New OCOs through the DoD don’t require congressional authorization or oversight
Bailey 20 [Dr. Christopher E. Bailey is an Associate Professor at the National Intelligence University in Bethesda, Maryland specializing in national security law, international law, and professional ethics. He is also an adjunct instructor in the Master of Science in Cyber Security program at the University of Charleston (West Virginia). Dr. Bailey is licensed to practice law in California and the District of Columbia and is a member of the American Society of International Law. “Offensive Cyberspace Operations: A Gray Area in Congressional Oversight” Boston University International Law Journal https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/builj38&id=253&men_tab=srchresults]//LP
Next, there are new questions about the nature of presidential and congressional oversight. The new statutory authorization allows for a range of offensive cyberspace operations that could be properly characterized as a covert action, but absent executive oversight required, such as is required for a presidential finding and Memorandum of Notification to the Congressional intelligence committees. 50 The new language creates an important change in congressional reporting requirements; the statute provides that "[the Secretary of Defense] shall brief the congressional defense committees about any military activities or operations in cyberspace, including clandestine military activities or operations in cyberspace, occurring during the previous quarter during the quarterly briefing required by section 484 of this title."'5 1 In other words, the DoD and U.S. CYBERCOM can conduct a broader range of offensive cyberspace operations, some which may be construed by an adversary as a hostile or wrongful act in violation of international law, but the Secretary of Defense is no longer constrained by the requirement of a presidential finding, Congressional leadership. In one sense, the 2019 NDAA has a broader requirement for congressional reporting than the covert action statute; the 2019 NDAA does not include a provision that could be used to limit congressional reporting on sensitive military cyber operations to the "gang of eight. '5 4 The traditional controls on uses of force, whether involving covert actions or armed conflict, exist to ensure executive and congressional oversight, as well as political accountability through elections, in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.55 There is a distinct difference between purely defensive actions, which are either responses against an on-going attack or the preparation of capabilities for prospective conflict, and offensive operations that could initiate or escalate a crisis. On one hand, it is true that the DoD experienced difficulties in obtaining mission approval within the executive branch for peacetime cyber operations that involved conduct beyond intelligence collection or a response to an on- going attack. That there has been disagreement over the propriety of certain activities is no doubt a reflection on the unique nature of certain cyber activities and the perhaps unknowable consequences that may result from them. Indeed, the United States has periodically faced intelligence crises resulting from ill- advised operations, such as the 1985-87 Iran-Contra affairs, that had been decided within a limited group of senior officials, without the benefit of interagency review and debate.56 Thus, the short-circuited approval process encapsulated in the 2019 NDAA albeit to intended to facilitate timely responses to on-going attacks is not necessarily a positive development. However, strong presidential control and prior congressional notification perform an important function: they ensure that the United States uses unacknowledged force only in pursuit of "identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States."'5 7 The need to inhibit unintended escalation with a foreign adversary mandates high quality intelligence to minimize the risk of misattribution and collateral damage, as well as tight political control. Now, however, the DoD can conduct a range of offensive cyberspace operations (i.e., "defend forward" 52 prior or contemporaneous reporting to Congress, 53 or even reporting to the senior through "persistent engagement" 58 ) independent of any explicit finding to that effect. The DoD has the authority to conduct a broad range of activities that it may consider "short of hostilities," 59 but ones that an adversary may consider as a hostile or internationally wrongful act.