Congressional oversight over cyber fails
Cordero and Thaw 20 [Carrie Cordero and David Thaw; Member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, CNN legal and national security analyst and professor of law at Georgetown / Professor at the University of Pittsburg in the School of Law with a focus in cybersecurity; “Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight”; January 30, 2020; DOA: 6/24/22; https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rebooting-congressional-cybersecurity-oversight; Lowell-ES]
Currently, existing laws, executive structure, and congressional oversight mechanisms are a mismatch for the nature of the cybersecurity challenges presented by a complex, technologically integrated society. Existing mechanisms for congressional cybersecurity oversight are likewise disjointed and uncoordinated. Unlike in many other policy areas, there is no one clear committee or clear set of committees responsible for cybersecurity issues. These are divided among many committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, often along historical lines that may not match current expertise. The Judiciary committees often encounter cybersecurity issues in the context of surveillance, cybercrime enforcement, and privacy issues. The Armed Services committees are called upon to consider cybersecurity issues when evaluating legislation concerning offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, which are part of the government’s response to counter hostile cyber activities by foreign nation-states. The Intelligence committees engage on cybersecurity activities most recently from the perspective of protecting electoral system infrastructure from foreign influence and malign cyber activities related to foreign interference in democratic processes. And the Homeland Security committees are heavily involved in cybersecurity oversight due to the critical cybersecurity functions that DHS provides in securing the federal government’s civilian networks and in coordinating information sharing between government entities and the private sector. The lack of a coordinating function among these committees limits Congress’ ability to obtain a comprehensive picture of the cybersecurity problem, particularly when these committees advance legislation solely from their own jurisdictions.39
To develop a successful cybersecurity approach, Congress must first be able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the problem. This is challenging, and not just because of the lack of committee coordination. The complex nature of the problem itself, previously illustrated, requires gathering information about the interaction of a large set of actors, economic sectors, and government departments. How would increased organized criminal investigative activities impact the incentives of potential nation-state actors? How would the responses by those foreign actors alter the availability of malicious tools and code to third parties targeting private organizations and individuals? How might proposals to legalize “hacking back” affect adversaries’ incentives to engage in false-flag operations? These are complicated questions spanning many different areas yet attempts to address any one area impact nearly all others. This is no easy challenge for Congress, made worse by the fact that it is happening in real time, and pressure to act is growing on executive agencies Congress must oversee.
Since January 2019, in the 116th Congress, there have been at least 13 hearings involving cybersecurity topics. These 13 hearings have been conducted by seven different congressional committees, including three committees in the House of Representatives and four committees in the Senate. From January 2017 to December 2018, in the 115th Congress, there were at least 56 hearings involving cybersecurity topics. These 56 hearings were conducted by 17 different congressional committees, including eight committees in the House of Representatives and seven committees in the Senate. (See Appendix A for a list of these hearings.) Meanwhile, specific members of Congress have launched the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, mandated by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act and comprised of members from both chambers of Congress, as well as outside experts. The commission is charged with “evaluating divergent approaches to defending the United States in cyberspace and driving consensus toward a comprehensive strategy.”40 The commission’s recommendations for developing this strategy are scheduled to be delivered in a 2020 report.
The lack of committee coordination is only one aspect of the problem, however. There are many different aspects to the cybersecurity problem, most of which are interrelated and equally vulnerable to adversaries who seek to compromise U.S. systems. In other words, attackers don’t care how they get in—only that they do. Their mechanisms do not neatly (or even weakly) follow committee jurisdiction. While the disjointed committee patchwork could be interpreted as an argument for intelligence oversight–style reform of congressional committee structure, this is as deceptively incomplete an answer as is the myth of information sharing or effective increased deterrence through criminal penalty. Because it is precisely the patchwork nature of the problem—which spans questions in national defense, law enforcement, agriculture, energy, transportation, finance, healthcare, manufacturing, consumer protection, and a host of other areas—that makes uncoordinated oversight and legislation challenging at best. At worst, it runs the risk of benefiting adversaries by promoting a false sense of security when problems are addressed in one area at the expense of ignoring another.