More arms are key to continued deterrence
The Economist 22 – The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a staunchly independent global media and information-services company with intelligent brands for an international audience. (Listening To, "Is the West supplying Ukraine with enough weapons?" Economist, 6-19-2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/19/is-the-west-supplying-ukraine-with-enough-weapons, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)
When the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania visited Kyiv on June 16th, they came bearing gifts. They endorsed Ukraine’s bid to become a candidate for membership of the European Union, a position echoed the following day by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. They also offered full-throated support for Ukraine’s military effort. “We are doing everything so that Ukraine wins this war,” declared Emmanuel Macron, France’s president. And they pledged more of the weapons that Ukraine says it desperately needs to make that happen. Mr Macron vowed to send six more state-of-the-art caesar artillery pieces “in the coming weeks”, on top of the dozen delivered so far. Unwilling to be outshone, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, turned up to Kyiv a day later and promised a big new military-training programme.
Such help is desperately needed. In recent weeks Ukraine has made some gains in southern Kherson province, and on June 17th it claimed to have sunk a Russian vessel reinforcing Snake Island, a small Russian-occupied fortress in the Black Sea. But these are small consolations next to the steady gains that Russia’s army has made in the eastern Donbas region, where fighting is concentrated. Russia now controls two-thirds of Severodonetsk, a town that lies deep in a Ukrainian salient under attack from three sides, with resistance confined to an industrial zone in the west. Russian forces are also making gains west of Severodonetsk around Slovyansk, attacking the same salient from the north.
Rochan Consulting, a firm that tracks the war, says that the settlements of Bohorodychne, Dolyna and Krasnopillya, to the north-west of Slovyansk, are crucial (see map). “It is possible that the Ukrainian defence in this area could collapse if the Russians maintain their pace of ground and artillery attacks,” a recent update stated. Even north-east of Kharkiv, where in May Ukrainian counter-attacks had pushed Russian troops almost back over the border, Vladimir Putin’s troops are on the offensive once again.
One reason for these setbacks is that Russia’s army is concentrating its forces and using them more methodically than it did in the first stage of the conflict—when it attacked along several different axes at the same time, dispensing with some of the rudimentary principles of warfare. Russia also has a big advantage in raw firepower. On June 14th Anna Malyar, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, said that Ukraine was firing 5,000-6,000 shells a day, one-tenth of Russia’s barrage. Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, adds that in some places Ukraine’s artillery is outnumbered ten to one.
Russia is also using long-range rockets, which allow it to strike Ukrainian positions while remaining safe from retaliatory fire. Ukraine is largely out of ammunition for its own Soviet-era Smerch and Uragan rocket-launchers, which can fire much further than conventional artillery. It has also run out of Tochka ballistic missiles. A recent video showed Ukrainian soldiers operating a diy rocket-launcher—an aircraft rocket pod strapped to a truck-towed trailer—revealing both ingenuity and scarcity.
Ukrainian casualties have reached shocking levels. On June 9th Mr Podolyak said that 100-200 Ukrainian soldiers were dying a day, a figure that Mark Milley, America’s top general, described as “in the ballpark” of the Pentagon’s assessments. Ukraine’s call for more arms has thus reached a new intensity. “Today we have about 10% of what Ukraine has stated that we need,” complained Ms Malyar.
On June 15th an American-led group of nearly 50 countries met on the sidelines of a meeting of nato defence ministers in Brussels to co-ordinate assistance to Ukraine (see chart). General Milley and Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, tried to allay Ukraine’s concerns. The country’s appetite was, in one sense, insatiable, suggested Mr Austin, pointing to his own experience in the field: “General Milley and I have been in a number of fights, and when you’re in a fight you can never get enough. You always want more.” Some Western officials hint that what Ukraine demands in public is not the same as what it asks for in private.
In fact Ukraine has got what it wanted—and then some, claimed General Milley. It had asked for ten battalions of artillery and received a dozen, along with half a million rounds of ammunition. It wanted 200 tanks and got 237. The 97,000 anti-tank weapons Ukraine had received were “more…than there are tanks in the world”, he pointed out, though neglecting to mention that they are used against other targets. The speed of support had been “without comparison”—often mere days would elapse between the authorisation of a Ukrainian request and the delivery of a weapon into Ukrainian hands. On the same day as the gathering in Brussels the White House promised $1bn of new weapons, on top of almost $6bn in military aid already supplied.
Further weapons are in the pipeline. Around ten rocket-launchers—American himars and British mlrs—are due to arrive shortly, and the Biden administration is considering whether to send four more. These fire-guided missiles have a range of up to 84km. Some Ukrainian crews have already been trained in Germany, and more are being taught. General Milley said that the quality of these weapons would eventually show on the battlefield: “The Russians are just doing mass fires without necessarily achieving military effect…The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are using much better artillery techniques.” Germany, which has been criticised for its reluctance to send heavy weapons, is also sending mlrs and said on June 14th that it had nearly finished training Ukrainian troops to use the Panzerhaubitze 2000, a potent self-propelled howitzer with a range of 40km.
In public, at least, American and European leaders sound hawkish about sustaining this flow of arms. “We will stay focused on this for as long as it takes,” insisted Mr Austin in Brussels. “As long as necessary, until peace returns to a free and independent Ukraine, we will remain committed,” tweeted Mr Macron. In private, there are doubts. nato countries are clean out of the sort of ammunition needed by Ukraine’s Soviet-era weapons: “It’s gone already in three months,” says one European defence official. “It doesn’t exist anymore.” The plan, to be formalised at a nato summit starting on June 27th, is to help Ukraine’s armed forces switch more fully to nato kit. That is a huge undertaking, and will take time.
Europe’s own stocks of munitions are low, and finding extra workers and components for complex weapons, like the Javelin or Stinger anti-aircraft missile, takes time. Moreover, as countries like Germany and Poland rearm at breakneck pace, demand will outstrip defence manufacturers’ capacity to produce. Shortly before his trip to Kyiv, Mr Macron warned that France had entered a “war economy in which I believe we will find ourselves for a long time”. The 18 caesars that France has sent or promised to Ukraine comprise almost a quarter of the country’s entire stock.
There are other anxieties, too. Insiders say that the fear of escalation among Ukraine’s partners is still constraining the flow of arms. American officials are carefully watching how Ukraine uses its powerful new himars launchers—it has promised not to target Russian soil—and how Russia responds, a policy that risks giving the Kremlin undue influence over future arms supplies. On June 16th Mr Macron repeated his claim, originally made in March, that nato had informally agreed not to provide Ukraine with “certain weapons, such as planes or tanks”—a red line that must presumably refer to Western-made tanks, rather than the ex-Soviet ones given to Ukraine by the Czech Republic and Poland.
America and its European allies have demonstrated extraordinary unity over nearly four months of war. Almost all want to see Ukraine emerge as a secure and sovereign state. But what that means in practice is not always clear, and seems to be shifting over time. In April Mr Austin said that America’s goal was to sap Russia’s strength: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” At a gathering of defence ministers the next day he added, “Ukraine clearly believes that it can win, and so does everyone here.” Last week he was more circumspect, saying cryptically that America’s aim was a “democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine”. Twice America’s defence secretary was asked whether he still wanted Ukraine to win. Twice he ducked the question.