Leaks degrade quick nonprolif sanctions
James B. Bruce 16, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, retired from the CIA in 2005 as a senior executive officer after nearly 24 years, “Keeping U.S. National Security Secrets: Why Is This So Hard?,” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 2016, https://www.afio.com/publications/BRUCE_James_Keeping_US_National_Security_Secrets_from_AFIO_INTEL_FALL2016_Vol22_no2_FINAL.pdf
• Imagery: Surprise Indian Nuclear Tests. Both authorized and unauthorized disclosures about intelligence techniques can be damaging. In this case, classified imagery had been used to support a diplomatic démarche asking India to stand down from its plans to test nuclear weapons in 1995, and was also the topic of press coverage based on leaked intelligence. The 1995 intelligence and diplomatic success backfired in May 1998 when the Indians employed countermeasures learned from these earlier disclosures. They prevented satellite imagery from detecting the signatures of their nuclear test preparations, which caught the United States by surprise.25
• Imagery—Missile Tests in Pakistan. In the mid1990s, dozens of press articles covered whether Chinese M-11 missiles had been covertly transferred to Pakistan. If such missiles had been acquired, Pakistan could be found in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which it was a signatory. Under the National Defense Authorization Act, US law mandated sanctions against proven MTCR violators. Press reports claimed that US intelligence had found missiles in Pakistan but “spy satellites” were unable to “confirm” such missiles. Readers of both the Washington Times and the Washington Post learned that intelligence had failed to convince the Department of State of the missiles’ presence in Pakistan. The message from the press coverage was, in effect, that any nation could avert US sanctions if they neutralized intelligence by shielding missiles from satellite observation. These articles not only suggested to Pakistan and China that some key denial measures were succeeding, but also spelled out specific countermeasures that other potential violators could take to prevent US intelligence from satisfying the standards needed for sanctions under the MTCR.
• Technical Recovery Operation: The Glomar Explorer. The Los Angeles Times published a story on February 7, 1975 that the CIA had mounted an operation to recover a sunken Soviet submarine, its nuclear weapons and cryptographic equipment, from three miles deep on the Pacific Ocean f loor. The New York Times ran its own version of the story the next day. Jack Anderson further publicized the secret operation on national television on March 18. In his memoir, former DCI William Colby wrote: “There was not a chance that we could send the Glomar [Explorer] out again on an intelligence project without risking the lives of our crew and inciting a major international incident…. The Glomar project stopped because it was exposed.”26
Unlike spies, most of whom are eventually caught; leakers of classified information are infrequently identified. The dramatic cases of Snowden (who identified himself) and Manning are notable exceptions. Most leakers remain hidden, and only a handful have ever been prosecuted. The record is dismal. During the four-year period 2009-2013, intelligence agencies filed 153 crimes reports about classified leaks to the press with the Department of Justice. But only 24 were investigated; only half of these were identified, and not a single indictment was issued.27 The scorecard reads: Leakers 153; Intelligence Community 0. In general, our legal system is ill equipped to deal with leakers.28 And the culture that strongly supports First Amendment press freedoms often seems conflicted about whether leakers are really law-breakers and is skeptical that press leaks of intelligence actually do much damage. Perhaps the greatest damage to national security from press leaks, as with espionage, is opportunity costs: The intelligence that will never be collected or used for the nation’s decision advantage because of the damage to or even the loss of classified collection sources and methods compromised by press leaks.
Conclusions
Importantly, American spies and government employees who leak classified information to the press have recently become a national priority for a concerted program to counter the threats they pose to national security. On November 21, 2012, the White House issued a Presidential Memorandum establishing a new Insider Threat Program. It aims to deter, detect, and mitigate such actions by government employees as espionage and unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including “vast amounts of classified data available on interconnected United States Government computer networks and systems.”29 While a notably important initiative, it falls dramatically short of the comprehensive steps really needed.
Until the United States makes game-changing improvements in the way it protects its sensitive and classified information, it cannot expect a fully performing intelligence community, military, or diplomatic corps. Poor performance in keeping secrets correlates directly with diminished capabilities of the major instruments of national power—and thus, a diminution of American power. The relationship is causal. A comprehensive, zero-based, review of how the nation keeps its secrets – and how to get better at it – is long overdue.