The notion of dignity is a form of state virtue representation that enables the survival of the state and shields the sovereign from the repercussions of enacting political violence.
Mohammad 10 (MALEK HARDAN MOHAMMAD, “THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND TECHNIQUES OF DISEMPOWERMENT: GIORGIO AGAMBEN, J. M. COETZEE, AND KAZUO ISHIGURO”, Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, December 2010, http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-12-8807/MOHAMMAD-DISSERTATION.pdf ) – WC-NAS
On the other hand, dignity—acquired through an image of popular revolt and violence— becomes the very means of preserving the power status quo and forestalling innovation and change. Walter Benjamin‘s distinction between ―constituting‖ power and ―constituted‖ power is helpful here. Benjamin, according to Agamben, ―presented the relation between constituting power and constituted power as the relation between the violence that posits law and the violence that preserves it‖ (Homo 40). Both forms of violence are part of a circular schema: law-positing violence (revolutionary, radical violence) becomes part of the law-preserving violence (the lawenforcing state). Agamben notes: ―If constituting power is, as the violence that posits law, certainly more noble than the violence that preserves it, constituting power still possesses no title that might legitimate something other than the law-preserving violence and even maintains an ambiguous and ineradicable relationship with constituted power‖ (Homo 40). Benjamin sees this hopeless circularity reflected in the work of representative bodies:
If the awareness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the juridical institution decays. An example of this is provided today by the parliaments. They present such a well-known, sad spectacle because they have not remained aware of the revolutionary forces to which they owe their existence . . . They lack a sense of the creative violence of law that is represented in them. One need not then be surprised that they do not arrive at decisions worthy of this violence, but instead oversee a course of political affairs that avoids violence through compromise. (qtd. in Agamben, Homo 28)
Benjamin laments the fact that legal institutions never remain faithful to their violent, democratic roots.
My argument, however, goes a step further; it is only to the extent that such institutions of sovereign power represent themselves constantly as attuned to their revolutionary beginnings that they hold on to the dignity that in turn guarantees their survival. Agamben‘s characterization of revolutionary violence as ―certainly more noble than the violence that preserves‖ the existing law betrays the role I see dignity playing in this paradoxical relation between the two forms of law. The ―noble‖ badge gives the creative violence immunity and turns it into an untouchable violence. Article Three of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen states that ―sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.‖ Article Twelve states that ―security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be intrusted.‖ The popular force that bestows mystique on this declaration then places force exclusively in sovereign power. The dignity of violence in a back-handed way shields sovereignty from potential violence.