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Increased PGMs are vital to continued European stability

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

There are many lessons to be learned from the Ukrainian operations against Russia to date that appear directly applicable to the defense of Estonia and the other Baltic states based on preliminary reports from the fighting in Ukraine. Further lessons will be confirmed over time as analysis and reporting on the conflict continues and solidifies. The successful Ukrainian employment of precision strike capabilities in a highly “asymmetric” operational approach based heavily on the employment of large numbers of small, short- and some medium-range, lethal precision strike weapons in the ground, air, and sea domains could suggest particularly important lessons highly relevant to the defense of other nations, including Baltic and other NATO states. The Ukrainian military has been able to inflict a remarkably high level of attrition on Russian forces by employing large quantities of small, mostly short-range, lethal precision-guided weapons (PGW) that it received from NATO allies and other states.39 These have included very large quantities of anti-tank/vehicle weapons such as Javelins and NLAWs. General Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that as of early April 2022, the U.S. and allies had provided 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine.40 These systems have been particularly useful because of favorable terrain and their ease of use.41 Armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), notably the Turkish TB-2, have proven singularly effective in detecting and destroying Russian tanks and other vehicles and equipment.42 Those aircraft are also able to perform in other roles such as reconnaissance and targeting for ground troops. Similarly, thousands of SHORADS such as Stingers, Starstreaks (UK), and other “Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” (MANPADS) not only inflicted attrition but as importantly “highly unpredictable ground-mobile SAMs complicate the tactical threat picture even more for Russia,” while being highly survivable compared with larger static air defense systems.43 Other types of weapons and supplies such as machine guns and assault rifles, ammunition, and body armor and other protective gear offered by NATO allies and others clearly have been of great utility as well, but it is the PGWs and the ways they have been employed by the Ukrainians that have underpinned the exceptional battlefield results seen to date. The battlefield experience in Ukraine provides but the most recent evidence of the key role of PGWs in modern warfare. It has highlighted the deadly effectiveness and high usage rate of modern precision weapons, particularly shorter-range weapons that are able to operate without a near-real-time targeting network.44 Indeed, the ability to detect and strike targets in near-real-time without the need for sophisticated real-time targeting networks may be the defining characteristic of a shorter-range PGW.45 This has important implications for addressing serious concerns about the resilience of command, control, communications, computer, and ISR (C4ISR) capabilities under attack in wartime.46

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