Cyber information siloing frustrates oversight and spills over. Turns case.
Hathaway et al. 21 [Oona A. Hathaway, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Tobias Kuehne, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; Randi Michel, J.D., Yale Law School & Ph.D., Yale University; Nicole Ng, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; "Congressional Oversight of Modern Warfare: History, Pathologies, and Proposals for Reform"; William & Mary Law Review, Volume 63, Issue 1, Article 4; Published: 10-2021; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3914&context=wmlr; KL]
B. Siloing and Its Implications for Oversight and National Security
While committees may gain political benefits from guarding their turfs, information siloing frustrates Congress’s ability to carry out effective oversight of the executive branch. The information gaps resulting from siloing of reporting and notification may lead to poorly informed and under-vetted congressional decision-making. Ultimately, information siloing of modern military operations can harm national security and foreign relations.
1. Siloing Obstructs Deliberation and Informed Legislating
Information siloing can obstruct deliberation and thus block informed legislating. If an operation is briefed to only one committee, members who are informed may lack the ability to engage in meaningful deliberation with other members, thereby impeding a proper response.277 A former SFRC staffer expressed the difficulty of conducting effective oversight when the committee is left in the dark on related operations: “[H]ow can you make foreign relations policy without having access to one of the most potentially influential capabilities to influence foreign relations?”278 Another staffer illustrated the dilemma with a hypothetical: imagine there is a critical intelligence program that involves close cooperation with the military of a partner country.279 The foreign relations committees have not been briefed on, and are not aware of, the program. As a result, they may not understand why the administration refuses to press that country on its human rights record—a record that “we would never let go generally.”280 If the foreign relations committees do not know about the intelligence program, they would be unable to understand why U.S. foreign policy toward that country contradicts our values. And they would not be in a position to discuss the appropriateness of this foreign policy trade-off.281 When issues are briefed just to the Gang of Eight, the problems of impeded information sharing become particularly acute. As a former staffer explained, “Then it’s just a small group of members. It causes all kinds of spillover effects.”282 For instance, when Congress was asked to reauthorize the § 215 collection program in 2011, most members were unaware of existing bulk collection programs carried out under intelligence authorities.283 Committee members had to fight to get a document describing these activities opened up to members, and then only in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at the TS/SCI level.284 If that had not been done, members voting on the reauthorization would have been entirely unaware of how it interacted with existing collection programs.285
Indeed, to exercise their authorities over the process of commencing war via authorizations for the use of force or restricting uses of force through the WPR, the foreign relations committees must be fully informed of uses of U.S. military power. After the Soleimani strike, for example, the foreign relations committees weighed what might be an appropriate response to Iranian retaliation, while being left in the dark about the ongoing or potential cyber, intelligence, and other operations between the United States and Iran.286 While the Senate and House ultimately voted to restrain the President from using force, better information sharing would have allowed the senators to make a more informed decision.287
Information siloing poses a particularly acute challenge to deliberation and informed legislating on cross-jurisdictional issues like cyber operations. As a DOD lawyer observed, congressional committees “are not structured to take a holistic approach to the problem of cyberspace,” which challenges traditional paradigms of jurisdiction that are focused on physical spaces (for example, commercial, domestic, and overseas) and actors (for example, government agencies, departments, and private sector).288 Cyber operations and cybersecurity transcend these distinctions and cut across issues of foreign affairs, intelligence, and defense, but congressional committees remain confined by these parameters. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission observed that the dispersal of oversight responsibilities across numerous committees and subcommittees “prevents Congress from effectively providing strategic oversight of the executive branch’s cybersecurity efforts or exerting its traditional oversight authority for executive action and policy in cyberspace.”289 Information siloing also complicates oversight over military cyber operations, which blur the jurisdictional lines between Title 10 and Title 50 that traditionally divided military and intelligence oversight within Congress.290 As Tressa Guenov and Tommy Ross have observed, “It is nearly impossible to consider cyber deterrence and the role of offensive cyber attacks in military operations without encroaching on business, homeland security, foreign policy, and criminal justice issues.”291
Information siloing also limits the ability of committees to consider how various legislative actions might affect and be affected by other programs already in place. Consider a hypothetical example involving Russia. In weighing whether and how to craft sanctions legislation against Russia for election interference, the foreign relations committees should have an understanding of all the tools brought to bear against Russia to counter or deter meddling—including cyber operations, such as those carried out by Cyber Command during the 2018 midterm elections.292 More generally, as relations with Russia remain tense, since the foreign relations committees are charged with overseeing the executive’s conduct of foreign relations with Russia,293 it is critical that they understand the full nature of the bilateral relationship, including hostile and potentially escalatory activities like military cyber operations. However, although there may be informal exchanges of information, the DOD is under no statutory obligation to report cyber operations against Russia to the foreign relations committees.294
The foreign relations committees are particularly affected by their lack of access to information about other programs and operations. While successive iterations of the NDAA have established new reporting and notification requirements for modern military operations, the reports almost all go to the armed services committees. The foreign relations committees receive virtually none of that information. This is even the case for operations with implications falling squarely within the foreign relations committees’ jurisdiction. One telling example is the aforementioned FY 2019 NDAA, which functions as a quasi-AUMF for cyber operations against Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.295 The consequences extend beyond the committees’ role in use of force authorizations, as well. For example, as described earlier, when HFAC was considering a “massive Pakistan aid package,” the CIA failed to inform the committee of the drone program in that country, even though it had obvious implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations.296 HFAC chairman Howard Berman was ultimately informed about the drone program, but he could not share the information with the rest of the committee because he was the only member read into the highly classified program.297 And in 2014, the SFRC considered and supported legislation to train and equip Syrian rebels, even though the chair and ranking member did not know any details of what media later reported to be the CIA’s parallel covert program,298 which had been initiated the year before.299
2. Siloing Means No Committee Has the Complete Picture
Information siloing means that no committee—and no member— has the complete picture of modern warfare operations. As a result, members are often called on to make crucial decisions without the full range of relevant information in hand. Based on our interviews, information siloing appears to be a particularly significant problem in the counterterrorism context, including special forces operations and drone strikes.300 As former National Security Council Director for Counterterrorism Daniel Rosenthal explained:
[N]umerous members of Congress, countless congressional staffers, and multiple committees all have access to some information about the drone program.... [N]o single member of Congress, congressional staffer, or oversight committee has visibility over all drone platforms, all strikes, taken in all theaters both within and outside of areas of active hostilities.301
The tragic events in Niger that led to the deaths of American special forces, recounted at the outset of this Article, illustrate some of the dangers that can result from this lack of visibility. Those deaths might have been avoided if not for the siloed oversight over those operations, which meant that no one in Congress was aware of the full extent of U.S. involvement in the country. Even when there is the rare collaboration between committees, the foreign relations committees are often the odd man out. This is true even though counterterrorism operations generally require the approval of the U.S. embassy for the country where the operation will take place.302 U.S. embassies and consulates are part of the State Department (organized under the Bureau of Consular Affairs)303 and thus under the oversight jurisdiction of the foreign relations committees.304 These committees are rarely notified of counterterrorism operations, despite the fact that they oversee embassies and diplomatic relations.305 This information gap thus inhibits the committees’ capacity to effectively oversee the agency for which they are responsible.
Information sharing restrictions and narrow notification and reporting obligations allow the executive branch to control committees’ access to information. Like the foreign relations committees, the intelligence committees generally do not receive reporting or notification on military cyber operations. As one congressional staffer observed, “When it comes to DOD activities, HPSCI feels itself pretty frozen out.”306 The intelligence committees are only briefed on operations conducted under intelligence authorities. If Cyber Command and the CIA conduct coordinated or supported cyberattacks, each agency will brief its respective oversight committee on its own activities, and neither committee will have the full picture.307 Moreover, it is often up to the executive to determine how much of a joint operation to disclose.308
Indeed, agencies sometimes exploit congressional committee jurisdictional divisions and turf wars to avoid onerous oversight. In the case of cyber operations, the armed services committees are perceived by some observers as friendlier to the military and less willing to engage in rigorous oversight.309 The executive branch “will hand-feed the congressional committees that they care about, but they will do anything in their power to avoid cooperating with the ‘other’ committees.”310 As a former Cyber Command lawyer put it, “If you’re the CIA you may say you aren’t talking to the armed service committees, they do not have my interests at heart, and vice versa.”311 Information silos can thus privilege the executive branch at Congress’s expense.
3. Information Siloing Exacerbates Institutional Jealousies and Impedes Agency Coordination
Information siloing may reinforce interagency competition within the executive branch, which may inhibit the government’s broader capacity to effectively address security threats. Andru Wall explains that siloing is both “legally incongruous and operationally dangerous because it suggests statutory authorities are mutually exclusive and it creates concerns about interagency cooperation at exactly the time in history when our policy and legal structures should be encouraging increased interagency coordination and cooperation against interconnected national security threats.”312 In fact, when agencies compete with one another, they can leverage information silos to advance their own equities with their congressional patrons.
A former congressional staff member recalled an incident in which the CIA and the DOD sought to displace each other from parallel operations in the same country, which included efforts to elevate concerns up to the host country’s head of state. “The oversight seams made this challenging,” the staff member recalled, “on these committees, the agencies played members off each other, getting members to be advocates for them rather than overseers.”313 Members of Congress made calls to the White House on behalf of their agencies, asking why the other agency was involved. “This was embarrassing from an oversight standpoint, but also potentially damaging from a national security standpoint,” the staffer added.314
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This Part has examined the ways in which information siloing impedes Congress’s ability to provide effective oversight of modern warfare and thus harms national security. Ironically, while Congress publicly recognizes the challenges facing executive branch coordination and has urged stronger coordination,315 it has not applied the same logic or solutions to its own institutional structure. Siloing, therefore, does not merely cut out certain committees, but it also hinders Congress’s ability to effectively carry out its legislating, war making, and oversight roles. The next Part considers possible reforms to address this problem.