IPR’s hampers pharmaceutical innovation
Giovanni Dosi 21, Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute of Economics at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa. He is the Co-Director of the task forces “Industrial Policy” and “Intellectual Property” at the Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia University “Big pharma and monopoly capitalism: A long-term view”, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.,August 2021, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/247295/1/2021-26.pdf)/maze
Abstract Are IPRs institutions meant to foster innovative activities or conversely to secure appropriation and profitability? Taking stock of a long-term empirical evidence on the pharmaceutical sector in the US, we can hardly support IPRs intended as an innovation rewarding institution. According to our analysis, pharma patents have constituted legal barriers to protect intellectual monopolies rather than an incentive and a reward to innovative efforts. Patenting strategies appear to be quite aggressive in extending knowledge borders and enlarging the space protected from the possibility of infringements. This is also witnessed by the fact that patent applications are very skewed in the covered trade names and patent thickness expands over time. Conversely, the number of patents protecting new drugs approved by the FDA which draw upon government-sponsored research – as such a mark for quality – falls. Firm-level analysis on profitability confirms strong correlation, restricted to listed pharmaceutical firms, between patent portfolio and profit margins.
1 Introduction Two distinctive roles have been attributed to intellectual property rights (IPRs hereafter) by the economic literature, namely, IPRs as incentives to undertake innovative activities and IPRs as forms of appropriation (Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali 2006). As well acknowledged for instance by Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, just to mention the classics, expensive search efforts by profit-motivated agents imply some departure from purely competitive conditions. However, the two crucial issues concern, first, the extent of such a departure, that is the actual or expected extra-profit necessary to trigger innovative search, and, second, the possible monotonicity in the relation between such a departure and the intensity of innovative effort. Such questions are particularly thorny with respect to the scope and breadth of patents. In one perspective, which we may call the incentive view, patents, by restricting the possibility of imitation, grant the innovator a monopoly rent which should motivate ex-ante and compensate ex-post the R&D investment. In the alternative perspective, which we may call the opportunity view, innovative activities are primarily driven by the richness of opportunities of technological advances, while patents represent intellectual barriers to innovation and obstacles to its diffusion. Whether being institutional forms embraced to secure rents or to ensure legitimate profits, both streams recognize patents as creators of intellectual monopolies, even if in the former case they are a necessary evil to drive the “unbound Prometheus” of innovation in capitalist societies, while in the latter case they are primarily a mechanism of generation of unproductive rents. Among all sectors, the pharmaceutical one has been recognised to be one of the most dependent on patents in order to ensure its intellectual monopoly. The reliance of pharma on patents – it is commonly claimed – descends from the very nature of its production activity, based on very low reproduction costs, and facing instead almost exclusively entry costs in terms of knowledge generation. Given the potential easy replication of the knowledge embedded in a product (Dosi and Nelson 2010), patents ensure a temporary exclusive use of such knowledge which would instead be easily acquired by competitors. Additionally, the knowledge embedded into pharmaceutical patents is often discrete and might be well confined into claims, therefore quite apt to be patented (Orsenigo and Sterzi 2010). This work challenges the correspondence between patents and innovation. Let us start by noticing that historical records of drug search (see for instance the monumental history of drug discovery in Sneader (2005)) show that until very recently it has been mainly driven by search heuristics for discovery and experimentation very far from mere appropriation objectives, even when undertaken within corporate laboratories. More specifically, the modern pharmaceutical industry was born – mainly in Germany – under a regime of basically non-existent patent protection and then, after 1877, thrived under a regime of rather weak protection of processes rather than products. Still, the chemical/pharmaceutical oligopolies – later merged in 1925 into one monopolist firm, IG Farben1 – were able to reap hefty profits stemming from the integration of “pure” scientific research in close collaboration with universities, applied product-oriented research, industrialization and scaling-up of production, market penetration, and product diversification. At the turn of the 20th century, the leading German dyestuff companies were paying annual dividends between 18 and 26% (Plumpe 1991). The German chemical/pharmaceutical industry is the first one to enter the era of modern monopoly capitalism. We use this term as a shorthand to mean industrial regimes characterized by a) the visible hand (Chandler 1977) of either few oligopolistic firms, or indeed a monopoly like the one of IG Farben in 1920’s and 1930’s Germany, or of platform firms nowadays; and b) the ability of these oligopolists or monopolist to secure a sustained stream of differential profits/rents. Monopoly capitalism may be either due to complementary assets (Teece 1986) and distinct organizational capabilities (like those just mentioned with reference to the 19th century German chemical industry), or due to the consequences of the extreme increasing returns nature of information-intensive activities (such as those associated with the contemporary platform technologies), or due to the sheer outcome of monopolistic rights over crucial tangible or intangible assets such as patents.