Executive constraint is necessary to prevent rights violations
Ng and Gray 21 [Yee-Fui Ng is a Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, and Deputy Director, Australian Centre for Justice Innovation, Monash University. Stephen Gray is a Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University. https://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/07-Ng-Gray.pdf]//LP
In exceptional situations of disaster and crisis, the executive government tends to take a pre-eminent role in managing emergencies and threats to the nation, while the other branches of government, Parliament and the courts, tend to relinquish their robust scrutiny roles, leading to a ‘government by decree’.220 This tendency, coupled with a ‘sophisticated bureaucratic and regulatory state … with the capacity to observe, police and regulate its citizens’, 221 generates great risks for individual rights and liberties. As we are faced with the largest worldwide public health crisis for a century, it is timely to consider what lessons can be gleaned from adopting a long-run historical perspective to major crises involving emergency powers such as wars and pandemics. In times of war, it can be observed that temporary coercive measures have become permanent, or reincarnated in similar forms in other legislation. The external wars with defined boundaries have been reimagined as internal amorphous threats in the form of the ‘War on Terror’, justifying the continuation of broad-ranging executive powers beyond a clearly defined emergency period. These sweeping executive powers have then been strategically deployed by successive governments for unintended purposes: to attack dissidents, protestors, journalists and whistle-blowers. The Second World War has also been used to successfully wrest financial power from the States to the Commonwealth, paving the way to an enduring vertical fiscal imbalance where the States are now permanently beholden to the Commonwealth for the funding of their programmes and policies. Yet wars can be distinguished from pandemics, as national security concerns create a centralising force, where there is a need for a uniform approach and secrecy in the governmental approach, which needs to be concealed from the enemy. In such crises, the ‘national-level executive branch will have access to unique information in the form of intelligence resources and capability assessments’.222 On the other hand, we argue that pandemics create a centrifugal or decentralising force, as information needs to be deployed to the whole of the community, and subnational governments tend to play a strong role in health-care provision. Thus, pandemic regulation requires intergovernmental coordination and cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States, as administration of quarantine is ‘intimately entwined with the state government functions of public health, policing, customs, harbours and marine and government health officers’.223 On that basis, Ginsburg and Versteeg have contended that in crises such as a pandemic – in which information is dispersed, the crisis is slow-moving, and local governments are needed to implement the crisis response – the executive should be structurally more bound, i.e. subject to legal and parliamentary checks and balances, than in national security crises.224 Yet Australia’s modern approach to pandemic regulation displays strong centralising features. From the fledgling federalist efforts during the 1918 Spanish Flu that failed spectacularly, the Commonwealth government has through fiscal dominance and strengthened national federalist arrangements managed to solidify its powers in terms of managing risks of infectious diseases in Australia. This centralisation is exhibited in the information-gathering processes in COVID-19. While Ginsburg and Versteeg contend that there should be decentralisation of information-gathering processes in a pandemic, as valuable information is dispersed amongst public and private actors such as universities, pharmaceutical companies and healthcare providers as to the best health response,225 this has not been the case in Australia. Rather, in Australia, information has been centralised in the form of the Chief Medical Officer in the Commonwealth and States – a medical technocratic response to crisis governance.226 Although it is reasonable in a public health crisis for politicians to defer to medical experts, reliance on such advice needs to be supplemented with greater procedural and legislative safeguards to prevent abuse.227 Further, this technocratic approach may have flow-on effects on the way that Australian courts and legislatures may see their role. For instance, Ginsburg and Versteeg’s empirical study of 106 countries has shown that Australia was in a small minority of democratic countries worldwide ‘where the legislature, courts and subnational units have not (yet) exercised active oversight’ during COVID-19,228 whereas in 82% of countries, there was either legislative involvement, judicial enforcement, or resistance from subnational units. Thus, Australian legislatures and judiciaries have been remarkably acquiescent to the executive government in COVID-19 compared to other democracies worldwide. In terms of individual rights and liberties, a distinction can be made between individual versus population-wide coercive measures. While far-reaching population-wide restrictions tend to be rolled back by governments as soon as possible, as it is not tenable to maintain widespread restrictions on the freedom of association and movement for the whole populace for an extended period, the coercive individual biosecurity measures pose a fundamental threat to individual rights and freedoms. The permissive legislative regime for individual coercive measures that allows biosecurity officials to subject individuals to executive detention and invasive bodily treatments therefore present a significant risk of misuse. There have been cases in Australia and overseas where the power of quarantine has been used by governments for reasons beyond genuine public health concerns, e.g. to target and segregate certain races or vulnerable groups.229 As Mariner, Annas and Parmet observe: ‘Measures like quarantine, surveillance, and behavior control have historically been targeted at people who are already disadvantaged, those on the margins of society, especially immigrants, the poor, and people of color’. 230 For instance, entire ethnic groups were quarantined during the Sydney plagues.231 More recently, in the handling of COVID-19 in Australia, concerns were raised that the hard-line housing commission tower lockdown in Melbourne,232 which confined 3,000 vulnerable individuals to their rooms for 14 days, enforced by a battalion of police that stormed into the housing commission towers immediately during the government announcement. This was seen to be a heavy-handed approach that directly targeted a vulnerable lower socio-economic group, while equivalent outbreaks in affluent areas were not treated in the same way.233 In late 2020, the Victorian Ombudsman found that this ‘hard lockdown’ imposed on residents at the Melbourne public housing tower was in breach of the human rights of those residents, including the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty.234