Here, epistemology and technology converge to create the war assemblage, an economy of mundane war, a slow, unending violence
Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//Eleanor//-ekh-
War as defined by classical war studies suggests a distinct class of actors, interests, aims, and expertise. As a result, the study of war as well as much of the social mobilization of war presumes an exteriority of war and warfare from other sectors and institutions like the economy or the state. For those who study military history, war—in this limited understanding—can certainly be decisive in the rise and fall of nation-states and even transformations of the global system when that system is only indexed by the states that populate it, but the pursuit of these histories still presumes a kind of exceptional character of war. War following this line of thought is a cataclysmic event that interrupts the otherwise normal character of daily life. For others, particularly in the field of strategic studies, warfare is a tool, an instrument whereby states and sometimes organizations pursue ends beyond the limits of politics and persuasion. War compels and determines a course of action as an orchestral direction of overwhelming force. For those who hope to abolish war, a parallel exteriority animates their theorizing about war. War, according to these thinkers, is reducible to the self-interest of hegemonic states, the militarism of soldiers, and the self-amplifying loop of profit and power. Presidents, generals, ceos, arms dealers, and patriots come together to pursue war as an end in itself. Again, those actors and those pursuits are treated as outside the normal realm of human social relations. But what if war is history? What if the very form of life that created, was reinforced by, mutated with, and emerged from the Eurocene is warlike? State-making, territorialization, expansion, annihilation, settlement, and globalization are all warlike relations. I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form of life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy or discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form of life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, a war ecology. I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations—from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to allout combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities for a war metaphor. To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world. The importance of shifting the point of emphasis or break between war and other “big processes” is to emphasize the way collectively making death comes to be its own organizing ecology rather than just an instrumental means for other ecologies, such as racism or sexism or capitalism, that are often more obviously invested in ordering—subordinating orders—than destruction. Furthermore, I do not think, given the extreme level of violence and deprivation necessary to create the global ecology we now inhabit, that it is “a stretch” to call war the constitutive fabric of planetary relations. Instead, war as an intensive difference takes possession of other categories, at which point phase shifts take place in categories like racism or economics. What was the slow, lethal burn of postslavery policing escalates into the fury of outright combat in the streets, a race war in the streets of 1921 Tulsa or the 2015 streets of Baltimore. Even in our sacred texts of democratic theory, the pulsing tributaries of war run throughout descriptions of political formation. John Locke argued with little dispute that slavery was the institutionalization of war.4 And W. E. B. Du Bois said of the process of reconstruction after slavery that war had begun again, and in fact had never ended.5 Do we think that the same could not be said for the vast carceral project directed at black people described so well by Michelle Alexander or Loïc Wacquant?6 The common retort is to ask whether this line of thinking means all forms of killing should be considered war. I think that is a reasonable question. However, I believe that retort actually demonstrates the problem of war in the Eurocene. Take, for instance, the lynching of African Americans after the American Civil War or the routine murder of Native Americans by settlers before the arrival of the American cavalry during the period of westward expansion. Were these killings disparate acts of murder or strategically valuable microevents of war? How would patriarchy’s sadistic continuity and heterogeneous creativity across geography and time survive without the nearly viral practices of domestic violence that suture norms to bruises, scars, and corpses? To exclude the way each micropractice of war—murder—aggregates over time and space into continental scale, slow-motion warfare would significantly impoverish our understanding of the role war plays in the making of global systems. Any one act of brutality could be dismissed on idiosyncratic grounds and attributed to lazy claims about human nature. Or these acts of brutality can be brought into a conceptual jurisdiction of war such that we can get a glimpse of how these seemingly disparate practices of violence resonate, congeal, and order the global system. The historical granularity necessary to prove this seemingly absurd proposition is well beyond the scope of this book. Instead, this chapter and the larger aim of the book try to identify operators or machines in the emergence of war that confound the tried and true questions of sovereignty, security dilemmas, and the increasingly apparent absurdity of circumscribing global political change to the behavior of “great powers” in a rationalist and statecentric sense. The commitment to a world run by the causal agents of states, regimes, and norms (whether thick or thin) appears to me like the Velveteen Rabbit: toys whose straw stuffing is beginning to poke through worn skin and whose button eyes have been long since lost. Unlike the mythic rabbit, there is nothing real for these fetishes to become.7 The first step to understand war as a form of life that is world forming requires building a community of concepts capable of capturing the diversity of relations at work in the making of war. It is a messy inquiry. In recoil from this indiscernible mess, there are those who would rather “un–black box” phenomena by exhaustively identifying all actants or detailing complex processes of social and material change, but these approaches are ill-suited to describing the broader ecology of war. The problem with the desire to explain or un–black box phenomena is that it seduces us to focus on those phenomena on which we think we have the best chance of imposing an artificial autonomy or separation of things and events. Those phenomena that seem to give themselves up to analyzable bits and pieces are prized for publication and research funding. This cult of discreteness has not gotten us very far. Reality does not, as some realist philosophers say in a creepy analogy to butchering, “cut at the joints.”8 Positivism, even the complexity and systems variety, wants an object of inquiry at an instant. In a particularly Whiteheadian moment, Merleau-Ponty responds to the desire for discreteness with disdain: In human existence, then, there is a principle of indetermination, and this indetermination does not merely exist for us . . . from some imperfection in our knowledge. . . . Existence is indeterminate in itself because of its fundamental structure: insofar as existence is the very operation by which something that had no sense takes on sense. . . . Existence has no fortuitous attributes and no content that does not contribute to giving it its form, it does not admit any pure facts in themselves, because it is the movement by which facts are taken up.9 In the attempt to vivisect existence—to reduce to an instant what is process and movement, rhythm and relation—those more subtle connections or resonances whose effects are felt but not discrete are overshadowed by those relationships we can chart and measure. Such an approach circumscribes our thinking rather than allowing it to remain open to the emergence of thought as provoked by a wild world. Domesticated notions of complexity are stand-ins for the merely complicated. Real complexity suggests that there is novelty in the world rather than thinking that novelty is an effect of a complicated process. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that the indeterminate is the “fundamental structure of the world.” Those who see in complexity the mere character of complicatedness invest in that image of complexity the hope for more sophisticated predictive models and desire a mechanistic universe defined by initial conditions.10 For those striving to create positivism 2.0, chance exists as an endangered species to be extinguished once all the data are in. I think this diminishes the creative and chaotic elements of becoming characteristic of ecologies like war, and reinvests the desire for order and control with a false and dangerous telos. The aleatory is reduced to a question of epistemology rather than being seen as a generative principle of the cosmos, giving new confidence to those who would see to make useful predictions or pronouncements upon their models of the world. I admit it is tempting when new scientific discoveries verify our own theoretical belief in thinking that somehow science has finally gotten it right. However, one need only look at what happens when the image of thought founded on this new faux-empiricism combines with the shabby categories of interest and security to see how quickly scientific facts about complexity or quantum physics or networks or sociobiology can be put to use for preventive war and social control.11 In international relations, even insights about uncertainty can become a predictive social scientific method.12 The postcolonies and pockets of peoples surviving settlement are still finding that the “study” of their cultures’ complexities serves the interests of those who would obliterate difference rather than those who would insist on a new pluralism. Anthropologists, sociologists, and economists—all armed with the latest in social-actor-network theory, complexity equations, and advanced social media scraping algorithms—are deployed as part of the subsequent revisions of the Human Terrain System in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chicago, Los Angeles, the Dakota Access Pipeline, Yemen, Mexico, Mali, and back again. Knowledge separated from its ethical considerations is readily weaponized.13 Rapidly scoping from the micro of culture to the macro of the planetary scale, the Eurocene is already transitioning from territorial warfare to geopolitically motivated geoengineering and regional terraforming to institutionalize hegemony geologically while still refining the microscopic collection of data on threats as small as a single person.14 Inspired by the work in early chaos and catastrophe theory, Deleuze and Guattari suggest another path for the pursuit of complexity. Rather than ignore the overwhelming complexity of the world, scientific inquiry can be a way to cope with chaos “defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes.”15 Creative sciences attack the problem of chaos by attributing functions to chaos so that its shifting patterns, orders, and relations can be thought. Functions are a kind of “fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.”16 I want to develop war as something between a function and a concept. I am trying to draw together consistencies by extending out, “building bridges,” and occupying larger zones of components and functions that attempt to slow down, distinguish, and make actual indexible territories of interest, which only appear whole because investigation as a science has imposed a kind of temporary and hesitant “freeze frame.”17 One could become worried that such provisional moments could get mistaken for reality itself, however, with close attention, care for the world, such mistakes are hard to maintain. The relational (in movement-process) and substantive character of the world defies reductionism. Novelist and philosophical tinkerer Tristan Garcia explains the neither/nor of concept object-relations as follows: A thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is in this thing and that in which this thing is. Unless one guarantees this double sense, there are no thinkable things. Every reductionist who claims to deduce that which this or that thing is from that which composes this or that thing only succeeds in dis-solving the very thing that they claim to account for. We attempt to accomplish the exact opposite of this: to guarantee things as invaluable differences embedded in the distribution channels of being of the world. To complete our task, we set out to discover the meaning which circulates among things, between that which composes them and that which they compose, inside or outside us, with or without us.18 War in particular demands this double aspect of things to capture war’s territorializing and deterritorializing tendencies to make and unmake things and be a thing all at the same time. Although throughout the book I take inspiration from new scientific research—examples from neuroscience, physics, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and experimental psychiatry—that inspiration will not be used to build some new, more stable, method of inquiry, but instead I will try to trouble a still pervasive image of the world as law-governed. Therefore, war serves a double movement: it presents itself as an ordering principle or form of ecology despite the frequent conflation between war and chaos, while also undermining the image of the world as one ruled by the laws of a singular transcendental order. Even many postpositivists, particularly interpretivists, of various kinds are unsettled by this kind of open-ended or experimental thought, absurdly big claims, oriented around assemblages, resonances, or systems of thought particularly in the context of war and violence because it means letting go, at least for a moment, of the desire to ascribe blame or culpability—from my perspective, consonant with causality—to particular individuals in time and space. This is a deficit, but it comes with the benefit of elucidating, even if only vaguely, the operators in the generation of technics, affects, peoples, and weak or novel connections in the savage ecologies that often determine, or at least circumscribe, the incipient possibilities of action by the individuals we so desperately want to hold accountable for their failures or vices. Remember Walt Whitman’s words that began this book, “The war—that war so bloody and grim—the war I will henceforth forget—was you and me.” The question in the context of this research is: Why is there so consistently an arrangement of racial supremacy, power, ethics, and violence to prosecute or distribute war and technical-martial logic to support and distribute it? While it is valuable to investigate how leaders can function to amplify conflict, what is striking is how quickly any one leader can be replaced and how little the trajectory of war changes. Following Sloterdijk’s pronouncement on the becoming atmospheric of contemporary warfare, collective violence is saturating every corner of the Earth system, but like carbon, neither the distributors nor distribution of violence is equitable. Saturation is no excuse for universality. There will never be a we that is human as such. And yet there is also no tribe, history of proper names, or nation-state that can bear the responsibility in any meaningful way. Twenty or thirty generations of malicious and sadistic decisions cannot amount to the collective effect of the heterogeneous relations that produced the Eurocene but neither should we let go of the particular forms of life that congealed around an instrumental approach to collective violence that swallowed and then organized peoples, nonhuman peoples, and things throughout Europe and then the regions those people, nonhuman peoples, and things settled. Mapping something like the totality of those actors and relations is impossible and maybe even counterproductive, but tracing the lineages of warfare that came to enable the expansion of the Europeans until they became a “cene,” a geologically and geopolitically significant order, may gather up a swarm of conceptual machines still buzzing through our contemporary moment. Consequently, I am less interested in why once such an institution or assemblage is in place, a leader at a given moment succeeds in making actual the already present virtual tendencies of war. Consider how difficult it is to reconcile our lost hope for Barack Obama with the expected failure of George W. Bush or how quickly the terror over Donald Trump was normalized once the adults from the military stepped in, precisely because foreign policies of each arrangement of leadership are in many ways indistinguishable, particularly from the perspectives of their victims.19 It is not surprising to me, then, that sovereigns make war, or that they take advantage of democratic paradoxes to do so. The problematic that drives this section is how such a complex, mobile, and global ecology of war so closely aligns and adheres to such a seemingly local decision as a sovereign act of violence or declaration of war. One might take a lesson from the electrification of sound. In order to amplify or magnify a sound and preserve the fidelity of a particular harmonic arrangement, one cannot simply “turn up” the volume. It requires a certain interface between the means of amplification, the ambient qualities of the room, the number of people present, and the resonant capabilities of those people, the furniture, the walls, the floor, and the ceiling. Similarly, political decrees or decisions to produce effects must reverberate and interface with complex assemblages of institutions, economies, ethical dispositions, affective discourses, and other machinic operators. From this perspective, sovereign “decisions,” whether by presidents or suicide bombers, appear to be on both sides of the razor’s edge between cause and effect. Such an approach requires, as Deleuze writes, “not so much . . . convincing, as being open about things. Being open is setting out the ‘facts’ not only of a situation, but of a problem. Making visible things that would otherwise remain hidden.”20 So we have a world full of sovereign violence, but the place of a given sovereign in the distribution of that violence remains obscure. What follows is an attempt to flush out the contemporary milieu or ecology of war in its mutational, material, and global tendencies to open up the landscape for something that requires a history. In the following chapter, I return to the specific historical mutations of war that contributed war’s contemporary becoming as a Euro-cum-American facialization of the Eurocene. The sections that follow look for these “loose associations” or different assemblages that may not yet have converged or connected but have tendencies and internal resonances that I think organize war’s various becomings. In particular, I consider the ecology of annihilation that characterizes American practices of warfare now dominant among “great powers.” These parts do not follow one from the other. They are often disjointed in their locations and themes. The hope is that the consistency that does connect them is one of possibility or chance rather than necessity so that the sense of inevitability that often characterizes the analysis of global security is not so easily territorialized for the capture of war. Some connections will appear more obvious than others, but, like other kinds of ecologies, sometimes the connections are merely the happenstance of coinciding; contingency can produce novelty and novelty can be catastrophic and horrifying. From this perspective, I ask what it would mean to consider the driving force of the Eurocene, war, ecologically.