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Otherwise, Russia escalates – it spillsover

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

Estonia and the Baltics will remain vulnerable to a broad spectrum of Russian threats. Chapter 1 noted the range of Russian threats from the sub-conventional level to a full invasion and occupation. The proximity of the Baltic states to Russia and the disparities between NATO and Russian forces in the region leave the Baltic states vulnerable in a variety of potential scenarios. Accordingly, NATO’s security posture in the Baltic region must move from a focus on forward presence to persistent forward defense, which entails having sufficient combat-ready forces positioned and ready to “fight tonight” to deter and, if necessary, to stop or greatly slow a Russian invasion. NATO and Europe as a whole do not have the option of returning to the pre-2022 European security status quo. The most likely persistent threats are those on the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum, where Russia could employ various “gray zone,” or sub-conventional, measures to attempt to intimidate or coerce Baltic states. Potential operations may try to use the Orthodox religion, Soviet nostalgia, or education and citizenship issues to manipulate Russian-ethnic populations living in strategically relevant areas of the Baltics such as Tallinn, Paldiski, Narva, Riga, or Daugavpils.96 Other scenarios below the threshold of open conflict include the weaponization of migrants, exploitation of natural or man-made disasters, or promotion of social unrest in the Baltics. Russia, however, could also try to provoke repeated reserve mobilizations in the Baltics through limited incursions or provocations in order to impose economic costs, mobilization exhaustion, or create tensions within NATO while also desensitizing indications and warning about possible future Russian operations. Mobilizing in response to any Russian provocation, however small, might risk Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania wearing out the current sense of urgency within the Alliance and could jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of their claims on other Alliance members. Even after recent events in Ukraine, it remains to be seen if and for how long the supposedly greatly heightened threat perceptions in western European NATO members persist.97 The Baltic states themselves, with limited assistance from NATO, are best positioned to counter these sub-conventional threats because they typically require civil and government rather than military responses. Further along the conflict spectrum to conventional military operations, limited air and missile strikes or “pulsed” ground incursions would put the onus on NATO to react or escalate.98 Limited attacks or incursions could create tensions within the alliance between members who want to rapidly escalate and hit back, and members who would prefer other, less risky response measures. These types of attacks would place a premium on air and missile defense capabilities, which the Baltic states do not possess in substantial numbers. Given the potentially high costs of these scenarios to NATO and their relatively low cost to Russia, the Alliance should work to significantly improve the Baltic states’ ability to defend against such Russian provocations. A key question for NATO to consider is the threshold at which point Estonia, the other Baltic states, and/or the Alliance would strike Russian territory in retaliation. A conventional ground invasion to seize and occupy one or more Baltic states is possible. Although it has been the least likely scenario, it is the most dangerous one, and one that NATO must be adequately prepared for. This scenario is especially salient now, given that Russia has actually undertaken exactly such an action against Ukraine. In the event of a similar future invasion, the Baltic states must be able to withstand preliminary Russian attacks and heavily attrite Russian forces as they enter NATO territory and sustain the fight as other NATO forces assemble and move to reinforce the region. Fundamentally, the credibility of the Alliance, both as a military organization and with regard to the Baltic region, rests on its ability to counter Russian threats by reinforcing units and assets, moving its forces rapidly to decisive combat areas, and executing successful conventional military operations to defeat such a Russian invasion. The NATO Alliance must also be prepared to counter these Russian threats in the face of increased nuclear saber-rattling from Russia.

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