laborers, in order to achieve security against what Congress deemed a type of foreign encroachment.37 Even with misgivings about the justice or fairness of the action, the courts will not second-guess that judgment of necessity. In realms touching upon foreign relations and potential national self-preservation, Field indicates, the nation must speak with one voice, and it is not for the courts to introduce a discordant sound. B. Complexity, Prophecy, and Experimentation in Foreign Affairs Decisionmaking Some critics of the plenary power doctrine question this asserted linkage between immigration and foreign affairs. Chinese exclusion was not a foreign affairs decision, they assert, but one driven by domestic political considerations — and in fact it worsened our relations with China.38 The invocation of foreign affairs is seen as a pretext covering up uglier motives, and the plenary power doctrine prevents courts from looking behind the mask.39 Therefore, some assert that courts should simply provide the ordinary measure of constitutional scrutiny — to smoke out invidious motives or at least to provide an appropriate evaluation of the weight of the governmental interest in light of the individual stake.40 This kind of pre-textual invocation certainly can occur. But here is the difficulty: We should not assume that pretexts in the foreign affairs arena are readily identifiable. As Justice Breyer observed in a recent political question case: Decisionmaking in [the foreign affairs] area typically is highly political. It is “delicate” and “complex.” It often rests upon information readily available to the Executive Branch and to the intelligence committees of Congress, but not readily available to the courts. It frequently is highly dependent upon what Justice Jackson called “prophecy.” And the creation of wise foreign policy typically lies well beyond the experience or professional capacity of a judge. At the same time, where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak “with one voice and ac[t] as one,” is particularly important.41 Many of the nation’s policy tools in the foreign arena are crude and imprecise, with uncertain impact. This very uncertainty may require trial-and-error application, with a need for quick policy changes, especially in times of crisis. Therefore, deference to the political branches is called for, not because we can always be sure that their motives are pure and nondiscriminatory — we cannot — but because subjecting these measures to detailed litigation would interfere with the flexibility often necessary to act beyond our borders. A too-ready judicial interference would also impair our ability to deploy uncertain tools — deriving from immigration control, trade regulation, or other components of our international relations — according to a single unified strategy.42 C. An Example: The Contrast to Domestic Measures Consider the seizure of U.S. diplomats by militants in Tehran in 1978. After the embassy invasion was ratified and defended by the new Iranian government, the U.S. government turned to a disparate variety of countermeasures to try to win release of the American hostages, including the seizure of billions of dollars in assets of Iran and of its companies and nationals, litigation in the International Court of Justice, an ill-fated military rescue attempt after Iran defied the International Court, diplomatic overtures through Algeria, and certain immigration-law-based restrictions imposed on Iranian nationals in the United States.43 There were even proposals at the time to use immigration or other powers to intern large numbers of Iranian nationals so they could perhaps be part of an exchange that would bring the diplomats home.44 Thankfully, such internment was never put into motion. Contrast the trial-and-error use of these generally crude and scattershot measures with how the government would respond to a domestic kidnapping and potential hostage situation. The police could deploy quickly to investigate who seized the victims and where they were currently located. In that process the authorities could use judicial search warrants to facilitate the inquiry, plus arrest warrants and compulsory grand jury subpoenas as appropriate. They could call on a wide range of assistance and technical support from a host of fully empowered domestic agencies, state and federal. Once the kidnappers were located, the police would establish perimeter control around the hostage site. No hostile militias would stand in the way (or if such appeared, other governmental power, including the National Guard, could be deployed). In a protracted standoff, judicially issued search warrants might help legitimate a forcible rescue operation. And the full weight of criminal punishment, imposed through efficiently functioning courts, could be expected for the kidnappers or hostage takers. This comparison helps reveal why courts are positioned to apply close constitutional scrutiny of official domestic action, whenever it is credibly challenged, but properly feel more constrained in the international arena. In the international arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory process or other reliable coercive means under their own government’s control. Moreover, the stakes are typically higher, as is the number of people potentially affected — not only by the immediate outcome but also by downstream effects, as the resolution either deters similar adverse actions in the future or instead stimulates them because the U.S. effort failed. With a domestic operation, judges can be confident that the government will still have plenty of capacity to deal with public safety threats, even in the presence of robust judicial review. One cannot have such confidence about the efficacy of alternative policy tools in the global arena if domestic judicial action begins to prevent or second-guess or slow down the use of those initially chosen by the political branches. Another difference between the two settings is relevant. In the domestic arena, we do not tolerate individuals using tit-for-tat responses to remedy wrongful behavior. I cannot justify seizing and carrying away my neighbor’s television on the ground that he borrowed my riding mower months ago and never returned it. But this prohibition on messy self-help obtains precisely because efficient hierarchical legal mechanisms, involving professional police and a developed court system, stand available to redress my neighbor’s wrongful act. In recent decades, the world has taken limited but hopeful steps toward investing transnational institutions with comparable powers, but progress remains quite uneven across different policy domains. The plenary power doctrine manifests the Supreme Court’s judgment that the kind of detailed constitutional scrutiny appropriate for the mature and developed domestic public order is not workable in the more primitive international legal system, marked primarily by horizontal action-and-response to try to rectify breaches. D. The Nongovernmental Component of Foreign Affairs Decisionmaking Foreign affairs are involved in immigration decisionmaking for another, more entangling reason, even when there is no clear effort to retaliate against or to influence a foreign government. Most high-level immigration decisions — by Congress or by the executive branch — are designed, at least in part, to influence or shape behavior overseas by individuals and nonstate actors, including both prospective immigrants (contemplating either legal or illegal channels) and smuggling organizations. For example, the decision (part of Operation Streamline45) to prosecute a high percentage of simple entrants without inspection caught along the southern border, causing them to spend some time in jail or prison before being repatriated, has been criticized as disproportionate to the inherent nature of this misdemeanor offense.46 But this critique misunderstands the policy decision. Operation Streamline is primarily meant to send a deterrent message to others contemplating a future clandestine crossing.47 The same is true of decisions to repatriate violators to a distant part of the land border rather than back to the border town from which they entered and where their coyote may be waiting to help them try again to enter.48 To take another example, in 1994, the Clinton administration decided to decouple the grant of work authorization from the simple act of filing for asylum, as had been provided under earlier regulations, though this change would mean that many applicants would be without a means of support, other than private or family charity, for as long as 180 days. This austere step was taken, in significant part, to discourage people planning to come to the United States to file an ill-founded claim that previously would have secured several years of residence and lawful work while they awaited a hearing.49 Changes to the treatment or opportunities of noncitizens in the United States, whether in the direction of restriction or liberalization, almost inevitably affect the decisions of people and organizations abroad who are thinking about organizing or participating in migration to the United States. Smuggling organizations, in fact, often build their business plans around finding and exploiting weak spots in immigration laws or processes.50 As a result, some U.S. government measures take on a more severe or restrictive aspect than might initially seem to be warranted by the acts of the individuals most immediately affected. This is because the policymakers mean the action not just for those who are the direct object of enforcement on U.S. soil but also for the message sent to others they want to deter. This dynamic appears to explain, in significant part, the Obama administration’s decisions to respond to the southwest border migration surge in summer of 2014 with a surprisingly severe set of measures, including sustained detention, even though the subjects were mainly children traveling with a mother or other relative. The executive branch also implemented accelerated removal processing where the law permitted such action, and assured substantial publicity for the flight whenever recent migrants were deported by airplane to their home country.51 Despite sharp criticism, these practices persisted, and they seem to have had much of the desired deterrent impact in the foreign nations at issue. In fact, monthly arrivals of unaccompanied minors from these countries declined from 10,631 in June 2014 to 2,432 in September.52 This kind of deterrence-based action, focused on overseas individuals and nongovernmental players, is also an aspect of foreign affairs, even though it falls below the plane of high-level geopolitics. It likewise may need to take the form of rough-hewn trial-and-error, like the more traditional foreign-relations actions directed at governments. The Supreme Court’s case law over the years appears to consider such policy choices equally worthy of foreign-affairs deference.53 This analysis is not meant as advocacy for the quick or expansive use of immigration restrictions to respond to objectionable or unwelcome actions of foreign governments or nonstate actors. For reasons of both policy and proportion, immigration sanctions of this type should be sparingly deployed. But the Court’s doctrine of deference in Chae Chan Ping and later cases is based on the recognition that even for relatively liberal foreign-affairs decisionmakers, rough-hewn actions that initially seem outsized or individually unfair might need to be in the mix to respond to, or to help shape, actions that others are taking abroad.54 III. Why the Court Resists Even Moderate Proposals for a More Active Judicial Role A more nuanced branch of the Chae Chan Ping criticism accepts that foreign affairs considerations may well be at stake in some immigration decisions, but would modify the doctrine to allow for a carefully structured closer judicial look.55 The courts, such observers contend, should not take political branch assertions as controlling, but instead should perform an initial judicial probe of the asserted reasons, to decide whether the challenged immigration restriction rests on a significant foreign affairs foundation. If the answer is yes, then the reviewing court should treat the political branches’ decision as dispositive — essentially, as a political question not subject to judicial review. But if not, then the court should apply ordinary modes of constitutional review, which might well bring a form of heightened scrutiny. At first glance, this kind of proposal would seem to offer an attractive middle ground to the Supreme Court. Yet the Court in practice has manifested great resistance to these scholarly invitations. Why? In my view, a majority of the Justices harbor a deep skepticism that lower courts can be trusted to give sufficient weight to foreign policy concerns in making any such threshold assessment. The very nature of immigration litigation in the courts of appeals, with an actual and often sympathetic human being front and center, makes a reviewing judge far more likely to overvalue the individual interests at stake and undervalue the more subtle and complex reasons why a particular measure may be needed for system stability or to influence behavior beyond our borders — connections that often would not become fully apparent until broader damage is manifested months or years after an interventionist judicial decision.56 Anna Law’s book, The Immigration Battle in American Courts, documents this disparity in outlook between the Supreme Court and the lower courts quite revealingly. She describes “how [lower court] judges can disregard congressional edicts limiting their scope of review in order to reach a desired result,”57 and can usually get away with it because the Supreme Court can review only a tiny fraction of their decisions.58 Professor Law regards this stance by the courts of appeals as a virtue, but the Supreme Court doubtless views it otherwise. Keeping the plenary power doctrine categorical gives the Supreme Court greater assurance that lower courts will preserve the space needed for government actions to meet real foreign affairs imperatives (even if this stance inevitably also leaves room for some ill-motivated actions adopted by the political branches). If this symposium were being held at the time of Chae Chan Ping’s centennial, in 1989, we might have had greater reason to expect some softening by the Supreme Court regarding the deference doctrine in the foreign affairs arena. Exactly twenty-five years before the week when this symposium convened in Norman, Oklahoma, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling that the Soviet bloc was coming apart, about to be replaced, in many instances, by democratic governments. Lengthy wars were ending in Latin America, and dictators were being forced from office. It appeared we were on the cusp of a far more benign world order — one that might permit the rapid flowering of more protective international legal institutions and thereby reduce reliance on crude action-and-response in the international arena. Today’s global scene is far more grim. Not only has the United States experienced the trauma of al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks, which revealed a genuine need for more vigilant immigration screening, but democratic nations are also facing new global threats from other nongovernmental actors who actually glorify the use of beheadings, crucifixion, and slavery, in addition to other players using more old-fashioned forms of terrorism directed at civilians. Failed states are more common, and well-armed insurgencies have proliferated. The march of democracy has slowed and, in several countries, reversed. Climate change and even plague-like diseases presage more complicated foreign policy challenges, many of which will have a migration dimension. The risks to the United States, if our government’s foreign-policy-linked initiatives are unsuccessful, now seem far higher than in 1989. Thus, I do not foresee the Supreme Court retreating significantly from the strong deference doctrines derived from Chae Chan Ping. 59

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