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Ukrainian defeat allows Russia to strengthen their land and air forces and grow their sphere of influence – forces will target NATO and exploit its vulnerabilities

Midttun 20 [Hans Petter Midttun (Hans Petter Midttun is educated at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the Norwegian National Defence Command and Staff College and the Norwegian Defense College, as well as education from the Federal Defence Forces of Germany. He has broad international experience from both operations and postings abroad (NATO, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Ukraine). The service includes seven years in command of frigates and six NATO deployments. Midttun put into operation, tested and verified the operational capabilities of one of the newest frigates in the Norwegian Navy. He served at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) before being posted to Ukraine as the Norwegian Defence Attache (2014-2018). Based on previous experiences, Midttun is presently publishing articles and analytic works on the security situation in and around Ukraine as a private person.), 5-22-2020, "What if? Hybrid War and consequences for Europe (part 1)," Euromaidan Press, https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/06/what-if-hybrid-war-and-consequences-for-europe-part-1/] // st

After Russia, Ukraine is the second biggest country in Europe. It is 603.628 km2 and is nearly as big as Germany and Poland combined. A Ukrainian defeat would, therefore, have grave geostrategic consequences. The border between authoritarianism and democracy will move roughly 900 km westward. The combined military power of “Great Russia” and its sphere of interest will move correspondingly. The illegal annexation of Crimea has already secured Russia’s ability to project power towards the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and Europe. Ukraine subjugated to Kremlin will go a long way in establishing the Black Sea as a “Russian lake.” At the same time, this will effectively reduce future threats to its sea control. The Russian military has become much more capable since 2008 as a “result of substantial increases in expenditures on military programs and forces, as well as a focus on readiness, organization, fielding modernized weapons, and updating tactics and doctrine.” Russian warfighting in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria has supported the development. According to RAND, “Russian Ground Forces have local dominance along its European and Central Asian borders. Of great concern to Russia’s neighbors and to NATO are Russia’s enhanced capabilities to invade and hold territory in neighboring countries on short notice… Key investments in lighter and more mobile armor, ground-based missile, and long-range fire systems, and electronic war and cyber capabilities have turned the Russian military into a highly mobile unit in Europe capable of conducting “combined-arms maneuvers at the formation level” that “pose serious challenges to US or NATO units in a conventional conflict.” This must be seen in the context of the change in the NATO force structure after the end of the Cold War, resulting in a reduction in its inventory of main battle tanks and artillery. Additionally, Russia has maintained its sustainability, resilience, and strategic mobility while developing supporting capabilities (e.g. ordnance, active and passive protection, UAV, EW, and more). Achieving indirect control over the Ukrainian Security and Defence sector, Russia could potentially gain control of one of the biggest, most experienced, and battle-hardened Land Forces in Europe. It includes the modernized and partly reformed Army, Marines, National Guard, and the Special Operating Forces. Ultimately, its combined Security and Defence sector could increase by as many as 510.000 men and women. The Armed Forces and National Guard of Ukraine alone consist of 250.000 soldiers. In real terms, the Russian gain would, however, probably be far less. More about that later. The 8th, 58th, and 49th Combined Arms Army and 22nd Army Corps of the Southern Military District of the Russian Forces would not only be reinforced, but its area of responsibility would also border to Romania, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. A Ukrainian defeat would also allow Russia to redeploy its comprehensive Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities 300-900 km westwards. This includes traditional airpower, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime capabilities, offensive and defensive missile systems (such as the Iskander, Bastion, Kalibr, and S-400), offensive electronic warfare, special operations forces, and cyber capabilities. The A2/AD concept is aimed at both limiting NATO’s freedom of movement while exploiting NATO vulnerabilities. In a time of conflict, the capability in place could impact NATO’s ability to deploy forces into and its ability to operate in the area. Increasing the costs associated with bringing in reinforcements to allies, it could potentially undermine the alliance’s political decision-making process. It would cover Bulgaria, Romania, Slovak, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. This would to an extent both negate the NATO AirPower while ensuring Russian Land Forces freedom of maneuver. The combination of a strengthened Land Force, the westward deployment of both Land Forces and A2/AD capacities, increased control of the Black Sea, permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and forces based in Syria constitutes a re-emergence of a military threat to NATOs southeastern flank. A threat that disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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