The plan prevents escalation in multiple scenarios BUT collaboration with NATO is necessary for proper implementation
Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
Establish stocks of common-use munitions and equipment. NATO and the United States should preposition munitions in the Baltics for use by reinforcing units. These stocks could include anti-tank and anti-air missiles like Javelins and Stinger as well as similar munitions produced by European NATO states, loitering munitions, armed UAS, cannon and rocket artillery munitions, and small arms ammunition. Inventories could also be used to supply and restock the training expenditures of Baltic forces. The cost of a munitions sharing program would be a relatively minor expense for NATO but could save the Baltics valuable training funds to be allocated toward high-priority capabilities or to training facilities for Alliance use or NATO Center of Excellence operations. This would have the dual advantage of enhancing peacetime training while constituting important prepositioned stocks. Ramp up U.S. and European production capacity for G-RAMMs. NATO and other states donated tens of thousands of G-RAMMs such as Stingers, NLAWs, and Javelins to the Ukrainian military, with resultant heavy depletion of their own inventories. Consistent with historical experience, the expenditure rates of those weapons in Ukraine have reportedly been very high. There is currently little surge production capacity, both for replacement of older G-RAMM types such as those sent to Ukraine or for more advanced versions for reasons both of supply chain issues and certain required materials.134 Current estimates are that large replacement orders will not be filled until 2023 or even 2024. Given that such weapons will play an increasingly important role on future combat operations, expanding production capacity should become a high priority for both U.S. and European producers.135 Bolster NATO’s ability to reinforce its eastern front and the Baltic region. NATO and the European Union should further invest in defense infrastructure along the eastern front using programs such as the NATO Security Investment Program, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the Three Seas Initiative. The United States should continue to support improvements to European logistics and training infrastructure through European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding. These projects should focus on NATO’s ability to rapidly move and sustain forces in eastern and northern Europe and might include improvements to airbases, seaports, rail infrastructure, fuel distribution systems, command and control networks, expedient bridging equipment, and hardening of critical nodes. NATO should continue to stress-test reinforcement scenarios in annual exercises and rehearse securing sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea. Several nations bordering the Baltics have ongoing technology and commercialization initiatives to develop and operate uncrewed cargo ships, which may prove vital in contested logistics scenarios. Finally, sealift capacity is a crucial aspect of any U.S. effort to reinforce and defend Europe. Recapitalizing the U.S. sealift force is long overdue and necessary for contingencies in both Europe and other theaters.13