Cyber cooperation and info sharing uniquely challenge oversight.
Lewallen 20 [Jonathan Lewallen, Assistant Professor, University of Tampa; "Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Congress's Oversight Role"; 66 Wayne Law Review 151; Published: 2020; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/waynlr66&div=7&id=&page=; KL]
Members of Congress value position-taking and credit-claiming opportunities, and legislative activity and constituent service tend to provide those opportunities to a greater degree than oversight; legislative action tends to be more visible than all but the highest-profile oversight hearings. 4 0 To the extent that oversight provides clear position-taking opportunities, it does so when either district, state, or party interests are involved. Cybersecurity information sharing may be a case where the lack of a clear partisan dimension hinders the prospects for effective oversight; members of the presidential out-party lack obvious incentives to elevate attention to information sharing by embarrassing the current administration
Another challenge is not necessarily unique to cybersecurity information sharing: how to measure whether oversight activities were successful. The stated congressional policy (as expressed through law) is for agencies to coordinate information exchange about cybersecurity threats with SLTT governments and the private sector. Sharing more information cannot be the end goal because too much information can actually be less helpful.' 4 ' Cybersecurity threats change over time and, thus, so will the specific information about those threats that would need to be shared, which in turn changes some of the appropriate metrics of "success." Is sharing the information alone enough to consider the policy successful, or does that information also have to be timely and acted upon?
One general oversight challenge is specific to information sharing: the information related to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities is to flow between agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector without also flowing to Congress. Legislators already face an information disadvantage relative to the bureaucracy; bureaucrats know more about the policy problems and likely effects of proposed alternatives to a greater degree.' That disadvantage may be exacerbated with cybersecurity information sharing: Congress does not know what information agencies and companies could be but are not sharing. And whereas Congress can rely on constituents, interest groups, and other "fire alarms" to help reduce its information asymmetry for other policies,"' almost by definition these groups do not know what information agencies are not sharing, either. Conversely, the problem definition and uncertainty reduction functions that bureaucracies perform for Congress may suffer because agencies also do not know what threat or vulnerability information the private sector is not sharing. Congress finds itself in a position of promotion-"what can we do to help?"- without knowing what kind of information would be shared with more resources, incentives, and support. And while oversight does not necessarily have to be adversarial, that advocacy position creates a conundrum: Congress can provide positive incentives for participation or improvement but fewer sanctions for non-participation.
Overlapping agency responsibility for cybersecurity generally and information sharing specifically poses another challenge to effective congressional oversight. Multiple agencies may share information about the same cyber vulnerabilities and threats, which then creates confusion about responsibility for both the private sector and for Congress. 1 4 The Department of Health and Human Services played a significant role in notifying the U.S. health care sector about the 2018 "WannaCry" ransomware attack on entities and industries around the world (including the British National Health Service), but some legislators looked to the DHS and Office of Management and Budget for a response in the attack's aftermath.14 1 Overlapping responsibility may also manifest when agencies share information with, or receive information from, an industry outside its traditional substantive jurisdiction, as when the Department of Homeland Security shares vulnerability information about healthcare devices or when the Department of Defense Cyber Command works with the banking sector. 146 Changing technology can make new industries vulnerable and require information sharing in a new domain; the U.S. Farm Credit Administration, for example, recently moved to "cloud computing" and, thus, created new data and system vulnerabilities relevant to cybersecurity information sharing policies and introduced agriculture policy, concerns into the cybersecurity domain.1 47
Overlap in agency responsibility and issue involvement raises questions about who in Congress is responsible for conducting oversight; in the Farm Credit Administration case, would it be the homeland security or the agriculture committees? Both have some claim to jurisdiction, and the resulting competition and turf battles among committees can send conflicting signals to agencies about congressional directives. 148 Legislative turf battles, then, can lead to more agency overlap as committees advocate for the agencies under their jurisdiction to gain authority over cybersecurity information sharing, which in turn would give those committees more policymaking authority in the future. 149