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Congressional oversight key to successful biotech development

Pallone 16 [Frank Pallone, Jr. was sworn in for his 17th full term in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 3, 2021. Pallone represents New Jersey's Sixth Congressional District, which includes most of Middlesex County as well as the Bayshore and oceanfront areas of Monmouth County. Pallone is the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has one of the broadest jurisdictions of any congressional committee. He has served as Chairman since the beginning of the 116th Congress in 2019 and before that he served as the Committee’s Ranking Member in the 114th and 115th Congresses. The Committee’s jurisdiction includes issues pertaining to health care, energy, environment, commerce, food and drug safety, consumer protection, telecommunications, and the internet. Pallone has held a seat on the Committee since 1993. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg25164/html/CHRG-114hhrg25164.htm]//LP

We need to ensure that this Panel's work does not become yet another undertaking by experts whose recommendations go unanswered. Congressional oversight is key to ensuring that Federal departments and agencies are meeting their mandates and doing so in an effective and efficient way. And therefore, I urge the committee to follow through on the Panel's recommendations by holding not just this session, but a series of hearings to assess the Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to biological threats. I would like to thank our panelists once again for coming and sharing their expertise. I look forward to hearing from each of you about what our Nation can do to improve our biodefense network. Thirdly, there is a major revolution in our understanding of how the biological world works and our ability to manipulate it. The advances in bioscience and biotechnologies should be part of the foundation of U.S. biodefense against both natural and deliberate epidemics. These advances are going to be extremely beneficial to humankind across many different fields that go beyond biomedicine. But it also means that we now have created a world in which there is wide access to advanced biological knowledge and the materials needed to build and disseminate biological weapons. As the Defense Science Board said in 2001, an age ago in terms of scientific advances, there are no technical barriers to nonstate actors, including terrorist groups and lone wolves, carrying out devastating bioattacks that could kill millions and cost billions. But these advances in science and in biotechnology also, for the first time, give us powerful tools that could allow us to prevent and to rapidly detect and quench epidemics, whatever their cause. And I'm going to give you some examples of critical technologies which might help realize the Panel's assertion that innovation is a key ingredient and that dramatic improvements in biodefense are within reach. First of all, the potential destructive power of biological weapons is akin to that of nuclear weapons. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that a kilogram of aerosolized anthrax dropped on Washington, DC, in ideal weather conditions would result in 1 to 3 million deaths. That's about the same toll as a 1-megaton hydrogen bomb. These statements are not based on speculation, but on decades of development and field testing by the U.S. military during the Offensive Biological Weapons program of the United States, which was ended by President Nixon in 1969. We also know that the USSR had a massive secret offensive BW program created after they signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. These were both ambitious, and at least in the case of the U.S., highly successful programs. During the cold war, the U.S. field tested many different bioweapons in realistic conditions, including releases from air, boats, ships, and subways. Declassified U.S. documents from the '60s clearly recognized the strategic power of bioweapons. We do not now know the fate of the Soviet effort. In the half-century since the U.S. ended its Offensive BW program, there has been a revolution in bioscience. Advances in many fields, including pharmacology and aerosol biological, and our ability to read, write, and edit DNA, the code of life, have resulted in tremendous beneficial achievements. But these advances have also meant the global spread of bioknowledge and access to sophisticated biotechnologies. The materials and know-how needed to build a bioweapon have many legitimate uses. These are dual-use technologies, and as the chairman said, this makes the task of collecting intelligence about covert bioweapons programs exceedingly difficult. We are going to see an increase in the tempo of naturally occurring epidemics, which we can talk about in the discussion. I want to end by saying that there are two critical technologies that have not gotten sufficient attention in our biodefense program. The first is rapid diagnostics, upon which we've spent very little money and for which there is a very big market problem that makes it difficult for private companies to pursue diagnostics. And the second is vaccines.

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