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Hotlines fail

Pape, 14 — Robert A., Pape Professor of Political Science Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism University of Chicago, 2014 (“Establishing a Workable US-China Hotline (CHILINK),” University of Chicago, April 30th, Available Online at http://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/Pape_Policy_Memo.pdf)

In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square protests, President George Bush attempted to contact Deng Xiaoping via phone. There was no hotline in place, and the President’s call was unanswered. This incident highlighted the need for such a hotline to be established. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin announced an agreement to establish a presidential hotline, so that, as President Clinton said, they “may confer on a moment’s notice.” In May 1999, the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Clinton attempted to contact Chinese President Jiang Zemin, but the call was not answered, despite the fact that their presidential hotline had been made operational in 1998. This underscores the difficulty in communicating via any hotline in direct crisis situations. As a further insult to the United States, President Jiang spoke directly with Russian President Boris Yeltsin later that day on the China-Russia hotline. In February 2008 the United States and China signed a formal agreement to establish a new hotline, called the Defense Phone Link, but the agreement was negotiated and signed following 4 talks between David Sedney, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and Chinese defense ministry official Qian Lihua. It has only been used four times. The inadequacies of these hotlines offer key insights into the construction a new hotline proposal. The 2008 hotline agreement with China arranges for a call to be routed through the Zhongnanhai telecommunications directorate, which then chooses to forward the call to the foreign affairs office within of Department of Defense, or the PLA’s command headquarters in West Beijing. The internal Chinese disconnect between the military and civilian personnel makes crisis management very difficult Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that President Hu was unaware that the PLA was carrying out a test flight of a new jet fighter in 2011, an action that could easily be misinterpreted by American foreign policy officials. The new Chinese National Security Council attempts to remedy this disconnect in authority. Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party rules dictate that the Standing Committee vote prior to conveying information to the Americans, making rapid communication between US and Chinese presidents in times of crisis very difficult. China also has a history of cutting communication during times of crisis to demonstrate anger.

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