Current ambiguity over US alliance commitments creates division within NATO – the affs military support overcomes those barriers
Anderson and Larson 13 (Justin V. Anderson and Jeffrey A. Larsen 13 {Justin V. Anderson is a Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC in Arlington, VA, providing contract support to government clients on nuclear arms control, deterrence, and WMD proliferation issues. Jeffrey A. Larsen is a Senior Scientist with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Colorado Springs. September 2013. “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy.” https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf)
Trading New York for Hamburg? The U.S. ability to defend Western Europe with nuclear forces capable of deterring a superior conventional opponent (and, in time, a nuclear peer) thus represented the cornerstone of NATO Cold War defense strategies. It was also vital to U.S. efforts to assure each of the alliance’s member states that they enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-armed superpower. With the United States representing far and away the most powerful member of NATO, the cohesion of the alliance depended on member states believing that U.S. political leaders were prepared to put their military forces – and perhaps even their homeland – at risk in order to defend allies on the other side of the Atlantic. As the Soviet Union began developing nuclear forces capable of ranging U.S. cities, however, not all U.S. allies were convinced this was the case. By the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle of France was openly speculating the United States would never trade New York for Hamburg – i.e. it would never risk a Soviet nuclear strike against a major U.S. city in order to protect a vulnerable allied target from an attack by the Warsaw Pact.92 He also argued that NATO was dangerously dependent on the United States and its uncertain (in his mind) nuclear deterrent, effectively ceding sovereign decision-making and national security decisions to American policymakers in Washington. This, he asserted, was extremely dangerous given tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, holding NATO’s European members hostage to decisions in foreign capitals. De Gaulle’s doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to NATO led him to strongly support France’s development of an independent nuclear deterrent. Neither assured destruction nor flexible response appeared credible to him in light of the Soviet Union’s ability to directly threaten the United States with nuclear attack. These doubts and his broader concerns that France’s membership in the alliance hindered its national security and ability to independently engage in Cold War geopolitics informed his decision to withdraw France from the NATO’s military structure in 1966.93 The questions raised by de Gaulle posed a significant challenge to U.S. efforts to assure its European allies as the Soviet Union began to develop ICBMs and other long-range nuclear forces.94 By the late 1960s Moscow possessed a significant edge in conventional forces and appeared capable of credibly threatening the United States, even if its overall numbers of forces were still several years from catching up to the U.S. arsenal. Some allies wondered if an American president would engage in brinkmanship with the Kremlin over Hamburg, Berlin, or other vulnerable areas of the alliance. U.S. domestic politics also contributed to allied unease in the 1960s, with a number of members of Congress voicing their displeasure over what they viewed as a failure of other NATO states to shoulder what they considered a fair share of the burden of defending Europe.95 The loss of one of its strongest members was a blow to NATO, but it remained intact through the end of the Cold War because U.S. leaders clearly demonstrated their willingness to risk blood and treasure on behalf of Germany and other members of NATO. When France’s exit from NATO threatened to leave the alliance homeless and deprive it of a number of key military facilities, the Johnson administration worked to quickly and seamlessly transition NATO’s headquarters from Paris to Brussels and U.S. forces stationed in France to the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. President Lyndon Johnson also used his skills in domestic politicking to head off efforts in the Congress to halve the number of U.S. forces in Europe, and ensured the provision of continued military and economic support to key NATO members.96 Furthermore, for many European allies de Gaulle’s argument that nuclear weapons represented the only true guarantee of national security in the superpower era ultimately solidified their commitment to NATO. Like de Gaulle, they had become convinced of the importance of nuclear deterrence to the defense of their home countries. They differed from de Gaulle, however, in their assessment of the U.S. commitment to their defense. For most NATO states during the Cold War, U.S. conventional and nuclear forces posted to bases on or near their home territory provided a visible demonstration of Washington’s preparedness to fight for Western Europe. In addition, the support of U.S. leaders, beginning with President Eisenhower, for NATO “nuclear sharing” arrangements (which would make certain types of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe available to allies in the event of a major Warsaw Pact attack) also addressed concerns the United States would reserve nuclear forces for use only in defense of its narrow national interests.97 As aptly summarized by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his study The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, most NATO allies during the Cold War “prefer[ed] to live with the known uncertainties of the US nuclear guarantee than with the political and strategic uncertainties of nuclear independence.”98 Despite significant stresses upon the alliance later in the Cold War, after 1966 no other states would defect from NATO, and U.S. nuclear forces would remain the linchpin of NATO defense strategies and plans until the fall of the Berlin Wall. De Gaulle’s defection also raised questions about the role of U.S. extended deterrence strategies within the broader geopolitics of the Cold War. The French president charged that these strategies could actually interfere with the development of stable, productive relations between European states and the Soviet Union. While disagreeing with de Gaulle’s decision to break away from the alliance, other members of NATO agreed the alliance needed to determine its views on the relationship between deterrence and diplomacy during an era of competition between two superpowers and their respective blocs. Recognizing the importance of this relationship to assuring its NATO allies, the Johnson administration supported Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel’s suggestion in late 1966 that the members of the alliance conduct a comprehensive study of its first 20 years and use the results to assess its future military and diplomatic goals. The initiative was recognized as a key effort to rally the alliance in the wake of France’s withdrawal and internal disagreements over whether and how to diplomatically engage the Soviet Union. The report found that the alliance could exercise deterrence and conduct diplomacy at the same time, concluding that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”99 While the Johnson administration would have preferred stronger language in support of deterrence, the report’s findings generally aligned with the president’s conviction that the alliance’s bargaining power was directly linked with its military strength: [a] strong NATO remains essential if we are to reach a solid agreement with the Soviet Union that reflects the common interests of each of the allied nations in peace and security.100 The United States’ endorsement of the report and its unanimous acceptance by the other members of NATO in late 1967 effectively ended questions about the alliance’s viability in the wake of France’s departure. It also addressed allied concerns regarding the superpower relationship. NATO members believed the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the alliance was important to their national security. However, they also wanted the United States to leave the door open for diplomacy with the Soviet Union, arguing that a cold peace with the Soviet bloc was better than a hot war that would destroy Europe. As a result, the willingness of U.S. leaders in the late 1960s and beyond to stake political capital on both the defense of NATO and on diplomacy with the Kremlin was an important component of U.S. assurance strategies during the remainder of the Cold War.